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ABSTRACT
That low productivity is a crucial problem in the Nigerian economy 
is well supported by empirical evidence. Industrial factories fa il to 
produce at optimum. Agriculture, once the prop of the economy,, has 
decreased in importance. Food, consequently in short supply, has become 
disproportionately imported. Hence, food trade debts now increase 
already huge national debts to foreign creditors.
Yet the combined volume of imported and local food does not 
sustain the increasing population. This, sometimes, is at the very basic 
level of subsistence. Therefore, malnutrition and low life  expectancy do 
occur in the economy. These have combined w ith unemployment, 
excessive inflationary trends, and low investment rates. The economy, 
thus, is clearly one under stress. This is basically because i t  is an 
under-producing economy.
The stress on the economy has lingered for a long time. However, 
it  has been most marked in the three decades beginning from the 
Independence year, 1960. Several attempts have been made to analyse 
the problem. Most of these, however, have been neither conclusive nor 
convincing. Sometimes, factors in the innate personality of the worker 
have been posited to account for this problem. At other times, 
indigenous management skills  have been criticized. Additionally, what 
often is described as Nigeria’s 'Economic environment' has been regarded
(V)
as the primary factor responsible for the problem.
The present study provides a d istinctly sociological explanation of 
the problem. Generally, ill-m otivation among Nigerian workers has 
become widely regarded as the prime factor that explains the problem, 
il l motivation among the workers is seen to be due to perceived 
discrepancies between the satisfaction of the workers’ needs and the 
attainment of the goals of their workplaces. It is deemed imperative, 
therefore, to cut a path ensuring that workforce needs and workplace 
goals are simultaneously met Productivity, thus, would rise.
This Path-Goal hypothesis is a point of departure for the approach 
adopted here. The former is regarded as reductionist in maintaining that 
the problem, in all its  complexity, could be solely understood by 
reference to the human need-satisfying nature of Nigerian workers. In 
contrast, the present study emphasizes the need to trace the roots of the 
problem to its  structural sources. It locates these in the conflicts 
between the State Government and Private Capital in Nigeria. It holds 
the contest between the State Government, Private Indigenous Capital 
and Private Foreign Capital for control over the Nigerian economy chiefly 
responsible for low productivity in the economy. Labour, i t  maintains, 
contributes to this problem through its  resistance against attempts to 
impose control over it  by the protagonist State and Private Capital. 
Therefore the problem, it  holds, is not primarily one of an ill-m otivated 
workforce.
(V)
In this frame, Chanter I defines the problem in greater detail. It 
also discusses some earlier approaches to the problem. Chanter II 
examines various general intellectual approaches to the overall 
productivity question. These date from the early productivity studies 
initiated in the U.S. and Britain before the First World War to the recent 
attempt to resolve the problem in Nigeria on the basis of social 
psychology. Chanter 111 is a critique of this social psychological 
approach.
An alternative approach based on an emphasis on the structural 
sources of the problem is given in Chanter IV. This Chapter examines 
some general elements in the Nigerian social structure including: 
Geography, Politics, Religion, and Ethnicity. It stresses the important 
role played by these factors in the Nigerian social structure. However, 
Chanter V argues that the contradictions between the State Government 
and Private Capital are more important than these in understanding the 
Nigerian social structure. Chanter VI underlines the significance of 
structural contradictions particularly for productivity in the economy 
w ith an analysis of the relations between the State and labour. What is 
concluded is that these conflicts and contradictions cause and 
exacerbate low productivity in the economy. Labour is not seen to be 
primarily responsible. Chanter VI1 is a brief summary of this conclusion.
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PART ONE:
PROBLEM OF STUDY
CHAPTER I:
THE PROBLEM OF LOW PRODUCTIVITY IN NIGERIA
A. INTRODUCTION
Human productivity through work has been, for long, a subject, of 
much controversy. Fredrick Taylor’s  ^^  emphasis on the instrumental 
relations between the worker and work tools: Elton Mayo's^V and
Frederick R o e th l is b e rg e r 's ^ )  counter-emphasis on the social relations
between the worker and other workers; as well as Joan Woodward’s ^
emphatic concern w ith the role of technology in productivity give a few 
of the highlights of this seemingly endless controversy. And, 
contemporary economic thought, even in most advanced industrialised 
societies, is s t il l marked by discussion of such phenomena as: the
British Worker Question; perceived loss of social production impetus in 
the US; and, Japan's purported overtaking of both Britain and the US in its  
'peaceful conquest of the world economy.'
One prominent focus in this controversy persists the worker and 
work-behaviour. And on the agenda are such vexed questions as: the 
cumulative effects of management control on the workers; the possible 
effects on productivity of workers' collective attempts to resist this 
control through unionisation; the value-loaded relationships between 
such workers' dissent and patriotism/national interests; and often, the
perceived necessity to goad the worker into specific kinds of required 
behaviour through variants of motivation techniques, into higher rates of 
productivity.
B. NIGERIA: A SPECIAL REFERENCE
Essentially a developing economy, Nigeria is characterised by even 
lower rates of productivity than the industrialised economies in which 
the Issue of productivity has been so widely debated for so long from 
Taylor to Braverman and beyond. Of the three countries in the sub- 
Saharan Africa classified as Middle Income Oil Exporters by the World 
Bank (Nigeria, Cameroon, and Congo People's Republic) for instance, 
Nigeria currently has the least income per capita of $890. Cameroon has 
$1010 while the Congo People's Republic has $910. In life  expectancy, 
Nigeria, again, has the lowest of 51 compared to Cameroon's 56 and 
Congo's 53. On the other hand; of the three countries, Nigeria has the 
highest average annual rate of inflation of 11.6% compared to Cameroon’s 
7.0% and Congo's 10.8%/5 * In 1982, there was a negative balance of 
payments of $1298 m illion which in 1987, however, showed a positive 
balance of $3465 million. .This, of course, would be due more to 
improved sales in crude oil and, possibly too, to the State Government's 
post 1982 fiscal measures aimed at curtailing imports rather than 
increased productivity. Indeed, if  anything, productivity was found to 
decline by 3.5% annually on average between 1983 and 1985.^6 ^
The incidence of low productivity is, perhaps, most clearly 
demonstrated in the Agriculture Sector which in 1960 had contributed
63% of the GDP. This fe ll to 22% in 1982. Hence, of the three middle 
income oil exporting countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria has a 
lower index of food production per capita average of 92 compared to 
Cameroon’s 102, for instance. This means that the Nigerian economy has 
had to rely more increasingly on food imports in the face of a growing 
population coupled w ith frequent drought and crop failure. In fact, the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (Washington) projects an 
approximate 21 m illion metric tonnes of staples imported by 1991 if  the 
calorie and protein requirements of Nigeria are to be met.*7) This food 
trade defic it could, in turn, worsen the balance of payments which 
present estimates place as a positive $3465 million. Indeed, in 
anticipation that this positive estimate would turn negative because of 
current food trade deficit, the World Integrated Model (WIM) projects a 
defic it cumulative balance of $210 billion for the country by the year 
2001.*8 ) Besides, at the end of 1985, Nigeria’s outstanding medium and 
long-term external public debt amounted to $11.5 billion (excluding 
converted trade arrears of $1.7 billion). This amounted to 25% of the 
GDP and because of the rather unreliable outlook of the world oil market 
and the country’s consequently unfavourable repayments profile, much of 
these debts have had to be rescheduled. The significance of this is that 
the consequences of past and present low rates of productivity have, 
even now, been moved forward into the future.
Not much can, therefore, be w ritten in favour of productivity rates 
in Nigeria. This, nevertheless, is in spite of the country's relatively 
abundant natural and human resources. For, its  923,773 square kilometer 
land mass, though subject to leaching in the rainy southernmost 
extremes and drought in the sub-desert northern fringes, yet is generally
4suitable for primary crop production. Barring the interruption of natural 
causes, the cocoa, palm produce, cotton, groundnuts, and rubber 
particularly suited to the soil types, could be so highly produced for 
export that much of the economy's import b ill could be met thereby. Also 
though oil markets have been recently weakened, higher production 
continues to raise export revenues. Tin, coal, diamond, silver, lead and 
columbite, also contained in this land mass, albeit in lower deposits than 
crude oil, are also additional resources. Thus, natural resources are 
relatively abundant in the economy. So also are human resources which 
w ith a population of over 105 m illion*9 ) makes i t  the largest country in 
Africa. Larger than the other 16 West African countries, all in one, and 
one of the eight most populous in the world, its  large population is its  
added strength.
But of greater significance to the potential productive capability 
of the country would be the evident advantageous age distribution of this 
large population. By the World Population Profile estimates (1980), out 
of a then population of 84,732,000 in Nigeria, 48,933,000 (i.e. 48%) were 
below the age of 20 years. Examined w ith the comparable proportions of 
28% for the UK and 32% for the USA, what is indicated is a relatively 
large reservoir of potential productive labour in the Nigerian 
economy.* But of equally great significance is the indication in these 
estimates that the remaining proportion (i.e. 52%) constitutes a large 
active labour force in Nigeria. When the elements comprising retired 
persons, post secondary students, and non-participating members of the 
female population are subtracted, what would be available in the 
economy as an active labour would be a force of about 60 m illion strong. 
This surpasses the total populations of the UK (56.5m); France (55.6m);
seven times that of Sweden (8.3m); and just slightly less than the total 
estimate for West Germany (60.3m).
However, the teasing question remains why in the face of this 
relative plenty Nigeria has for so long remained essentially a low 
producing, undeveloped economy. The low productivity problem must be 
addressed if  Nigeria's essentially undeveloped status is to be understood. 
And as i t  happens, most previous attempts to explain this undeveloped 
status have linked i t  w ith low rates of productivity as w ill become 
evident in what follows.
C. PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM
(i) Early Government Reports And Studies
Probably as early as the nineteen thirties, occasional probes had
been initiated into the problem of low productivity in Nigeria and,
indeed, African economies generally.*11) Constituted mainly of 
Government reports and a few individual studies, these probes chiefly 
dwelt on the image of an African worker who was characterised by "an 
absence of conscious need (and) contentment w ith lit t le ." *12) Being, in 
consequence, prone to high rates of absenteeism and turnover, he was 
seen to be inept at the workplace where he, thus, produced minimally.
A stigma of imperfect performance appeared therefore to have 
been cast on the Nigerian workforce that early. Interestingly though, 
these early reports and studies found l i t t le  scientific basis for
6explaining this perceived imperfect performance on inherited 
imperfections. Rather, it  was stated to be a factor of several primordial 
arrangements prevalent in the Nigerian society among which were:
(a) Traditionally, work aimed at making individual gain was unknown.
(b) Wage labour was targetted towards achieving immediate ends.
(c) Division of labour was lim ited to the two factors of age and sex.
(d) The organisation of work was exclusively dictated by the rhythm 
of the seasons.
Consequently, the earliest understanding of the problem of low 
productivity in the Nigerian economy was causally related to perceived 
unsatisfactory labour performance. As elaborated by the African Labour 
Survey;
It is a fact that by tradition and background, the 
African is singularly ill-adapted for assimilation 
as an effective element in wage economy on 
modern pattern, that the reason that leads him to 
seek wage-paid labour heavily influences his 
attitude to work and his reactions d iffe r widely 
from those of the European worker whose 
background and aims are so different. It has also 
emerged that the African’s work performance is at 
present unsatisfactory in many respects by 
European standards; that in quantity and quality, it  
is often inferior; that the African sometimes lacks 
pride in his work; that he is often unstable and 
restless and prone to absent himself apparently 
without valid reasons.(!3)
Obviously, this line of thought had major shortcomings. Foremost, 
this traditional image of the African worker appears to have been 
primarily based on studies which were lim ited to the period before 1940. 
They were also largely confined to only two regions - the then Union of
7South Africa, and the then Central African Federation. Besides, they 
were equally lim ited to plantation and mine labour. Thus, the construct 
of the 'African worker’ emerging from them and subsequently applied to 
generalise on the Nigerian workforce was based on rather inadequate 
fieldwork. Though as an extrapolation, i t  was of some heuristic value. 
Vet, given the expanse of Africa and the impact of social change on the 
continent, it  is very likely that these findings as Peter Kilby, for 
instance, pointed out, were only of lim ited v a lid ity /1
Remarkably, the organisation of wage labour in Nigeria showed 
some marked differences from the organisation of wage labour in Central 
and Southern Africa - the bases of these early studies. Mine labour was 
dominant in Nigeria during the period as it  was in these areas. But 
plantation labour was virtua lly non-existent. The labourer in the 
Nigerian coal mines was, nevertheless, quite a different category from 
the labourer in the South African mines. Work behaviour of an African in 
a racist South Africa would be expected to be influenced by the 
conditions there. For residential segregation, abject living and working 
conditions (including a colour bar to promotion beyond the semi-skilled 
level) would hardly be any incentives to effic ient work performance.
Even so, that these early studies were inordinately reliant on 
management opinion is a methodological flaw that further undermines 
the valid ity of the traditional construct of 'African worker' extrapolated 
to the Nigerian. This would be so since such management opinions were 
largely based on views of expatriate officers who were often racially 
insulated from the Africans in separate communities. Being, in 
consequence, lim ited by d ifficu lties  of communication and by social
8distance, they could easily have misunderstood the conduct and behaviour 
of the African.
( i i )  Ineffic ien t. Indigenous Supervisory Roles
in a major sense, therefore, Peter Kilby's 'Reconsideration' of the 
productivity problem along lines akin to the above critic ism  in 1961 was 
both timely and unique. Fundamentally disagreeing w ith the traditional 
construct of a restless, imperfect worker, Kilby’s conclusion that 
working conditions were a far more important variable than the 
attitudes and capabilities of workers was a major contribution towards 
understanding the problem. For, based on evidence from 29 
establishments in Nigeria w ith a total of 30,935 workers, he was 
persuaded that a positive correlation existed between wages/hours of 
work, and distance from work, on the one hand, and absence and turnover, 
on the other. But, perhaps, of more Importance was his finding that 
voluntary absence and voluntary turnover were low in these 
establishments. Where, however, they appeared high, he maintained, this 
was either because of low wages or far distance from work. On this 
evidence, therefore, emerged Kilby's important conclusions that Nigerian 
workers' performance at work was more dependent on working conditions 
than on inherent work attitudes.*1 5) -
What is significant is that by making wages, conditions of work, 
and managerial behaviour his primary foci, Kilby had introduced elements 
of scientific management thinking into the understanding of the low 
productivity problem in Nigeria. Thus, in a sense, he had advanced the
9discussion by de-emphasizing those internal factors in the Nigerian 
cultural environment which, hitherto, had served as a primary basis for 
explication. These factors he now (correctly) considered in the f irs t 
approximation as independent variables.
Kilby's consistency w ith scientific management understanding is 
further demonstrated by his preoccupation w ith indigenous supervisory 
roles in his approach to the problem. Through his studies of workers in 
the Nigerian Ports Authority; a privately owned soap factory; and a 
rubber-processing firm, his findings remarkably informed the 
productivity problem in a new way. According to him:
(a) When the proper financial reward is given, Nigerian workers 
maximally exert themselves in the workplace.
(b) The workers excel in simple repetitive operations perhaps becasue 
of their cultural disposition towards rhythm. This transforms 
repetitious work into a mildly satisfying experience.
(c) . The workers perform badly in a complex work that requires co­
ordination.
(d) They perform badly in work that requires specific technical 
training.
(e) The Nigerian is a poor supervisor. This is partly explained by past 
patterns of forced dependence on the European and by poor 
training.^
With a subsequent study of work performance in the West African 
Institute for Oil Palm Research, came Kilby's reinforced view that 
managerial behaviour was a more crucial determinant of productivity in
Nigeria than attitudes and capabilities of workers. As a buttress to this 
viewpoint was his argument that the gains in productivity found in the 
Institute were proximately due to:
(a) A continuing increase in supervision in both its  extent and 
intensity. This was achieved by management pressure on the 
overseers and promotion opportunities of the la tte r to artisan 
pay-scales when their performance so merited.
(b) In the Institute, tasks were enlarged.
(c) Greater incentives, both positive and negative, were given to the 
workers including: promotion, to junior supervisory positions; 
clearer enforcement of penalties for failure to complete tasks; 
and selective dismissals during times of seasonal redundancy.
(d) Improved work methods and better control which contributed to 
increased efficiency.
Above all, however, was Kilby's insistence that the above causes 
were contingent on the more general cause that the management of the 
institute had accumulated experience and had gained an increasing 
awareness of the importance of labour productivity, and in consequence 
had paid greater attention to the problem at the upper level. Hence in the 
final analysis, was Kilby's conclusion that:
Low labour productivity cannot be attributed to 
the attitudes and capabilities of the African 
worker. On the contrary, where low levels of 
output/man prevail, the burden must fa ll on those 
responsible for management and supervision of the 
enterpriser 17)
And finally,
Thus in the final reckoning, it  is not the African 
labourer but his employer who must bear the 
stigma of imperfect performance^ 18)
Remarkably, both the traditional construct of an inept workforce 
and Kilby's opposition to it  indicated the existence of constraints 
against labour productivity in the Nigerian economy. However, the 
singular insight emerging from the Kilby studies was that these 
constraints were less due to workers' inefficiency or lack of sk ill 
endowment than to faulty supervisory management roles. This new 
thrust of course was an echo from W. Hudson's earlier finding in the 
Nigerian economy that, w ith possibly only few exceptions among firm s 
employing over 25 workers, the adequacy of supervisory performance 
was poor.(19) These supervisors, according to Hudson, were often guilty 
of arbitrary and inconsistent treatment of subordinates and showed 
favouritism concerning discipline and promotion along tribal and village 
lines. Consequently, the work performance of the subordinate workers 
'would be sadly wanting. Thus, poor work performance chiefly was a 
function of poor supervisory roles, Apparently, Kilby had followed this 
clue. And after adumbrating it, he largely succeeded in rescuing the low 
productivity problem in Nigeria from its  traditional understanding to a 
more robust explanation based on faulty indigenous supervisory roles. 
This thrust, nevertheless, equally focussed on the personality of the 
Nigerian.
12
Clii) Managerial Incapability
Soon, s t i l l  following the scientific management tradition to a 
large extent, explanations of this problem went beyond a focus on 
indigenous supervisory to more general indigenous management sk ills  
which were adjudged incapable of enhancing productivity.
Concerning the local building industry for instance, G. Akin 
Ogunpola observed that:
Most Nigerian contractors are s t il l to adopt 
sim ilar efficient management control and it  is not 
until they do this that they w ill gain parity w ith 
their expatriate counterparts. Most of the 
contractors lack managerial ability, business 
acumen., and integrity; all of which are 
prerequisites of a successful enterprise.(20)
Again, concerning local entrepreneurship, indigenous management 
skills  were equally indicted for instance by S.l. Edokpai thus:
A typical Nigerian businessman is a man w ith 
many weak parts. He is inadequately equipped 
w ith capital and technical know-how. He is apt to 
imitate known sk ills  and methods but is least 
ingeneous in innovating new ones. He is invariably 
conservative in the ideas of economic change. He 
is low in business morals, greedy for quick returns 
and pompous in living habits. As an entrepreneur, 
his greatest weakness is his organisational 
inertia.(21)
Even Kilby, too, appeared to have up-dated his in itia l focus on 
faulty indigenous supervisory roles to accommodate the wider generality 
of Nigerian indigenous maangement. Hence, eight years after his
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African Labour Productivity Reconsidered (1961). he subsequently 
wrote:
With few exceptions, Nigerian industrialists are 
unwilling to provide continous surveillance of 
their business operations in terms of both physical 
supervision in the factory shop and in utiliz ing the 
principal instruments of management control - 
w ritten records. This disposition is combined 
w ith a general lack of interest in production 
efficiency and in possibilities for improving 
product quality. Nigerian entrepreneurs are 
generally slow to move when their operations h it a
snag Nigerian businessmen are typically unaware
that their managerial performance is in any way 
wanting.(22)
Clearly, therefore, the low productivity problem in Nigeria had 
become explained on the basis of incapable indigenous management 
skills. Against this background, i t  becomes easy to understand why the 
Indians were invited over to help manage the Nigerian railways, for 
instance, in the mid-nineteen seventies. And, also, the sim ilar invitation 
to the Dutch to manage the Nigerian Airways in the same period.
(iv ) The •Economic Environment* Factor
Though clearly prevalent as a mode, of explication, managerial 
incapability was not the sole explanation of low productivity in the 
Nigerian economy as the debate unfolded. Sayre Schatz’s attempt to 
explain the problem through an environmentalist approach provided an 
alternative view. For, while he granted that the managerial incapability 
factor of the conventional view was important, Schatz also held that its  
importance tended to have been exaggerated. Therefore, there was the
14
necessity to examine the role of Nigeria's 'economic environment' in the 
productivity problem.
Emerging from Schatz’s emphasis on the Nigerian 'economic 
environment’ are a number of interesting points. Primarily, Nigeria's 
'economic environment’ was highly unfavourable to productivity. This, 
according to him, involved such problems as the requirement on the part 
of the Nigerian manager to make what he termed, technological, 
organisational, and marketing 'leaps' if  he would attain any increases in 
productivity. To Schatz, the level of technology required in Nigeria often 
changed dramatically; sometimes entailing the adoption of an entirely 
different set of qualitative standards. Problems of this kind, of course, 
are very real if  the changes in the production process of palm oil, for 
instance are taken into consideration. In this, a change from the 
rudimentary hand-press operations to the more technologically complex 
oil m ills required the Nigerian manager involved in the production of 
palm oil to make the kind of dramatic leap identified by Schatz. This 
possibly could lead to an inhibition of productivity; more so, at the 
in itia l stages of transition. Also, the case of Nigerian saw m illing in 
which sawing for export demanded greater control of quality and an 
ab ility to f i l l  large orders in a relatively short notice would sim ilarly 
involve the problem of switching to a different set of qualitative 
standards highlighted by Schatz.
In addition, was Schatz's point that an 'organisational' leap was 
also often necessary. This often involved a change from an enterprise 
personally supervised by an owner on a basis of close personal 
fam ilia rity  w ith all the firm 's operations, to a more complex
15
establishment requiring the use of more modern impersonal management 
techniques and devices.
Furthermore, a leap to new marketing methods also was often 
necessary, according to Schatz, for an expanding firm. The Nigerian 
manager, however, was handicapped in making these leaps by such 
problems as the d ifficu lty  of obtaining suitable capital equipment and 
other inputs; the scarcity of competent personnel; the inadequacy of 
social overhead capital, and the lim ited size of markets, for 
example.(23)
Inherent economic environmental disabilities, therefore, appeared 
to Schatz chiefly responsible for low productivity in the Nigerian 
economy; not managerial incapability. Indeed, in his view, most Nigerian 
managers possessed a high degree of pure personal qualities of 
management; especially, in business. They tended to be highly responsive 
to the possibility of gain, and to pursue economic advantage vigorously 
and strenuously. They were often w illing to seek far and wide and to 
take risks in the quest for profit. And actually, a few of them had 
developed the ab ility  even to organise at a faster rate than the economy 
allowed their enterprises to expand. This view, incidentally; was shared 
by Joseph Stepanek.*24 *
Notwithstanding the apparent cogency in Schatz’s 
environmentalist approach to the low productivity problem, the 
conventional managerial incapability thesis, nevertheless, generally 
retained its prominence in the debate for much longer. G.K. Helleiner, for 
instance, reinforced the conventional position by underlining that since
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expatriate-managed firm s appeared to thrive in the same economic 
environment in which indigenous-managed firms produced poorly, 
"managerial ab ility  and experience may after all explain the 
difference."*2 5 *
Of course, this was not an entirely novel conflict. For long in the 
history of industrial sociology, the effects of the environment on the 
productive capability of organisations in the economy have attracted 
considerable interest. Max Weber (1968) for instance, showed interest 
in this discussion in his historical and comparative studies of the 
effects of social structure on bureaucracy. Also, the work done by 
Bendix (1956) on the relationship between entrepreneurial and 
managerial ideologies and social structure is largely in this vein. And 
notably, the theory of the firm  in economics has also shown interest in 
the relationship of an organisation to its  environment and posits that 
organisational decisions concerning price and output are the results of 
market forces (Stigler, 1966).
Herbert Spencer, in a sense, seems to have provided the 
philosophical background on which the net effects of the task- 
environment of an organisation on that organisation's 
survivability/productivity were based. He had perceived a universal law 
pervading inorganic, organic, and superorganic structures by which 
organisms were naturally selected either to survive or to atrophy by 
their environments. Environments, therefore, d ifferentia lly selected 
organisations, as superorganisms, for survival on the basis of the f i t  
between each organisation and its  environment characteristics.*2 6 * 
This viewpoint particularly emphasised by M.T. Hannan and J.H.
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Freeman/2 7 * probably prompted Schatz to account for Nigeria's low 
productivity problem using environmental, not managerial behavioural 
factors.
However, even before the conventional explanation of the low 
productivity problem in Nigeria based on managerial behaviour, this 
factor had gained some attention elsewhere, especially as an alternative 
to the environmental factor. Indeed, i t  would appear it  had taken 
environmental selection as a point of departure. To its proponents, 
organisations were active systems quite capable of changing as well as 
responding to their environments. And, administrative behaviour 
(especially concrete administrative decision-making) were seen as the 
vehicles of productive change in organisations/28* Besides, 
administrators according to them, manage their environments as well as 
their organisations. And, in fact, the former activ ity could be more 
important than the latter. The environment, therefore, did not constitute 
a major impediment on productivity since it  could be managed the same 
way as the organisation.
In consequence, the managerial behaviour perspective drew 
attention away from the environment to the various criteria  by which 
decisions were made as well as the various observable patterns of 
management style w ithin organisations. Essentially w ith in this 
framework, the Kilby studies on productivity in the Nigerian economy 
seem to have been cast. The Survey Research Centre’s (Michigan, USA) 
emphasis on the precedence of managerial behaviour over environmental 
factors in influencing productivity s im ilia rly  appears w ithin the same 
framework. But of importance is that the major correlate of
productivity identified in these studies was the quality of leadership 
(calibre of management) available to organisations. In a summary 
provided by Katz and Kahn, some of the major conclusions of the studies 
were that the level of productivity achieved in an industry was directly 
related not only to the amount of time spent on supervision by the 
foremen but also on the extent to which the style of leadership was:
(a) general rather than close;
(b) democratic rather than authoritarian;
(c) employee-oriented rather than production-oriented;
(d) • non-punitive rather than punitive.*29)
Thus, arguments emerged against the determinant role of 
environment in productivity. John Child,*30 ) for example, raised three 
such arguments, namely: First, that managers had more autonomy than 
might be inferred from the environmental determinist perspective. It 
would remain true, according to him, that managers could both select 
from a range of viable alternatives compatible w ith the niche which they 
occupied and also choose the type of environment in which they could 
operate. Nigerian businessmen, for instance, could choose to enter or 
leave markets. Thus to Child, there were often a variety of structures in 
a given environment which organisation managers could decide to u tilise  
to their best advantages. Secondly, he pointed out that organisations 
were not always passive recipients of environmental influence but also 
had powers to reshape their environments -  a point also emphasized by 
P.M. Hirsch.*3 *)
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Child’s third argument against environmental determinism was 
that the theories stressing the importance of environment frequently 
blurred the distinction between the characteristics of the environment 
and the perception and evaluation of these characteristics by persons 
within the organisations. This distinction, Child stressed, would not be 
crucial if people always accurately perceived environmental dimensions. 
This, of course, was unlikely and as J.M. Pennings noted, there are only 
minimal correlations between objective and subjective measures even of 
dimensions of organisational s t r u c t u r e . ^ )  child, besides, pointed out 
that since selection was made by the environment according to some 
dimension of fitness, a theorist using this model could, in explaining 
only long-run changes, safely neglect intra-organisational managerial 
processes.
These general arguments against environmental selection 
notwithstanding, the managerial behaviour perspective, in turn, was 
found to contain flaws. While, for instance, managers might be able to 
select and manage their environments, this selection process was found 
open to constraints. Industrial policies, for instance, might constrain 
managers from selecting and managing environments of their 
organisations to the best advantage of such organisations. Besides, the 
expanding role of the government, especially in developing economies, 
might render some environments less manageable than others. Thus in 
Nigeria, for instance, the Federal Government through what has often 
been described as ’federal might' might create the situation in which 
industrial managers could no longer effectively manage their 
organisations or their environments. This would be largely due to the
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government’s sometimes unduly patronising attitude toward some 
organisations. Moreover, w ith particular reference to business 
organisations, potential environments could be excluded by law because 
of funding restrictions or legal barriers to entry.
The controversy between these two approaches apart, both the 
managerial behavioural factor and the economic environmental factor 
evidently addressed the low productivity problem in the Nigerian 
economy w ith greater lucidity and conviction than did the preceding 
traditional construct of an inherently inept indigenous workforce. 
Besides, being based on relevant empirical studies, both approaches were 
also, unlike the earlier approaches, backed up by specific theoretical 
bases. Roughly situated, these would be scientific management and 
environmental determinism. By providing the earliest systematic views 
on this problem, both approaches rightfu lly have become landmarks in the 
interpretation of Nigeria's social-economic world. This would be 
especially so since they provided the bases from which emerged the 
current social psychological explanation of the low productivity problem. 
For analytical convenience, this latest approach would be discussed in 
the next chapter. But it  could be pointed out at this stage that this 
latest approach was, once again, focussed on the 'human nature’ of the 
Nigerian workforce.
D. CONCEPTUALISATION DIFFICULTIES
For as long as the discussion of low productivity in Nigeria has 
existed it  has been d ifficu lt to conceptualise the problem appropriately.
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It has been often unclear whether it  is wage labour alone that is 
unproductive or whether it  is the generality of Nigerian labour, including 
the peasantry.
In the past, in a s tr ic tly  traditional sense, Nigerian labour was 
principally deployed in subsistence-agriculture. Some was deployed in 
some form of cottage industry though. The institution of wage 
employment, however, was introduced at the onset of colonialism. This 
in itse lf was in itia lly  resisted for reasons not separated from the slave 
trade of the recent past. Thus, the colonial government, for instance, 
was constrained to resort to the policy of forced labour to recruit the 
workforce for its railroad constructions. This marked the beginning of 
wage employment in Nigeria since the recruits, though conscripted, were 
paid wages/33)
In time, by 1926, the Government had enlisted as many as 5,800 
employees as established staff. In addition, there were 5,533 skilled 
artisans who also worked for the Government as well as 32,728 
unskilled daily paid l a b o u r e r s . ^ )  gy 1938, 6,784 clerical workers and 
teachers had been enlisted along w ith 900 artisans and 50,000 unskilled 
daily paid l a b o u r e r s . ^ )  These formed the core of employed labour in 
Nigeria whose primary responsibility, generally, was to maintain the 
pax col infca and to promote trade and commerce. This labour core has 
since expanded to include over a m illion public employees who are.paid 
by the respective governments. They include the bureaucratic s ta ff who 
man the m inistries and parastatals, the teachers, the nurses, the 
doctors, technicians and artisans and a host of unskilled staff.
22
As Nigeria's economy became increasingly monetised and some 
elements of the peasantry and craftsmen became proletarianised, the 
industrial wage-earner duly emerged. Employees in this cadre were 
expectedly relatively few in the beginning. Out of an active labour force 
of 8 m illion in 1953, for instance, only 6.7% could be regarded as 
industrial wage-earners.*36 ) With a greater degree of industrialisation, 
nonetheless, this cadre of workers has multiplied many times over and 
diversified into manufacturing, processing, construction, mining, 
quarrying, and others.
When, thus, labour productivity is described as low, the need to 
specify the type of labour in reference becomes necessary. But this has 
never been done. The implication is that low productivity, which indeed 
is a reality in Nigeria, is blamed on the entirety of Nigeria's active 
labour force irrespective of sector and period. This low productivity, 
however, does not seem so absolute. For, as has been remarked by G.K. 
Helleiner, it  is a fact that productivity in pre-colonial and early colonial 
Nigerian economy was relatively low and stagnant.*37) However, this 
was followed by a pronounced economic expansion in the f irs t  three 
decades of the twentieth century due, largely, to increasing British 
influence. Thus, just before the great depression, Nigeria's economy had 
attained an annual growth rate of 8%.*3®)
Behind this growth was an expanding export of cash crops which 
were produced mainly by the Nigerian peasantry using mainly the peasant 
tools of hoe and matchet. A look at what this peasant economy produced 
and exported would make it  unjustifiable to describe its  productivity as 
low. Below are tables showing its  exports of crops during the f ir s t  half
of this century.
TABLE 1.1
Palm Products Exports: Nigeria to Britain 1900-44 (Tons)
Year Total Exports
Palm Oil Palm Kernels
1900-04 53,729 120,778
1905-09 65,177 130,241
1910-14 77,771 174,236
1915-19 80,485 184,567
1920-24 90,352 203,021
1925-29 124,716 255,469
1930-34 141,702 274,584
1935-39 139,000 334,000
1940-44 134,377 320,613
NB: Figures have been averaged for each quinquennium.
Sources: (1) Nigerian Handbook. 1936.
(2) Nigerian Trade Reports 1939-45. Lagos, 
Government Printer.
TABLE 1.2
Cocoa Exports: Nigeria to Britain 1900-44 (Tons)
Year Total Exports
1900-04 305
1905-09 11,67
1910-14 3,857
1915-19 13,887
1920-24 27,276
1925-29 45,483
1930-34 62,948
1935-39 96,000
1940-40 102,376
NB: Figures have been averaged for each quinquennium
Source: (1) Nigerian Handbook 1936.
(2) Nigerian Trade Reports 1939-45. Lagos, 
Government Printer.
IA BLE-1 3.
Cotton Exports: Nigeria to Britain 1900-44 (Tons)
Year Total Cotton Exports
1900-04 132
1905-09 1,383
1910-14 1,884
1915-19 2,112
1920-24 3,980
1925-29 6,038
1930-34 4,594
1935-39 8,332
1940-44 9,913
NB: Figures have been averaged for each quinquennium
Source: (1) Nigerian Handbook. 1936.
(2) Nigerian Trade Reports 1939-45. Lagos. 
Government Printer.
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TABLE 1.4
Groundnut Exports: Nigeria to Britain 1900-44 (Tons)
Year Total Exports
475
531
8,195
41,300
44,278
109,068
188,744
249,600
181,901
NB: Figures have been averaged for each quinquennium
1900-04 
1905-09 
1910-14 
1915-19 
1920-24 
1925-29 
1930-34 
1935-39 
1940-44
Source: (1) Nigerian Handbook. 1936.
(2) Nigerian Trade Reports 1959-45 Laaos. 
Government Printer.
Even the most casual glance at these tables would reveal that the 
volumes of these cash crops consistently increased w ith the years. With 
particluar reference to the global depression years of 1930-34, the 
export of palm oil rose by 16,986 tons against the volume of the previous 
quinquennium. This was in defiance of the depression. The corresponding 
increase in the volume of cocoa was 17,494 tons while that of 
groundnuts was 79,681 tones. It was only the export of cotton that fe ll 
by 1,444 tons.
This notwithstanding, the general impression of productivity 
levels that emerges of the incipient Nigerian economy is a relatively 
high one. Clearly, as argued by Schatz, the price offered by the foreign 
trading companies for the peasants' crops as well as the accompanying 
demand for imported goods induced in those peasants the sp irit of hard 
work to the extent that they were w illing to sacrifice leisure.*-59) The 
consequence was the boom in the export of cash crops which Table 1.5 
(overleaf) showing the cargo vessels from Europe into Nigerian ports 
about that period would substantiate.
That this peasant economy continued to produce highly up to the 
eve of Independence in 1960 is, even so, indicated by the annual growth 
rate of that economy averaged at 5A% in the nineteen fiftie s .*40 ) It 
would become easier to reckon the peasant group as the main source of 
this growth when it  is recalled that large-scale industries were 
v irtua lly non-existent in that economy. Hence, W.A. Lewis' description of 
that group as the 'prime movers’ of Nigeria's economic growth in the 
period.*4 *) However, of all evidences suggesting a relatively high
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TABLE 1.5
Cargo Vessels Entering Nigerian Ports. 1914-38
Total Vessels Registered
In UK
Year Number Tonnage
C000)
Number
i i I 
—i
 
o
8
B
1914 411 722 284 502
1915 290 548 243 521
1917 253 403 196 386
1918 193 310 155 303
1919 269 435 223 400
1920 343 676 245 565
1921-22* 369 741 215 514
1922-23 484 1,0-10 288 670
1923-24 449 1,027 254 610
1924-25 471 1,260 279 757
1925-26 542 1,476 293 838
1926-27 597 1,615 309 907
1927-28 784 1,900 370 969
1928-29 795 1,942 373 985
1929-30 775 1,813 399 916
1930-31 664 1,578 325 733
1931-32 561 1,281 282 635
1932-33 583 1,332 290 643
1933-34 652 1,493 291 669
1934-35 786 1,770 351 838
1935-36 777 1,844 388 863
1936-37 870 2,090 357 960
1937-38 732 1,871 317 903
^Financial year ending 31 st March.
NOTE: Figures for 1916 were not available and shipping returns were 
not released during the war period, 1939-45.
Source: N igerian Blue Book. 1914-38
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productivity amongst the peasants of Nigeria's incipient economy, the 
sterling reserves accruing for Nigeria in London between 1954 and 
1960,provides the strongest conviction. These had- been accumulated 
through the Marketing Boards and for those years, stood at £243.7m; 
£263. 1m; £256m; £243.1m; £231m; £216.5m; and £171.8m
respectively/42  ^ These reserves would underline, even more, the 
productivity of those who were responsible for them when it  is, again, 
recalled that they were created largely independent of external aid. For, 
apart from a £10m loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development for the extension of the railway line to Bornu from Jos 
in 1959, the UK was Nigeria's virtual source of external aid providing a 
total sum of £27m through the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts 
between 1946 and 1958/4^  Therefore, in examining the question of 
productivity of labour in Nigeria, it  becomes d ifficu lt to speak in 
absolute terms. Evidence suggesting that the peasants and, indeed, the 
bulk of those in self-employment produced relatively highly makes it  
mandatory to distinguish this group when characterising the wage- 
earning labour as low producers. Thus, a more rigorous conceptualisation 
of low productivity as it  occurs in Nigeria is called for along these lines.
Of importance, nevertheless, is that the analysis of the low 
productivity question in Nigeria so far has all along emphasized the 
wage-earner. The earliest studies and government reports on the 
productivity of the African worker in general were largely based on this 
cadre. Those studies and reports now appear only to have made the best 
out of a d ifficu lt situation by approaching the concept of productivity 
through incidents of absenteeism and turnover of the workforce. This
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approach evidently was an indirect one probably due to the d ifficu lty  of 
operationalising what productivity would mean, say, in a clerical 
assistant or in a court messenger. Thus, it  was claimed that 
absenteeism represented an impairment of the early Nigerian wage- 
earner's efficiency and, hence, lower productivity. Substantial turnover 
also was taken to mean that the worker could only accumulate minimal 
experience and sk ill in each job before abandoning it. Hence, also, lower 
productivity. It was not considered, however, that absenteeism and 
turnover could themselves have been caused by other conditions in the 
workplace like low wages, long distance from work and long hours of 
work. Besides, these assumed indices of productivity could well have 
been quite lim ited in scope - specially confined to the very unskilled and 
non-essential workers/4 4 * There was, therefore, inadequacy in 
employing them even if they were used compulsorily in an attempt to 
explain a rather d ifficu lt concept. It is worthwhile to point out though 
that in the subsequent Kilby studies, these indices were found low 
amongst the Nigerian Workforce: "very tow when the conditions o f work 
are taken into account " (4 5 * The fault in using them as indirect 
indices, all the same, suggests the d ifficu lty  involved in conceptualising 
the problem these early studies had sought to understand.
When Kilby, in his studies, applied the more direct methods of 
quantifying output as a measure of productivity in the oil palm 
plantation and the rubber processing firm , he could not be said to have 
totally resolved the conceptualisation problem thereby. For, he had 
concentrated on wage-employed labour. The low productivity which he 
found among these workers was, according to him, largely due to 
employment conditions. In this instance, management and supervisory
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functioning/4 6 * However there remained yet other segments of Nigerian 
labour who were subject neither to other management nor external 
supervision. These included for instance, the peasantry who the attempt 
has been made to establish, were chiefly responsible for the boom in 
export crops up to the eve of Independence. The low productivity that 
was found to characterise the wage employees could, therefore, hardly 
apply to them as well in any logical sense. A distinction between wage 
employment and non-wage employment, thus, becomes necessary in 
conceptualising productivity in Nigeria.
This would be equally so when the productivity of self-employed 
craftsmen is considered too; especially prior to the incursion of more 
advanced industrialised production. The very diversity and u t il ity  of 
these crafts tend to suggest a reasonably high rate of productivity 
amongst those that practised them. Cloth weaving and dyeing among the 
Yorubas, for instance, took care of the clothing requirements of the 
economy before cloth became imported. Ironworks of Awka, Bida, and 
lllo rin  sim ilarly provided the iron components of agricultural hoes and 
matchets. Leatherworks among the Hausas and Fulanis of the North were 
also 'large-scale' enough to meet clothing and ancillary needs in 
conjunction w ith local ginning, spinning, and weaving of cotton. The 
argument, nevertheless, is not made of the degree of sophistication of 
these crafts. For, if  anything, hindsight underlines their essential 
elementariness. Yet reports from early missionaries and colonial 
officers agree that these local crafts were relatively diverse and served 
useful local purposes. Though production statis tics are d iff ic u lt to 
summon in defence of the relatively high productivity of those 
craftsmen, yet the magnitude of d ifficu lties  which they had to overcome
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in pursuit of their crafts do indicate productivity in the contribution 
they made to the economy. Communication and transport problems, for 
instance, were real in that economy. The primary means of transport 
was the ‘canoe’ in the coastal and riverine areas; the foot in the forest 
belt, and animals in the grass belt. Various constraints associated w ith 
these means of transport were many, ranging from drowning in the 
precarious canoe journey to savaging by w ild animals in foot journies. 
These notwithstanding, the pre-industrial, non-wage workers generally 
attained a satisfactory ratio between the resources available to them 
and the resulting social outputs in the form of agricultural crops and 
artisan products. These workers, therefore, should be spared the blight 
of low productivity which the wage-earning group, rightly, have 
deserved. The concept of low productivity, thus, needs some 
modifications in the Nigerian context.
E. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK/METHODOLOGICAL 
ASSUMPTIONS_____________ _
Productivity itse lf as a concept, of course, has not been 
universally clear in usage. Perhaps because of the general tendency to 
view it  as obtaining only in a wage employment situation, several 
attempts in defining it  have laid particular emphasis on the employee. 
Robert Sutermeister, for instance, defines it  as "output per wage 
employee-hour. "(47) Focussed in this way, the concept obviously would 
ignore the productivity of categories like the peasant farmer or the local 
craftsman in Nigeria whose production is characterised neither by wages 
nor by s tr ic tly  regulated hours of work. The definition, thus, reflects 
the tendency that has been noted above always to perceive production in
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Nigeria from the point of view of wage-employed labour.
But of greater significance in conceptualising productivity is the 
continuing controversy especially among Economists, on where the 
boundary of what is production should be drawn. Thus, the services of a 
wayside Nigerian barber or even those of a University lecturer could 
sometimes become suspect as aspects of the economy that contribute to 
national production because they are intangible in nature. On the other 
hand, the cocoa and groundnuts of the peasant farmer as well as the hoe 
and matchet of the artisan craftsman, being visible goods/could be seen 
to make tangible contributions to national production. Hence, the farmer 
would appear to be a producer and the barber, a non-producer. This 
controversy ultimately would affect how productivity is conceptualised. 
It would call to question the inclusion of the various activ ities of a 
whole lot of workers which are of a service nature while considering 
productivity. This would be so w ith the services of those who s ta ff the 
Public Service under Government employment. The case of the court 
messenger mentioned earlier may represent an extreme case, yet i t  
would serve to highlight the problem of conceptualising productivity 
peculiar to the tertiary sector of the economy.
Besides, there is often the additional problem of the treatment of 
quality change in productivity. In a typical illustration, Sutermeister 
argues that:
When twenty units were produced by one person in 
one hour last month and 22 identical units are 
produced by one person in one hour today, 
productivity has risen ten per cent. If 20 units 
were produced last month and 20 units of higher 
quality are produced today, productivity has also
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risen although the measurement Is more 
d ifflcu lt.(48 )
Arising, therefore, is the problem of viewing productivity in qualitative 
as well as quantitative-incrementalist terms. The former, nevertheless, 
would appear less measurable. This problem would become even more 
tractable in the case of workers in the tertiary sector whose activ ities 
are already qua lita tive  in nature. Of course, it  may not be d ifficu lt to 
recognise a good yield of cocoa, rubber, or cotton as quantitative 
evidences of increasing productivity. But it  is certainly d iff icu lt to 
perceive qualitative changes in the productivity of the court messenger 
who has been cited earlier. But that any advances made in quality are 
recognised when considering productivity changes is important. 
Otherwise, biases could arise in judging rises and falls. In Nigeria today, 
long-wear ceramic containers are now produced replacing less durable 
ones of yesteryears. More effic ient textile machineries now turn out 
better quality clothing materials. And, modern hoes and matchets have 
become better finished than ever before. Thus, there evidently have been 
qualitative changes in the country’s social products over time. In 
analysing productivity, the recognition of these changes, of course, 
would render productivity an even more d ifficu lt term to conceptualise. 
This contributes to its  inherent conceptual unclarity.
Face to face w ith these d ifficu lties, the present study adopts a 
broad conceptualisation of productivity that goes beyond a focus on the 
wage-employee to include the entire Nigerian producers and how they 
adjust to productive changes in methods and organisation of work in 
Nigeria. This would accommodate not just wage-employment but also 
non-wage employment. It becomes a measure of the total efficacy of
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manpower utilisation in Nigeria over time which itse lf, is taken to 
result from the combined effects of a number of interrelated elements. 
These include sk ill and e ffo rt of Nigerian workers; quantities and 
qualities of equipment they use; efficacity of management and 
supervisory functioning; issues of control, dissent, and labour relations 
generally, and the role of the bureaucratic state in national production in 
Nigeria. Essentially, this approach to conceptualising the problem is an 
indirect one. This is a result of the inherent d ifficu lty  of defining the 
concept which Theo Nichols, in particular, has underlined in The British  
Worker Question ( 1986: pp.95-144).
The cumulative output of goods and services is considered to 
depend largely on the intensity w ith which Nigerian producers exert their 
organic abilities at work. This means their ability and preparedness to 
exercise effort.
Traditionally, this ab ility and preparedness were considered low 
in the past largely because of several constraints which the Nigerian 
cultural inheritance was perceived to bear against wage labour. Hence, 
the African Labour Survey’s image of the Nigerian wage earner who is 
"singularly ill-adapted for assimilation as an effective element in a 
wage economy on the modern pattern" Significantly, that Survey 
perceived minimal e ffort only in Nigeria’s employed wage labour 
category; not in the entirety of Nigeria’s workforce.
In contrast, the Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
perceived the industrial e ffort of the same labour category as good on 
the basis of findings from a number of industries ranging from cement to
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tyres. On the Intensity of work-effort that Nigerian employees put into 
the*cement industry, for instance, i t  argues:
At the cement works in Ewekoro in Western 
Nigeria, it  has been reported that the f i lte r  press 
machine was the same in Nigeria as that in an 
associated company in the UK. In both countries, 4 
presses are run by 4 operators and each operator 
undertakes 16 processes. Most of the operators in 
Nigeria are illite ra tes who were trained in Yoruba 
for a period of 3 weeks. It was observed that their 
productivity was exactly equal to and sometimes 
better than that of their UK counterparts, in a 
timed operation requiring regularity of sequence 
rather than sk ill.(49)
The two conclusions though contradictory, nevertheless, leave the 
d ifficu lty  of determining the extent to which the ’minimal effort' or the 
'good e ffo rt’ of Nigeria's employed wage labour could be extended to 
cover the generality of Nigerian producers who are affected by differing 
conditions of work. Effort, therefore, clearly is dependent on the other 
factors earlier outlined including equipment of work used, management 
and supervision, issues of control and dissent and most importantly, the 
role of Government.
It is true the Government's chief economic role in the country has 
often been characterised as merely compradorial^50  ^ This has created 
the image of a government whose primary economic role has been the 
facilita tion of foreign capital influence in the economy. Therefore, the 
best it  could ever do would be to establish, where it  could, profitable 
niches within the foreign dominated economy for relatively less 
important indigenous public and private investment. Its role in the 
crucial question of productivity would, therefore, appear peripheral.
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This is, nevertheless, incorrect. Indeed from its acceptance of the 
Report of the Advisory Committee in Aids to African Businessmen of 
1959 to its present-day attempts to 'structurally adjust' the Nigerian 
economy in line w ith IMF recommendations, the Nigerian Government has 
been largely at the centre of Nigeria's low productivity problem. 
Besides, as the largest single employer of the most important single 
factor of this low productivity, its relationships w ith this factor (i.e. 
labour) do influence the la tter and its  conduct of social production. 
Thus, Government's role in the low productivity question is a vita l one 
which the present study takes as a particular point of interest. The 
patterns of control and dissent that characterise the Government's 
relationship w ith labour in the business of social production are factors 
of productivity which though ignored in past analyses are so crucial that 
they are highlighted by the present study.
Importantly, too, the subject of low productivity is a shared 
concern amongst the social sciences. In economies, besides the problem 
of defining the concept, production generally is a major concern. 
Psychology also has attempted to understand the issue generally by 
reference to human nature; the needs associated w ith that nature, and 
motivation. The present study freely draws from the strands of thought 
associated w ith these disciplines. From labour economics for instance, 
it  draws attention to F.H. Harbison’s classification of labour in 
developing economies in its classification of the Nigerian labour. And in 
psyuchology, it  critiques the need paradigm associated w ith Abraham 
Maslow and Fredrick Herzeberg.
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In spite of this interdisciplinary character, however, the study 
lays emphasis on a sociological understanding of the problem. This is 
based on the conflicts and contradictions amongst categories in the 
Nigerian social structure. While acknowledging the particular relations 
which the governments in the respective 21 states have w ith private 
capitalist classes, the focus in this thesis is on the relations between 
these classes and the Nigerial Federal Government. The term ’State' as 
used in the study, therefore, pertains to that government.
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CHAPTER II: 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES
A. EARLY PRODUCTIVITY STUDIES
The d ifficu lties  surrounding the conceptualisation of productivity 
notwithstanding, considerable attention has been paid to Its study. It Is 
possible to date the earliest Interests in It as a study back to the period 
before the First World War w ith the publication of Josephine Goldmark's 
Fatigue and Efficiency in America; and in Britain, w ith the 
appointment of the Committee on 'Fatigue from the Economic 
Standpoint'.* 1*
During the war, enquiry into the lim its  of productivity was 
urgently pushed forward by the Health of Munition Workers' Committee 
appointed by Lloyd George in 1915 and in America (as soon as she entered 
the war) by the US Public Health Service. The results of these enquiries 
were published between 1916 and 1924 in two reports of the British 
Association, twenty one memoranda of the Health of Munition Workers' 
Committee, Bulletin 106 of the US Public Health Service, Vernon's 
Industrial Fatigue and Efficiency, and Florence’s Economics of Fatigue 
and Unrest.*2 *
However, these enquiries were mainly concerned w ith the effect
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of hours and physical conditions of work on particular kinds of jobs. 
Hence, their emphasis on fatigue, physical health, and the lim its  to the 
capacity of labour. Florence, for instance, gave separate hour by hour 
work and accident curves for different types of work and analysed all the 
jobs in a giant factory according to the part played by the human 
operator.
Between the wars, interest in productivity studies shifted 
emphasis from these concerns to the very nature of people as workers 
and the implications this had for their efficiency and productivity. Two 
strands of these attempts to analyse the productivity of the workman 
based on an understanding of 'human nature' include scientific  
management and self actualisation. Though both are quite opposed in 
underlying sentiment and assumptions about 'human nature', yet they 
represent a style of thinking about work which prescribes to managers 
how best to organise jobs based on what they understand the nature of 
the individual worker to constitute. However, before delving deeper into 
the impact of these strands on the productivity question, it  is plausible 
to preface this w ith the various influences on the question from the key 
founding fathers of sociology.
B. LEGACIES OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT ON THE
PRODUCTIVITY PROBLEM_______________________________
I Emile Durkheim
Often described as the sociologist par excellence, Durkheim 
provides an invaluable basis for understanding productivity in the
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workplace. His key idea is his stress on the primacy of the community 
over the individual. Amongst a community of workers, therefore, the 
problem of productivity should be approached by examining the existing 
patterns of relationships rather than the individual worker and, perhaps, 
his needs. In this methodological opposition to psychological 
reductionism, Durkheim provides the theoretical underpinning for the 
human relations thinking and its emphasis on the social system of which 
individuals form only a part. Much of the factory social systems thinking 
on the productivity question therefore retains roots in Durkheim to whom 
industrialism w ith the associated rise of a whole new set of tasks 
represents a progressive force. This progression, to Durkheim, lies 
mainly on the basis which societal division of labour provides for new 
forms of social solidarity and cooperation. The ensuing harmony can, 
thus, promote industrial efficiency and, hence, productivity.
Furthermore, Durkheim’s idea that a workplace organisation can be 
based on a 'web of rules' and consensus of values also influences the 
contemporary concept of harmonious socio-technical system which can 
also enhance productivity *3)
However, excessive specialisation or egoism and self-in terest 
which Durkheim saw developing in the European societies of his time can 
result in a disruptive loss of meaning. This would produce anomie which, 
if found in a workplace, can be detrimental to productivity. Through his 
ideas on division of labour, consensus, and rules, Durkheim has, thus, 
made a lasting impact on the understanding of productivity.
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II Karl Marx
Marx assumes that human beings achieve the fullness of their 
humanity through their labour. Indeed to him, the human world is created 
through the labour process. Productivity is, of course, the goal of this 
process which under capitalism is dominated by the owner of capital to 
whom the worker sells his labour power. Resulting is an unequal 
relationship in which the owner of capital always has sufficient means 
of subsistence whilst the wage-worker is dependent on work being 
available to him.
Besides, the owner of capital requires the worker to do more work 
than he would need to meet his needs. Since he extracts surplus value in 
this way, the capital owner exploits the worker. In the end, work under 
capitalism would not allow the worker the creative fu lfilm ent which 
labour could potentially give him. Again, since the worker does not use 
tools and materials which are his own, and since he neither controls the 
products of his labour any more than the methods which he applies in 
work, he cannot achieve his potential self-realisation. He is, thus, 
alienated. 1
Interesting in Marx’s analysis, though, is that in the capital 
owner’s compulsive search for profit, productivity is attained in the 
workplace. This, however, is at a cost to an expropriated, alienated 
labour. With these concepts of labour process, alienation, exploitation, 
and class, Marx makes a major contribution to social science 
understanding of productivity. There is li t t le  doubt that much of the 
discussion that has been contributed by Blauner and Braverman in
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particular and the whole range of reactions they have evoked have 
themselves been reactions to Marx. His contribution to the productivity 
question however appears problematic probably because of his rather 
ambitious attempt to merge theory and practice in social science in the 
bold political campaign for action.
I l l  Max Weber
Generally, Weber attempts to f i l l  out the one-sidedness that 
seems evident in some Marxian thinking. He especially attempts to 
separate scientific analysis from political interpretation and advocacy 
that Marxism entails. But his primary contribution to the productivity 
question can best be seen in his ideas on bureaucratization. To him; this 
process is endemic to industrialised societies. And, industrial 
efficiency indicated by high productivity is a function of the level of 
rationalisation of the bureaucracy.
Weber’s insight on the effic ient productive bureaucracy can, 
nevertheless, be best appraised by briefly examining his general theory 
of power and domination w ithin which the former is lodged. Power to 
him, is the probability that an actor w ithin a social relationship w ill be 
in a position to carry out his own w ill despite resistance, regardless of 
the basis on which this probability lies. This concept of power can be 
distinguished from that of domination. The la tte r involves the use of 
power but can be really expressed as a special type of power 
relationship. This is the relationship in which the individual who is able 
to carry out his w ill (the ruler) feels and believes he has the right to 
exercise power. This concept further denotes that the individuals below
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the ruling individual feel and believe that it  is their unquestioning duty 
to obey the wishes and demands of the ruler, in a power relationship of 
this kind, therefore, both rulers and ruled legitimate the actions of one 
another, in some situations, domination of one by another can be 
exercised in a conflict-free situation because of the legitimation of the 
actions of the ruler by the ruled. Placed in perspective, the productivity 
question becomes the central problem of legitimating the apparent 
domination of the workplace by management.
Weber, however, extends this logic by explaining that many 
situations of domination occur when a small number of individuals 
exercise power over a large number of individuals. When a situation like 
this arises, the need also arises for some kind of organisation to evolve. 
With this organisation, there must be what Weber calls an 
administrative class associated w ith it. This administrative class is 
responsible for carrying out the orders and instructions of the rulers at 
the highest level. Furthermore, it  is responsible for acting as a 
communications link between the rulers and the ruled.
On the basis of these arguments, Weber produces a typology of 
domination. The types given, however, remain rarely found in pure form 
in the world of reality. Distinguished by three types of legitimation, 
each type corresponds to a particular administrative apparatus in which 
domination operates. These are the Weberian traditional, charismatic, 
and legal-rational types of domination.
it  is Weber's legal-rational type of domination that brings into 
real focus the forms and functions of the bureaucracy which he explains
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(in its  most rational character) engenders efficiency and productivity. 
Individuals in the light of this type of domination have a sense of 
rightness about the way things are conducted w ithin the framework of an 
established legal system. In a workplace, for instance, laws and 
procedures are stated (ideally in w ritten form) to ensure that methods of 
working, degree of authority, etc. are legitimated by both management 
and workforce. Both sides of the power relationship have to agree that 
the procedure for working w ith specified methods has been followed in 
the correct manner: that is, that the procedure has been legitimated. The 
manager himself is part of this legal procedure. He exercises power in 
the workplace as a result of going through the correct procedure. 
Bureaucratic rules also provide more than an indication of the way in 
which relations are to be conducted in the workplace. They also 
rationally lay down the hierarchy of the place in terms of the number of 
levels of control, the authority of each position in the hierarchy, and the 
span of control of each individual in the organisation.
This ideal type of bureaucracy, therefore, was Max Weber’s 
proposition for confronting the problem of industrial inefficiency and 
low productivity. It is his primary input into the discussion of 
productivity in the workplace. His formulation of the problem comes 
under criticism  especially from psychologists because of his apparent 
failure to take account of 'human needs’ in his analysis. These needs 
seen to be expressed in the informal patterns of behaviour, form the 
central concern of some of the f irs t systematic studies of productivity; 
for instance, the Hawthorne experiments. And by appearing to disregard 
these informal aspects of the workplace, Weber would seem to his 
critics  to have considered only a fraction of the problem. In its  most
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extreme form, W.G. Bennis expresses these sentiments by attributing to 
Weber a view of '!organisations as i f  they existed without people"
These critic ism s notwithstanding, Weber's emphasis on 
systematically ordered and routinized jobs placed under managerial 
control remains central to the discussion of the productivity question. 
Especially so, in respect of the vexed issue of control. But in neglecting 
this crucial issue, the various ’human nature' based approaches to the 
question have been inherently inadequate in providing sociological 
insight. These approaches are now briefly discussed below.
C. SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
The nature of the workman captured by this strand is basically an 
economic man, a self-seeking, non-social individual who prefers 
management doing all the Job-related thinking for him. Given this, the 
question of productivity essentially revolves round management 
functioning. Management simply has to work out the most effic ient way 
of organising work and then tie  the monetary rewards of the work to the 
level of output achieved by the individual. This approach would ensure a 
productivity that is beneficial to both employer and employee. In theory, 
therefore, i t  would represent a jo in t venture of management and workers 
to the mutual benefit of both. If production problems arise, they could be 
solved either by altering the technology of work or by modifying the 
wage incentive programme.
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Evidently, scientific management focusses too narrowly on the 
psychology of the individual worker. Of course, there are reasonable 
bases to doubt the image of the manipulate, insular, reward-seeking 
worker that it  presents. A worker in Nigeria, for instance, would not 
react to management’s work incentives precisely in the manner of 
Skinner’s pigeons. Such a worker would not simply produce highly 
because of economic rewards only. The various factors mentioned in the 
preceding chapter including: level of sk ill and effort, quality of 
equipment, labour relations, as well as the management factor (which 
has been emphasized) would clearly interact as determining factors for 
work-outcome. Thus, scientific management tends to ignore the various 
social, political, and cultural dimensions of w ork-life  and the range of 
possible effects these may have on productivity.
However, it  was singularly an innovation in the discussion of the 
productivity problem. For, against the backdrop of the traditional view 
on work (particularly in the 'home industries' before the industrial 
Revolution) its  prescriptions certainly are a classic. In the preceding 
patterns of organising work, the relationship between the worker and his 
employer, for instance, had been largely clientelistic. The ’patron’ 
employer had ensured that his ’c lient’ worker toiled hard and for long 
hours by using sheer physical and/or financial punishment. Productivity, 
thus, was forcefully ensured through intimidation.
With scientific management, however, workers or more 
specifically, ’good’ workers are seen as pursuing their own best economic 
interests. By recognising the interests of the workers, the new system
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accords them a certain boom. This notwithstanding, the approach 
certainly rests on several questionable assumptions about the nature of 
human beings, it  sees workers as typically lazy; often dishonest; dull; 
and most of all, mercenary. To get them into the factories and to keep 
them there, management has to pay a 'decent' wage thus outbidding 
alternative forms of livelihood like farming and craft. To get workers 
into maximum producitivity, tasks are to be simple and repetitive; 
output controls are to be externally set and workers are to be paid 
bonuses for beating their quotas. Management's task is, then, to 
supervise workers to ensure that they meet their production quotas and 
adhere to company rules. Therefore, for a price, workers are seen as 
prepared to tolerate the routinized, highly fractionated jobs of the 
factory. In this way, productivity according to scientific management 
would be ensured.
D. SELF ACTUAL 1 SAT I ON
The self actualisation approach/however, considers the scientific  
management understanding of human nature and its  implications fo r 
productivity as unenlightened. As labelled by a foremost proponent of 
self actualisation, Douglas McGregor, the scientific management
characterisation of human nature is an X theory. Essentially
unsatisfactory as an explanation of human nature, this theory is replaced 
by a Y theory in the self actualisation approach. The new theory takes 
the contrary view that human beings are not lazy; they naturally like
work and, therefore, do not avoid it. They are capable of taking
responsibility and, therefore, can participate in making and executing
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decisions at work. They prefer to exercise self-control and se lf- 
discipline, therefore, there Is li t t le  need for management to coerce 
them into maximum productivity.
The new approach, besides, sees scientific management as over­
emphasizing the economic seeking nature of workers, neglecting, thus, an 
essential social component. The approach points out the necessity of 
considering the ’whole person' on the job; particularly, a ’social man’ who 
seeks satisfaction primarily as a member of a stable work group which 
has interdependent job roles. To routinize tasks as scientific  
management does, therefore, would reduce the possibilities of finding 
satisfaction in the task itself. Consequently, workers would begin to 
seek satisfaction elsewhere. This failure to treat workers as human 
beings would cause low morale, poor craftsmanship, unresponsiveness, 
confusion, and low productivity. The worker in Rose’s assessment, would 
become ".....amonstrosity: a greedy machine, indifferent to its  own pain 
and ioneliness once given the opportunity to maim and isolate 
itse lf
The new approach also argues that workers have other incentives 
that could generate productivity and when considered, money was seen as 
the least significant motivoator.^6  ^ And since the ’carrot and stick' 
philosophy that forms the main basis of scientific management depends 
highly on a view of workers who are isolated individuals in search of 
economic ends rather than social beings engaged in and deriving 
satisfaction from their interaction w ith workmates, it  becomes of 
doubtful validity.
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Self actualisation, therefore, centres its  arguments on the view of 
a ’social man’ who primarily seeks satisfaction by membership of stable 
work groups. The lesson for management in worker productivity is thus 
quite clear: rather than operating on 'atomised economic automations', 
work through the small group by encouraging its  members to develop 
favourable views of their situation and by avoiding creating a sense of 
frustration and threat.
In line w ith the above thought various techniques of enhancing 
worker productivity are suggested such as: 'expressive supervision' and 
’worker-participation' which would promote a climate of good human 
relations in which work groups could usefully function. Emphasized, 
therefore, is a strong social consideration in the attempt to understand 
the problem of productivity among workers. Improved social sk ills  of 
management thus become the missing key to efficiency and productivity. 
Management is seen to have a responsibility to make employees feel 
useful and important on the job, to provide recognition and generally, to 
facilita te  the satisfaction of workers' social needs.
These social needs, in any case, represent only a part of the needs 
that Abraham Maslow arranges in a hierarchy of importance as cherished 
and pursued in human nature. The physiological one at the basal level, 
followed by the safety, the social, the esteem, and the self actualisation 
needs in that rank order.^* The self actualisation approach adopts this 
model to stress that motivation factors (embodied in higher level needs 
like recognition and responsibility) in conjunction w ith 'hygiene factors' 
(embodied in lower level needs like salary and status) are crucial to the 
attainment of worker productivity.*®* Productivity at work, therefore,
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becomes dependent on a graded satisfaction of these needs.
Unhappily though, the self actualisation recommendations have not 
always been found to leave their desired effects on work satisfaction 
and p ro d u c tiv ity .^  Factors like inter-worker communication which are 
particularly emphasized, would seem to be dependent on more basic 
structural and cultural factors which, in any case, are central to 
sociological analyses. Structured relations of power w ithin the 
organisation, for instance, can affect the way inter-worker 
communication functions as a factor of productiviy. Self actualisation, 
however, de-emphasizes this factor. H.L. Wilensky, for instance, found 
hardly any evidence of the degree of union militancy, class 
identification, or mobility aspirations of the persons studied in the 
Hawthorne experiment And, he was quite right in saying of the 
Hawthorne experiments, that
The effect of participation programmes might be 
different w ith young rural girls on their f irs t jobs 
in a small pyjama factory than on hard-bitten men 
w ith long industrial experience and identification 
w ith the working class and for a strong union.C 10)
Besides, self actualisation retains the management bias of 
scientific management in spite of its  recommended worker participation 
since the emphasis is on the creation of the social conditions through 
which management could successfully engineer the simultaneous 
attainment of productivity and the satisfaction of workers’ needs. In its  
attempt to rectify  the machine-centred recommendations of scientific  
management, though, it  ignores the role of technology in productivity -  a 
role which the technological implications approach emphasizes in yet 
another major contribution to the discussion of the productivity problem.
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E. THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS APPROACH
In its  attempt to come to terms w ith the basic problem of 
productivity, the new emphasis on the role of Instruments of work would 
represent social science’s f irs t  major breakthrough towards a d istinctly 
sociological analysis. The previous approaches w ith .a focus on the 
assumed needs of workers: sometimes concentrating on economic needs 
and at other times, on social needs, were largely psychological and 
seemed to presume that the satisfaction of workers’ needs always would 
lead to increased productivity.
However, in realising that workers applying different types of 
technology are likely to think and act differently, the technological 
implications approach makes technology exert a crucial influence on 
productivity. These ideas though foreshadowed by Marx in the nineteenth 
century, are emphasized by investigators like L.R. Sayles (1959); R. 
Blauner (1964); and J. Woodward (1965), who all argue that workers’ 
social relationships, the quality of their work experience, and their 
propensity to engage in conflict w ith management are factors heavily 
dependent on technology.
In an analysis of 300 primary groups in th irty  plants, Sayles for 
instance, found the degrees of conflict in these plants linked to group 
patterns which were established by the technology of the plant. And in 
terms of the factory itse lf, he referred to the social system as being 
erected "by the technological process. 11)
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In Blauner's study, work Is seen as subject to structural 
differentiation related to changing technologies. By focussing on 
technology, alienation, and division of labour, he further argues that 
more advanced technologies like automated process production, for 
example, could be expected to bring about attitudes and work behaviour 
more in line w ith those of the traditional craft worker and away from 
those of the alienated and resentful mass-production operative. And, 
coinciding with a sim ilar characterisation by Woodward, he isolates four 
basic types o f.w ork technologicy Including: craft, machine-tending, 
assembly-line, and continuous process. With technology evolving 
towards the continuous process, he thus sees a reduction in alienation 
and an increase in workers’ satisfaction and productivity.
The insight provided by these investigators cannot be 
underestimated. However, they have been taken to task by c ritics  like 
Eldridge (1971); Kumar (1978); and Salaman (1981). The relatively 
direct causal link between technology being applied and work attitudes 
and behaviour of operatives that technological implications assumes has 
been strongly questioned by these critics  among others. Generally, the 
argument has been raised that in practice, there often are differences in 
attitudes and behaviour between organisations which have sim ilar 
technologies and that even w ithin a given organisation, changes may 
occur which are the results of adjustments other than ones in technology 
itself. A useful illustration cited by T. Watson, on this, is the car 
industry studied by Turner et al, and R.H. Guest. In investigations on 
industrial relations in the car industry, Turner points out that the 
differences in strike records of different car manufacturers could not be
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put down to variations in technology. And Guest's American case study 
demonstrates the possibilities of changes in conflict and general 
interpersonal behaviour which can be achieved by changes in managerial 
policy and staff; not technology.
All told, in the productivity question, w ith the debut of the 
technological implications approach, work technology becomes the 
commanding feature of factory life. Psychological aspects of the 
workforce, however, retain some importance. With the job rotation and 
job enlargement that technological implications encourages, workers 
w ill be able to overcome the psychological starvation and loss of bonding 
that can result from the new patterns of technology associated w ith 
mass production. The technological implications approach, thus, slants 
the discussion on productivity away-from psychology to technology and, 
indeed, represents early rumblings of the contemporary excruciating 
concern w ith what Tony Eiger in a review article in Work. Employment 
and Society entitled 'New Technology and the Contemporary 
Transformation of Work'.^12^
F. SOCIO TECHNICAL SYSTEM
In its  preoccupation w ith the technological aspects of workers' 
productivity, technological implications deemphasizes the human 
aspects. This shortcoming was recognised in the Tavistock Institute's 
later attempts to address the workers’ productivity problem through the 
principal concept of socio-technical system. Basing its  perspective on 
long-term research findings in the mines, the Institute attempts to
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modify Woodward’s technologically determined management styles found 
in a workplace, it  stresses that production systems require both a 
technological organisation (equipment and process layout) and a human 
organisation. Both relate to each other and as Rose would put it, "the 
technological demands place lim its on the type of work possible but a 
work organisation has social and psychological properties o f its  own 
independent o f technology 1 •*)
G. THE HUMAN RESOURCES APPROACH
With its  renewed interest in the human aspects of work 
organisations, socio-technical system raises the ghosts of the 
rnanagerial-psychologistic perspectives. These explain worker 
productivity based on an understanding of human nature assumedly 
circumscribed by economic and psychological needs. These ghosts are 
also revived by the human resources approach that explains workers’ 
productivity by focussing on the psychological characteristics of 
workers instead of the social system. Approximately a variant of self 
actualisation, it  emphasizes behaviour modification. Certain prescribed 
styles of management and conditions of work are seen capable of 
improving job satisfaction and workers' productivity. And, inherent 
social needs for self-fu lfilm ent, status, and belongingness which though 
seen to arise from outside the workplace could be satisfied w ith in it.
Significantly, nevertheless, is the need in the human resources 
approach to modify managerial practices also. The nature of workman 
that is captured is that of a 'complex man' -  a man generally motivated
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by a complex set of interrelated factors such as money, need for 
affilia tion, need for achievement, and desire for meaningful work. 
Assumed is the fact that different workers often seek quite different 
goals in a job and have a diversity of talents to offer. Workers, 
therefore, are seen as reservoirs of potential talent and management's 
responsibility is to learn how best to tap such resources.
Based on this knowledge, management should attempt to determine 
how best to use the potential resources available to i t  through its  
workforce. It should assist workers in meeting their personal needs 
w ithin the organisational context. A greater degree of worker 
participation in relevant decision-making activ ities as well as increased 
autonomy over task accomplishment is implied.
In contrast, therefore, to both scientific management and human 
relations, management's task is seen not so much as one of manipulating 
employees to accept managerial authority as it  is of setting up 
conditions so that workers could meet their goals while at the same 
time ensuring high productivity in the workplace. Largely prompted by 
these insights, proposals for participatory leadership, group decision­
making, decentralisation of organisation power, and job enlargement 
gained prominence as strategies for stepping up workers' productivity in 
the nineteen sixties.
The apparent popularity of these insights notwithstanding, other 
investigations focussed research efforts on other angles. Through the 
strategy of participant observation, these efforts examined the 
traditional concerns of the work group w ith emphasis on restriction of
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output. Lupton, for instance, related production norms to real workgroup 
cultures in the garment and engineering factories he studied. He 
explained that restriction of output in the factory did not arise out of an 
irrational failure on the part of the workers to comprehend managerial 
logic. Rather, i t  was a means of surviving work, maintaining earning 
power and jobs, and a response to perceived managerial
authoritariansim .^4 *
H. THE REDISCOVERY OF THE LABOUR PROCESS THEORY
Beyond the attempts to understand productivity through work 
group norms, the publication of Labor and Monopoly C apita l^  
carried the discussion into a quite different philosophical terrain. In 
this book, Harry Braverman infuses a distinct ideological content into 
the discussion. Drawing from Marx, he sees the capitalist labour process 
as one in which the interests of the capital-owning class are 
represented by management, whose basic task is to design, control, and 
monitor work tasks and activities so as to ensure effective extraction of 
surplus value from the labour of employees. His basic assumption, thus, 
is Marx’s underlying insight that capitalist employment is essentially 
exploitative and attempts to take from working people the ’value' which 
they create through labour and which is properly their own. In managing 
the labour process in order to fu lf i l this function, managers are 
therefore following the logic of the capitalist mode of production 
whereby the need for capital accumulation demands employers’ constant 
attention to subjugating labour in order to extract enough pro fit from it  
to enable the employer to survive w ith in the capitalist market economy.
Consequently, Braverman argues that the pursuit of capitalist, 
interests has lea to a general trend towards deskilling, routinising, and 
mechanising of jods across the employment spectrum., from 
manufacturing to retailing, and from design to clerical work. He sees 
industrial engineers as going from strength to strength as they apply the 
deskilling logic of scientific management to work tasks. They are helped 
along, in this way, by the personnel and human relations experts who act 
as fellow manipulators and as maintenance crew for the human 
machinery rather than as any kind of check upon or reaction to work 
degradation.
Braverman links these work design processes to class analysis by 
reference to Marx’s argument that the working class w ill become 
increasingly homogeneous. He suggests that through the process of 
deskilling and work degradation, all employees are finding themselves in 
a more and more sim ilar position and, distinctions between blue collar 
and white collar, technical and manual, production and service workers 
are becoming increasingly blurred. He sees scientific management as 
rampant in the later twentieth century as it  is aided and abetted by more 
modern electronic techniques which are continually reducing the need for 
capitalist employers to depend on human skills  and hence, reducing their 
need to reward employees in any but a minimal and straightforwardly 
economic way.
Since the appearance of Labor and Monopoly Capital, there has 
taken place what L ittle r and Salaman have characterised as Bravermania. 
This has centred upon the extent to which Braverman's claims of a single
and universal trend towards the deskilling of work is true and about the 
implications of whatever structural changes are occurring. These 
critic ism s range from accusations that Braverman perceived 
management as too omniscient and united and of exaggerating and 
romanticising the skilled craft worker of the past to charges of 
underplaying the role of organised labour in defending themselves 
against managerial strategies and of failing to recognise that 
managements may in certain circumstances, see it  as advantageous to 
upgrade rather than downgrade jobs.
These and other critic ism s are discussed usefully in S. Wood*16) 
and J. Storey.^1 Dan Clawson,^®) nevertheless, gives support to 
Braverman especially in his empirical studies which show the 'giant 
impact' which scientific management had in the evolution of modern 
American industrial bureaucracies. Similarly, Paul Thompson^ 9 Vcomes 
to Braverman's defence and attacks those like Wood who adopt an 
agnostic' attitude towards the deskilling thesis. He maintains that 
deskilling remains the major tendency within the development of the 
capitalist process and that too much attention has been paid to the 
extent of deskilling and not enough to its  consequences.
But a very significant development within labour process thinking 
since Braverman's seminal work has been a series of attempts to produce 
a more subtle 'dialectical' approach to analysing capitalist labour 
processes which affords much greater recognition of the challenge 
offered to employers by organised labour. In this way, some of the main 
criticisms against Braverman are seen to be overcome, it  is argued that 
managerial activ ity should be understood not as straightforwardly
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imposing upon employees the work tasks ’required by capital' but as 
engaging in a ’competition for control' w ith employees, albeit in the 
same long term interests of the owner of capital.
An important analysis which goes beyond Braverman in its stress 
on the way some employees are better able than others to resist 
managerial control and, hence, deskilling, is that by Andrew 
Friedman.^2 0 ) in this analysis, Friedman puts emphasis on the longer 
term aspect of captialist pro fit motive and stresses that the managerial 
treatment of labour and the way jobs are designed may vary 'according to 
circumstances'. Working on the Marxian assumption that managements 
operate in the ultimate interests of long term pro fitab ility , he suggests 
that they may choose either a direct control strategy which is consistent 
w ith scientific management deskilling policies or a responsbile 
autonomy strategy in which employees are allowed a degree of discretion 
and responsibility in their work. This la tter approach is followed where 
management fears that the introduction of scientific management 
controls would risk a loss of what they see as necessary goodwill. 
Workers who are ’central' to long term pro fitab ility  in that they have 
skills, knowledge, or union power which renders their opposition 
dangerous, have to be treated carefully and are therefore candidates for 
responsible autonomy treatment. 'Peripheral' workers, on the other hand, 
who are less critica l to longer term pro fitab ility  can be more directly 
controlled. Their work is much more liable to deskilling and degradation.
Richard Edwards^2 ^  offers a more fu lly developed and 
historically located analysis along sim ilar lines to Friedman's. He 
suggests that the simple employee control strategies of early
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competitive capitalism were gradually found wanting as the trend 
towards monopoly capitalism developed. As class resistance towards 
'simple managerial controls’ grew and as the centralisation of capitalist 
organisation increased, various alternative approaches to control were 
tried. However, experiments w ith scientific management, welfare 
policies, and company unionism were not successful, as Edwards shows 
in his analyses of a selection of notable American companies. The sh ift 
instead was towards more 'structural' approaches to control in which 
there would be less dependence on the personal power of employees and 
managers and more on the effects of the physical and social structure of 
the enterprise. The firs t of these was a 'technical control strategy' 
which depended on the discipline of assembly line and sim ilar types of 
technology. However, as problems appeared w ith this approach, 
in itiatives were taken which produced 'bureaucratic control strategies'.
Edwards' conception of bureaucratic control structures 
emphasizes the role of internal labour markets within organisations. 
These involve career structures and relatively high levels of job security 
are offered to privileged sections of the labour force. The effect of this 
is to gain commitment of employees to employer purposes and to 
encourage 'reasonable' and predictable levels of performance.
It is clear, therefore, that the attempts in social science to 
understand the problem of productivity has been tortuous. The industrial 
engineer who formulated the problem in its early stage emphasized that 
management should conceive work, fragment it, and train workers to 
execute it  w ith minimum effort and time. In this way, inefficiency 
would be minimized and productivity increased. The 'enlightened'
67
Chicago managers who seemed to have gained a sudden inspiration 
through perceiving the 'human side of an enterprise* reacted against the 
industrial engineer's 'ultra-rational' approach to the problem and 
indicated the necessity of considering informal social relations 
alongside formal relations in the workplace because these social 
relations were deemed to determine workers' productivity.
However, that management was considered the sole agency that 
could more or less veto these desirable social characters into existence 
in workplaces became the weakest point in the Chicago managers' 
analyses. With an increasing dissatisfaction w ith the understanding of 
the problem based on the social character of the factory, the 
implications of technology for productivity came into primary focus. 
This was followed by the sub-debate on alienation and the voluminous 
literature on restriction of output as a group work-norm that tended to 
impede productivity. And, the climax of the discussion was reached w ith 
the rediscovery of the labour process theory by Braverman and the 
reactions it  has contemporarily triggered.
Certainly, considerable light has been produced by the heated 
discussion so far. The contemporary student of the productivity question 
is informed through these several approaches that three basic sets of 
factors may, at different cultural, economic, and social situations, 
largely influence productivity. First, are factors in the personality of 
the individual worker. Second, are factors in the workplace. And third, 
are a broad range of other factors found outside the workplace which, in 
any case, influence the level of productivity.
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In the Nigerian context, the understanding of the problem typically 
has been in social psychological tradition. The crucial issue of control 
is, thus, not addressed. Nevertheless, the structure and dynamics of any 
industrial capitalist economy can hardly be adequately understood 
outside the terms of interests, power, and control. Nigeria could best be 
described as an industrialising capitalist economy though. Yet the 
incidence of low productivity in flic ting it  could better be understood by 
systematically examining the structured patterns of conflicting 
interests, powers, and control characterising it  than by examining 
management functioning. Or the psychology of the individual Nigerian 
worker based on the worker's ab ility to satisfy certain needs.
However, previous attempts to resolve the problem have stagnated 
at the latter. The earliest systematic Kilby studies are essentially in 
the Taylorist tradition and explain the problem from the point of view of 
'non-functional'managerial behaviour:
The conclusion is unavoidable: low labour
productivity cannot be attributed to the attitudes 
and capabilities of the African worker. On the 
contrary, where low levels of output/man prevail, 
the burden must fa ll on those responsible for 
management and supervision of the 
enterpriser 22)
in the main, however, Kilby’s studies are a response to the 
previous largely unsystematised thinking on the traditional construct of 
an incapable African worker. But later attempts at resolving the 
problem have themselves been a response to the 'economic man' concept 
that it  is inherent in Kilby's Taylorism. Seeking to project the 'complex
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man’ image of human resources thinking, these attempts essentially 
pursue a social psychological resolution of the problem. This, of course, 
is without prejudice to the attention drawn to the role of Nigeria's 
economic environment in the problem by Sayre Shatz.
By perceiving the human nature of workers in Nigeria as basically 
'complex' rather than economic these post-Kilby attempts at resolving 
the problem consider the managerial behavioural approach 
'unenlightened'. To the new approach, Nigerian workers are not simply 
like Skinner's pigeons - rational calculators of economic ends. But are 
far more complex in nature. Probably because of the influence of sim ilar 
thoughts in North America in the nineteen sixties, the new approach 
stressed the importance of meeting the workers' complex needs while 
the goals of the workplace are pursued. Productivity, thus, would be 
enhanced.
Based, for instance, on ethnographic data from the Portland 
Cement industry in Western Nigeria, Olatunde Oloko*23 ) argued that the 
low productivity evident there was chiefly due to a discrepancy between 
the goals of the firm  and the needs of the cement workers. In order, 
therefore, to increase and maximize their productivity, i t  would be 
necessary to simultaneously meet both sets of goals and needs. For, i f  
the workers perceive that they would meet their personal needs by 
pursuing the goals of the firm , they would produce maximally. 
Otherwise, they would not; especially i f  they perceive that pursuing the 
goals of the firm  would frustrate the meeting of their personal needs. 
The panacea, then, was to motivate the workers and persuade them that 
the meeting of their needs and the attainment of the goals of the firm
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were not at variance.
This line of reasoning would represent a version of the 
Georgopoulos Path-Goal Hypothesis that characterises much 
contemporary understanding of the low productivity problem in the 
Nigerian economy. Evidently, it is hinged on the human nature, need- 
motivation theory which reaches out into Abraham Maslow. In the main, 
it recommends that to tackle the productivity problem, Nigerian workers, 
irrespective of sector, should be motivated into perceiving that their 
personal needs and the goals of their firm s are not at cross-purposes. 
They should, therefore, closely identify w ith the firms, effectively.
The approaches discussed in this chapter do confront the low 
productivity problem and offer solutions in a straightforward, 
convincing, even if  simplistic, manner. For invariably, human beings are 
constrained by needs. Nigerian workers come under this constraint. 
Ignoring for a moment the relatively tenuous Maslowian se lf- 
actualisation and social needs, Nigerian workers are confronted by the 
hard and real physiological needs of food, clothing, and shelter. And 
given the relative scarcity of the means available for satisfying these 
needs, the ultimate influence they may have on workers' general 
behaviour could be quite considerable. Therefore, i f  management could 
deal w ith these needs to the mutual benefit of both workers and the 
organisation, a positive approach could appear to be made towards 
resolving low productivity. Certainly therefore, the path-goal 
hypothesis presents a simple model for understanding workers; 
productivity.
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CHAPTER I I I :
CRITIQUE OF THE NEED-MOTIVATION MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
The straigthforwardness and apparent ve rifiab ility  of the need- 
motivation model contributed to its attraction as an explanatory model. 
The insight it  shed on the workers’ needs was an innovation from the 
previous preoccupation w ith management functioning. Further, its  
modification of the human relations conception of the industrial worker 
as basically, a ‘social man' to an expanded concept of 'complex man* who 
besides social needs, had other needs, was an additional credential. 
Beyond that, its other strengths included its  tacit recognition that the 
workers had a diversity of talents to offer in the workplace. The 
prescription was that management should tap such resources to the 
ultimate end of assisting workers in meeting their personal needs w ithin 
a maximally producing organisational context. Finally its  other asset 
was the implied greater degree of participation by the workers in 
relevant decision-making activities as well as increased autonomy over 
task accomplishment.
However, the very concept of need on which it  is pivoted appears 
presumptuous in the very least in seeing the satisfaction of needs as 
always inducing worker motivation towards increased productivity. The
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motivation of the workers could partially be dependent on the level of 
need satisfaction they are able to get through participating in the work 
process. But it  ignores the possibility of conflict between the 
satisfaction of the workers' needs and the achievement of the goal of 
maximum productivity in the workplace. This presumes that whatis good 
for the workers is also good for the organisation. But this is by no 
means always so because high morale is not always associated w ith high 
productivity amongst workers.
Vet even i f  it  were a crucial factor of productivity, any motivation 
that the workers would need to goad them into producing maximally 
would depend on other variables, perhaps in addition to that of need 
satisfaction. Two other variables, at least, could be isolated. The f irs t  
would be the degree of equity that the workers observe in the 
distribution of rewards in the organisation. The second would be the 
possible effects of various sanctions on their subsequent work 
behaviour. Roughly situated, the f irs t factor would correspond w ith the 
equity theory perspective on motivation while the second would 
correspond with the behaviour modification theory.
B. EQUITY
Obviously, this variable does determine the level of motivation 
amongst workers in Nigeria. The relatively wide differences in workers' 
incomes probably would account for this. Therefore, in explaining levels 
of worker motivation, it  would be arbitrary to single out the isolated 
factor of need satisfaction as an exclusive factor. Such would be a
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narrow approach given, for instance, the range of contemporary wage 
differentials amongst the workers and the obvious influences of wages 
on work-behaviour generally.
Between the sectors, for instance, incomes in the public sector 
generally are less than those in corresponding positions in the private 
sector. The chief executive of a private bank for example would earn 
twice as much as his counterpart in a public corporation like the coal 
corporation. While incomes in the oil sector are much higher than those 
in the industrial sector or the tertiary sector, w ithin the same 
organisation sharp differences are also evident. In the same 
organisation, the lowest paid worker (invariably, the cleaner) could earn 
as li t t le  as below one-tenth of the salary of the highest paid worker. In 
the most recently Revised Scale of Salaries for University Staff (1988) 
for instance, the lowest paid s ta ff (who could be a newly recruited 
cleaner) would receive NI560 per annum. This represents only 5.7% of 
the N27000 per annum that the highest paid sta ff (a professor) receives. 
Perhaps, these would be extreme cases. But in spite of the corresponding 
differences in training, content, and description between the two jobs, 
the cleaner would hardly perceive the 94.3% chasm between his salary 
and that of the professor as fair. The salary scales are, of course, 
published in the newspapers. The differences between them being thus 
exposed do become causes of grievance and disenchantment amongst 
those workers who consider themselves deprived.
Thus even if the point is raised that there is li t t le  basis for 
comparing these two extreme cases which are very dissim ilar in 
requirements and functions, the theoretical reasoning underlined is that
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one worker tends to perceive inequity in the work situation and that this 
perception may affect his work behaviour. Such a worker's level of 
motivation in the organisation would therefore be subject to these social 
comparisons as much as it  would be to the degree of need satisfaction. 
Perception of equity in the organisation therefore is a motivational 
relevant variable in a work situation. In ignoring this variable, the 
previous studies neglected a vita l aspect of the human nature of the 
workers on which their assumptions were principally based in the f irs t 
instance.
Indeed as two related aspects of the human nature of the workers, 
perception of equity in the organisation possibly could represent a more 
relevant variable of motivation than need satisfaction. The la tter is 
rather tenuous and imprecise as would be emphasized below. Worker's 
perception of equity in the distribution of work rewards on the other 
hand, represents a more visible internal logic of the work situation in 
Nigeria not only because genuine disparities exist in workers' incomes 
but also because of the general tendency for most workers to 
overestimate the salaries of others. These groups of influences on the 
behaviour of workers therefore are as important if  not more important in 
motivating them than the need satisfaction variable. Besides, the 
perception of equity variable would represent a more dynamic approach 
to the motivation question than the relatively static need considerations. 
By neglecting these perceptual processes, the previous studies failed to 
provide an adequate framework for understanding motivation of workers 
in Nigeria. Neither did they provide a satisfactory approach to the 
general low productivity question.
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C. WORK SANCTIONS
In addition to the need satisfaction variable, various workplace 
sanctions could also affect the level of motivation of the workers. At 
the positive angle, these would range from the simple le tter of
commendation for work well done to promotion to a higher position in 
the organisation. On the negative, would range sanctions like the verbal 
warning, the written query, and demotion to a lower position in the 
organisation. Evidently, these sanctions are motivationally relevant 
variables because they could reinforce on the one hand or could dampen 
workers' commitment to the organisation on the other hand. The
workers, of course, would shun negative sanctions and naturally would 
desire the benefits from positive sanctions. In a large measure,
therefore, these variables would be relevant to workers' motivation.
In paraphrase, these views would represent the Skinner behaviour 
modification theory which though largely applied to lower animals
studied in highly controlled situations, would apply to the workers also. 
For, though the workplace is a much more complex world than Skinner's 
laboratories, yet it  is probable that the workers would respond to 
sanctions in ways sim ilar to Skinner's pigeons. The scarcity of the 
positive sanctions, for instance, makes the workers compete for them. 
And, at the very extreme, workers would hate to lose their jobs. This 
creates room for the shaping of their work behaviour through sanctions. 
These work sanctions, thus, are important motivationally relevant 
variables that are ignored by unduly emphasizing the need satisfaction 
variable.
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D. NEED SATISFACTION
It was at the expense of social comparison and behaviour 
modification, amongst other variables, that the need satisfaction 
variable was assumed to play the most important role in motivating 
workers in Nigeria. A direct one-to-one relationship was assumed to 
exist between the satisfaction of workers' needs and their motivation to 
produce maximally at work. This represented probably the most 
fundamental principle of explaining .the incidence of low productivity 
among the workers. Other corollary princples included the achievement 
of maximum productivity through workers' 'participative' approaches; 
the enriching of jobs by reducing the extent of supervision; and 
monitoring and developing open and authentic colleague relationships. 
Encapsulated w ithin these principles were the conditions assumed 
capable of making the workers meet a hierarchy of personal needs whose 
acme was that of self-actualisation. This need category was assumed, 
therefore, to represent the arch motivation factor in the workers. A 
shade below it  in potency of motivation were the slightly lower needs of 
achievement, advancement, recognition, growth, responsibility, and 'the 
work itse lf’ that Fred Herzberg (1966) describes as ’satisfiers*. Lower 
on the scale, were the contextual needs of salary, status, security, 
working conditions, supervision, and company policy (dissatisfiers) that 
were mere ‘hygiene’ factors. Their differing prepotencies 
notwithstanding, they were collectively seen to contain the means of 
workers’ motivation in Nigeria. That they were satisfied amongst the 
workers was regarded as leading to a motivated, highly producing 
workforce.
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However, the whole question of Nigerian workers' needs and the 
inherent capacity of their satisfaction to induce motivation raises many 
more questions than i t  would settle about productivity. Foremost, is 
how ’real1 these needs are. There is l i t t le  doubt the workers have 
genuine needs in food, water, clothing, and shelter. in calorie 
requirement, for instance, the workers can barely meet the minimum 
needs from the available staples mainly made up of carbohydrates. The 
more expensive proteins are often priced beyond the reach of their 
salaries. Thus, it  would not be uncommon for them to treat their 
families to the luxury of a chicken dinner only about thrice a year. These 
would be on special occasions like Christmas, Easter and New Year 
celebrations. Outside these occasions, meat and poultry would be quite 
rare on their menus. Besides, w ith inflation rates averaging between 
20% and 24%, their salaries are grossly insufficient to cover expenses on 
rents, clothing, and bills. Nigerian workers, therefore are confronted by 
phsyiological needs perhaps more direly than Maslow had described in 
human nature. If, therefore, they can acquire the means for meeting 
these genuine needs through participating in work, they naturally would 
participate. However, participating in work and doing so effectively 
could mean quite two different things. Yet the need satisfaction thesis 
would seem to assume that the meeting of the workers' needs would 
invariably imply their effective participation in work. This one-to-one 
relationship, of course, can hardly be automatic especially in the light of 
the intervening variables previously noted. Thus, in spite of the 
genuineness of physiological needs and their ab ility  to lead workers to 
workplaces, their satisfaction can hardly be seen to constitute all that 
is necessary to make the workers productive.
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For the other higher sets of needs, however, there are a whole 
chain of problems. Beginning w ith the very next in the hierarchy - safety 
needs - it  is d ifficu lt to interpret this need in the workers outside 
perhaps, in the sense of economic security. In this sense, the need would 
become as genuine as the physiological needs and could quite correctly 
be met in the workplaces like the physiological needs. However, if  
interpreted in the conventional sense, workplaces would hardly be venues 
for meeting the safety needs of workers. Traditionally, safety is a 
collective responsibility. In the most traditional sense, i t  would be 
handled at the village level where the services of experienced hunters 
and sometimes, renowned medicine men are harnessed to ensure the 
safety of all. Workers, thus, have their safety needs already met before 
they set out for the workplace. Therefore, they would not deliberately 
seek the satisfaction of these needs in a context of work. The 
proposition that they would be motivated to produce highly if  their 
safety needs are met in the workplace would become, therefore, less 
valid.
The fiaslowian social needs would equally pose sim ilar problems. 
'Workplaces, of course, are venues where various forms of social ties 
could be forged by workers who interact for upwards of six hours a day. 
In this way the social need of interpersonal association could be met in 
workers. This, however, could have been largely incidental consequences 
of work association which might in any case have been unintended.
Yet, given the relatively intense primary group relations that 
characterise social life  in Nigeria, and the gregarious needs that are met
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through them, perhaps only few workers could set out for work 
consciously to meet social needs. These needs are largely met at the 
primary group level and less at the work group level. Evidence for this 
could be found in the common practice that obtains amongst townfolk 
who form kinship associations in the towns to which they have migrated 
and work in. That these workers seek membership in these social units 
suggests that the satisfaction of their social needs is deliberately 
sought in these primary group units rather than in the workplace. This 
unique sense of solidarity that unites members of a Nigerian primary 
group and the satisfaction of social needs that is derived from it  would 
make it  a less valid proposition to attempt to motivate workers through 
the satisfaction of their social needs in the workplace.
For the need of self-esteem, what is obvious is that in the 
Nigerian society, esteem generally does not repose on occupation. 
Working for a multinational, or an oil company, or a bank, or a university 
could attract relative prestige. This would be at least, rnoreso than 
being a farmer, a petty trader, or a carpenter. Yet self esteem generally 
is not inherent in these jobs. Rather, it  reposes in the respective 
traditional title s  that incumbents have been able to take. An individual 
would become a man of esteem only after taking the tit le s  that are 
appropriate for his age grade. This remains particularly so in eastern 
parts of the country where the ozo, the ekpe, and the okonko are the most 
revered titles. Indeed a recipient of the ozo t it le  amongst the 1 bos is 
looked upon as a man of high honour, fame, and wealth. His self-esteem 
would surpass that of a non-ozo irrespective of other attainments in 
life. Most importantly, the ozo t it le  would bestow on the recipient that 
cherished position of an individual whose views would be crucial in
communal discussions. By that, he would have acquired an 'onu okwu' 
amongst his kin. On this revered, position of respect and honour rests 
self-esteem; not on positions held in the workplace. Thus, even a 
university professor might have only a li t t le  self-esteem until he has 
taken the traditional t it le s  appropriate for his age grade. Only then 
could he have attained a position of esteem in the community and be able 
to make a respectable input into various discussions on matters that 
concern the community. The application of the Maslowian need for se lf­
esteem, therefore, would have to be modified by these cultural 
peculiarities in Nigeria if  i t  should make sense.
- Finally, w ith the self-actualisation need, it  would be d iff ic u lt to 
precisely place this category in Nigerian workers. The ambivalent and 
tenuous nature of this need would make it  hazy to understand how it  
would operate in the workers. In academics, perhaps, the se lf- 
actualisation need could make some sense. The lecturer could visualise 
becoming a professor at which position he could appear self-actualised. 
But the same could not be said of a host of other positions. What for 
instance would a postal clerk self-actualise into? What would the 
industrial worker who packages confectionery? Or the railway engine 
driver? Clearly, the hierarchical arrangement of positions that is 
evident in an academic career would not be quite obvious in most other 
work positions. This would leave less room for incumbents of such 
positions to 'self-actualise' in the manner that Maslow wrote about. The 
self-actualising need, therefore, is of li t t le  relevance in motivating 
Nigerian workers. Thus the valid ity of the approach to the low 
productivity question in Nigeria on which it  is based would become 
increasingly less tenable.
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Again, because of the relative imprecision of these highest order 
needs as they apply to the cultural situation of workers in Nigeria, the 
general descriptive valid ity of the Maslow need satisfaction scheme 
becomes less founded. The Nigerian economy is characterised by relative 
scarcity. Thus, it  remains basically a subsistence economy. The 
satisfaction of basic physiological needs, therefore, s t il l preponders 
over the satisfaction of the higher order needs which, in any case, are 
not clearly defined. If anything, therefore, the Maslow hierarchy of 
needs would seem to have been operating in the reverse w ith the 
physiological needs at the apex.. This would turn the whole scheme 
upside down and dramatically violate the model of understanding the 
motivation issue based on it.
However, based on general evidence, it  would appear that higher 
order needs and their satisfaction can only make sense w ith the senior 
categories of the workers. Probably on account of their relatively high 
salaries, these categories can meet physiological needs w ith je s s  
d ifficu lty  than the junior categories. Hence, they can begin to ponder the 
satisfaction of the higher order needs. But for most of the junior 
workers, the central concern would be the basic needs of food, clothing, 
and shelter. Higher order needs and their satisfaction would therefore be 
relatively unimportant. Regarding such workers, therefore, the Maslow 
two-level hierarchy of needs would not operate. Nor would there be real 
bases for the deprivation/domination/gratification scheme to hold.*1)
Thus, the d ifficu lty  of providing a valid explanation of the low 
productivity problem in Nigeria is more real than the previous studies
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had envisaged. Their underpinning in the need satisfaction model creates 
new problems. For one thing, most of the junior workers tended to show 
lit t le  concern for the satisfaction of any hierarchy of needs/beyond 
perhaps, the safety needs. Thus only a li t t le  sense could be made of the 
Maslow two-level hierarchy of needs. Yet, there was the additional 
problem of determining how each need was gratified out of existence in 
the face of a more dominant one. Besides, the manner in which the sh ift 
from one need to another took place did not seem quite clear. And, there 
was the further problem of determining whether there was an 
independent hierarchy of needs for each situation or whether the workers 
in general developed a general hierarchy for all situations.
The need-satisfaction thesis therefore creates a great deal more 
problems around the productivity problem in Nigeria. Thus, the 
enlightenment.' that it  has been seen to bestow on the understanding of 
worker motivation becomes suspect.
E. MOTIVATION FACTOR
Isolating the need-satisfaction variable as the prime variable for 
motivation is reductionist. But isolating motivation as the prime factor 
of productivity implies not only reductionism but also psychologism. 
These two tra its  would obviate the riches of a sociological explanation 
that'would take into account crucial structural and dynamic aspects of 
the productivity problem.
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However, as a concept, motivation could be linked w ith the 
principle of hedonism - a principle discussed even in early Greek 
thought.*2 ) Its very links w ith hedonism of course would disqualify it  
as the possible prime factor of productivity amongst workers in Nigeria. 
For the assumptions in hedonism are d ifficu lt to identify empirically in 
Nigerian workers. Generally these could be spelt out as:
(a) The workers are generally pleasure loving.
(b) They would choose to perform activities from which they would 
maximize pleasure.
(c) They would rationally avoid unpleasant activities.
Work must, therefore, be a pleasurable experience before workers 
are drawn into it. In this reasoning, thus, work experiences in Nigeria 
would appear not pleasurable enough to motivate the workers into 
producing maximally. Hence, the incidence of low productivity in the 
economy.
The philosophical significance of this reasoning cannot be down­
played. However, the underlying assumption that the individual would 
deliberately seek pleasure; especially for its  own sake is doctrinaire. 
There would be li t t le  evidence to substantiate the proposition that most 
Nigerian workers are pleasure-seeking or pleasure-loving. Besides, the 
hedonist prinicple could hardly be used to specify what types of events 
in workplaces in Nigeria are pleasuarable and whether such 
pleasurableness would be perceived so by all workers at all times. It is 
in the light of d ifficu lties  such as these that followng Victor Vroom, it
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is argued here that as an explanation of workers’ behaviour, the hedonist 
assumptions in worker motivation basically have no empirical 
content.^)
Another concept that has been linked w ith motivation is instinct. 
Indeed, the latter seems closer to the motivation concept than the 
principle of hedonism. Rather than being rational seekers after pleasure, 
workers in Nigeria would be seen to be motivated in the workplace by 
their instincts. Thus, they would be seen as possessing automatic 
predispositions to behave in specific ways depending on internal cues. In 
this reasoning, Freud, for instance, would argue that the workers' 
behavioural tendencies are not necessarily consciously determined. They 
would not always be aware of their desires and needs. Rather, a major 
part of their behaviour would arise from sources quite unknown to them. 
Such instincts as hunger, safety, and survival would therefore be 
interpreted as the unconscious motivators of desirable work habits.
Individual workers would naturally vary in strengths and 
intensities of motivation at work even if  they all possess instincts. 
Moreover, what has often been described as instinct could, in fact, have 
been learned behaviour. The relationship between instincts and 
unconsciously motivated work behaviour, therefore, appears problematic.
Indeed, learned behaviour in the workers could account for their 
motivation better than instincts. For decisions concerning the present 
behaviour of an individual are largely based on the consequences of past 
behaviour. Thus a child who has had his finger burnt on a hot stove would 
often fear the stove. Where, therefore, the past actions of the Nigerian
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workers led to positive consequences, they would tend to respect such 
actions. Where, on the other hand, such past actions led to negative 
consequences, the workers would tend to avoid repeating them The 
relationship between motivation and productivity could therefore rest on 
the use of positive sanctions as reinforcement for desirable work 
behaviour. This would illustrate the law of effect which Thorndike has 
explained:
Of several responses made to same situation, 
those which are accompanied or closely followed 
by satisfaction to the animals w ill other things 
being equal, be more firm ly  connected with the 
situation so that when it  occurs, they w ill be more 
likely to occur; those which are accompanied or 
closely followed by discomforts, the animals w ill 
other things being equal, have their connections 
w ith that situation weakened so that when it  
recurs, they w ill be less likely to occur. The 
greater the satisfaction or discomfort, the greater 
is the strengthening or weakening of the bond.(4)
W.B. Cannon's^5 * insight would probably help to understand the 
Thorndike law more clearly as an explanation of workers' motivation. In 
his concept of homeostasis, he reinforces this law by stating that the 
worker as an organism exists in a normal state of equilibrium. 
Disequilibrium would, however, occur whenever the worker feels hunger 
or threat of punishment. This stimulus would motivate him into working 
in such a way that would reduce the disequilibrium and make him return 
to the normal state. Hence, the worker is seen as existing in a dynamic- 
work environment and the determining motives for his behaviour in the 
workplace would constantly change depending upon his internal drives. 
Thus certain drives or motives may move to the forefront of his 
attention and once satisfied, retreat while other drives may become
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paramount. This notion to a large extent Is the one echoed in the later 
works of Maslow.
In this reasoning, therefore, the motivation of Nigerian workers 
would largely be a function of the changing drives and stimuli w ith in and 
around them. It should be pointed out, however, that though drives arid 
stimuli form an essential part of workers’ physical and emotional world, 
yet workers would not be expected to respond exactly in the same way as 
the animals studied in very highly controlled situations did. Beyond this, 
the workers' social world would often moderate the influence of their 
drives and stimuli on their work behaviour. Their families, co-workers, 
and friends could, for instance, provide norms which may modify the 
ways they would normally respond to drives and stimuli. Besides, the 
possibility of conflicting stimuli sometimes would be there. For 
example, the use of the positive stimulus of higher pay to increase their 
productivity may at the same time stimulate their fears that increased 
productivity may lead to higher standards of performance being required 
of them. Drives and stimuli therefore pose yet another set of problems 
in the explanation they provide for understanding worker motivation.
It was on grounds such as the above that Edward Tollman*6 * and 
Kurt Lewin,*7 * among other theorists, criticized the Thorndike law of 
effect as ’Hedonism of the past’. For instance, Lewin who studied human 
behaviour, would see motivation from the point of view of human 
organisms that make conscious decisions concerning future behaviours. 
Such decisions as whether to produce maximally or to restric t output 
would be based, according to Lewin, on certain cues in the environment 
and would be determined by the workers’ beliefs, expectations, and
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anticipations about future events in the workplace. Thus their work 
behaviour in this light would be purposeful, goal-directed, and oriented 
towards the future. Tolman, for instance, would argue that motivation to 
work would result more from changes in the workers’ beliefs about the 
workplace than from changes in the strengths of their past work 
behaviour. To Lewin, however, the workers' past work habits and their 
expectations from the workplace would complement each other in 
shaping their present work habits. Generally, however, in this reasoning, 
it is the events of the day in the workplace that are considered largely 
responsible for the level of motivation that workers would demonstrate. 
Past events would be important only to the extent that they affect 
present and future beliefs and expectations. These views clearly recur 
in the more recent approaches to motivation that recommend the 
harmonization of the attainment of the goals of the workplace w ith the 
meeting of the needs of workers.
A consensual basis for understanding worker motivation appears, 
therefore, to have eluded much of the social science that has given 
attention to it. The earliest philosophically based hedonist explanation 
seemed lacking in empirical content. The more empirically verifiable 
Freudian explanation appeared reductionist and incomprehensive just like 
the later emphasis on drives, stimuli, and learned behaviour. However, 
the Tolman-Lewin explanation that saw human behaviour as determined 
by beliefs, expectations, and anticipation about future events and 
suggested that motivation was a purposeful, goal-directed process 
appears generally to have been adopted by the social psychological 
approach that currently provides the most widely accepted explanation 
of low productivity in Nigeria. The question could be raised,
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nevertheless, why the motivation factor was assumed the prime reason 
for low productivity in Nigeria.
• >
F. ATTRACTIONS OF THE MOTIVATION FACTOR
A search for the possible reasons for the primacy of the
motivation factor in the explanation of Nigeria’s low productivity 
problem reveals an interplay of historical, psychological, and economic 
variables.
Historically, that Nigerian workers were drawn into industrial 
production rather unwillingly would suggest that the workers would 
require some amount of motivation to make them exert their organic 
abilities fully in the workplace. These historical facts seem to have 
provided the bases for the assumption that if  productivity were low in 
the economy, then i 11-motivation of the workers must have been the 
prime factor.
Historical evidence, of course, would tend to support this 
deduction. The recruits for the earliest construction works, for
instance, were conscripted workers. For, during this in itia l period, the
workers clearly had misgivings about wage labour which they somehow 
looked upon as another form of slavery. Indeed, this misgiving was even 
extended to schooling which because it  was closely associated w ith 
wage employment was equally shunned as youngsters were encouraged to 
remain in the farms rather than go to school. However, only those who 
were considered unfit as farm-hands were released to attend school and,
so, be able later to work for the white man! Wage labour thus was
considered the white man's job (Olu Ovibo).
That wage labour was regarded as the white man’s job perhaps 
provided the strongest psychological basis for explaining low
productivity in the economy. There is li t t le  doubt that until, very 
recently, v irtua lly all economic life  in the economy outside se lf- 
employment in farming, trading, and craft was considered Olu Ovibo. As 
an alternative to private employment. Olu Ovibo resembled an imposition, 
especially w ith its  various regimented forms and practice. Thus, those 
who1 joined in it  would expect to be supervised at work, disciplined for 
errors and sometimes rewarded for good performances. To such recruits 
who traditionally were used to unsupervised, unorganised work
practices, the new requirements in Olu Ovibo were sufficient to dampen 
morale and lower productivity. Hence, the need to motivate such 
workers.
But that such workers who because they could not quite identify 
w ith Olu Ovibo would only regard it  as a mere means for acquiring the 
white man's money provides the economic basis for regarding.motivation 
as the prime factor for low productivity in Nigeria. The very vernacular 
for wages - ego Ovibo - would seem to suggest that participating in 
wage labour was largely a mercenary enterprise. However, motivation 
indeed would become indispensable if  work is principally perceived in 
such instrumentalist terms. Work as conceived by Marx and Freud would 
have lost crucial aspects of its  meaning. This nevertheless, represents 
the reality in Nigeria even in most recent years. Recent attempts to 
effect changes in this mentality are encouraging. The attempts made by
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State Governments in the Eastern states to reconstruct the Olu Ovibo 
concept to that of Olu Obodo (public service) would be a case in point. 
Another would be the later efforts on the part of the Federal Government 
to mobilize the masses towards greater national consciousness and 
economic revival. Yet the apparent harm resulting from the influence of 
these historical, psychological, and economic factors on work generally 
has formed the basis for regarding i 11-motivation as the prime factor of 
low productivity in the Nigerian economy.
G. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
' Given the mode in which the Nigerian workers were drawn into
organised work and the psychological dispositions as well as the
economic orientations which they developed towards wage labour, i l l  
motivation could, indeed, appear to be the prime factor of low 
productivity in the economy. Its case as the prime factor of low
productivity, certainly, is strengthened by the role of bribes in the
economy. As gratifications, these bribes would seem a welcome 
supplementary stimulant to work which wages appear insufficient to 
stimulate. In this sense, bribes. in the economy would become 
instruments for inducing worker-motivation. Absenteeism and turnover 
sim ilarly could largely be seen as workers' reaction against a low level 
of motivation at work. So also could the strikes and lockouts that 
characterise relations between labour and employers.
There is, therefore, a substantial merit in focussing on i l l -  
motivation as the prime factor of low productivity in the economy.
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Previous attempts at understanding this problem which have made 
motivation a primary focus have, thus, dealt w ith crucial aspects of the 
problem. By recognising the necessity of meeting the workers' needs, 
these approaches have dealt w ith the problem insightfully.
However, the explanation is reductionist in its  assumption that 
understanding the problem is a matter of harmonizing the attainment of 
organisational goals w ith meeting the workers' needs. Beyond the 
physiological needs of the workers, of course, the need scheme that has 
been suggested is of limited concern to most of the workers. The se lf- 
actualising need in particular has been seen to be largely inapplicable in 
the workers' peculiar cultural and economic realities. Importantly also, 
the meeting of the workers' needs and the attainment of the goals of 
their workplace have been shown, sometimes, to be in genuine conflict.
These cultural and economic factors unfortunately have been 
ignored by the previous approaches. Yet, such factors remain central to 
any meaningful attempt to understand the problem. Understanding the 
Nigerian workers' behaviour at work would be more adequately reached 
by making their interests; their positions in relation to power and 
control in the workplace, focal concerns. Nigerian workers and their 
employers are what they make themselves. Thus, their work behaviours 
are highly socially mediated. Within lim its, they very much mould 
themselves as well as one another in the workplace. These moulding 
processes could sometimes result in high productivity; at other times, 
they could result in output restriction.
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Thus, any patterns of work-behaviour in the Nigerian economy 
would be susceptible to influences from the processes of social moulding 
in the workplaces. Consequently, there is a compelling need to introduce 
a way forward in the discussions. This new way recognises the 
centrality of structural variables in understanding the problem. It 
particularly holds that the power relations between the State 
Governments, Private Capital, and Labour in Nigeria provide the most 
useful basis for understanding low productivity in the economy. 
Confrontational as these relations have been, they generally have had 
negative implications for productivity.
For instance in 1978 alone, 153 incidents of strikes were recorded 
in the economy w ith a total loss of 448,335 m an-days.^ This would 
represent a major depletion. If multiplied to accommodate the numerous 
other incidents including lock-outs, a more compelling basis for 
understanding productivity rates in the economy would clearly emerge.
Besides, between the State Government and Private Capital, 
confrontational power relations also have persisted: leaving further 
negative implications for productivity. Relations between the State 
Government, qua Public Capital, and Private Foreign Capital (especially 
beyond the Second National Development Plan Period, 1971-74) suggest a 
contest between the two over the control of the Nigerian economy.
With the aid of the Second Plan, for instance, the Federal 
Government had urged Private Foreign Capital to:
Perceive investment opportunities, to establish 
their commercial viability, and to undertake most
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medium or large-scale economic activ ities in the 
modern sector.(9)
That this charge apparently was well-executed is indicated by the 
enhancement of productivity o ffic ia lly  acknowledged as resulting from 
the accelerated activities of Foreign Private Capital. The Federal 
Government, for instance, published an 11.7% annual growth in GDP for 
the period. Further, it  announced that considerable expansion had 
occurred in Manufacturing and Construction; and that previous deficits in 
the balance on current account of an annual average of N300 m illion had 
been converted to an annual surplus of N400 million, on the average, in 
the period.^1
Given these remarkable increases in productivity and general 
economic health, it  becomes curious that the Federal Government would 
in the Third National Development Plan indict the architects of these 
enhancements in productivity thus:
Experience has shown through history that 
political independence is but an empty shell .The 
interests of Foreign Private investors in the 
Nigerian economy cannot be expected to coincide 
at all times and in every respect w ith national 
aspirations...A tru ly independent nation cannot 
allow its  economy to be distorted or frustrated by 
the manipulations of powerful foreign 
investors.O 1)
However, it would become less curious when it  is realized that 
what was at play was, to a large extent, a power-game in which concern 
with establishing firm  control over the economy had become more
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important than productivity enhancement. A clearer meaning would, 
thus, tend to emerge from the Federal Government’s assertion in the 
Third Plan that:
The Federal Government w ill therefore occupy the 
commanding heights (of the Nigerian economy) in 
the quest for purposeful national 
developments 12)
Arenas such as these, marked by inter-class contests for power 
and control, dissent and resistance in the Nigerian economy hold 
commanding implications for productivity in the economy. They are, 
therefore, of more crucial relevance in understanding contemporary low 
productivity in Nigeria than the previous pre-occupation w ith the 
assumed human nature of the Nigerian manager or workforce. These 
arenas are a more crucial basis for understanding the problem chiefly 
because;
(a) The general situation of combat that prevails in the economy tends 
to de-emphasize the importance of national interests in favour of 
group interests.
(b) The State Government tends to be distracted by the 
confrontational relations from the important task of creating 
authentic productivity enhancement programmes.
(c) There has been a tendency for the economy's productivity base to 
diminish largely through labour resistance.
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PART THREE:
AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE
CHAPTER IV;
THE NIGERIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE: 
Some General Considerations
The making of Nigeria essentially involved the amalgamation of 
disparate social groupings. This process created a largely amorphous 
entity in 1914. Because of this character, i t  is therefore not d iff ic u lt to 
separate this entity into structural segments. The differences 
characterising them are distinct. The entire social formation is marked 
by strains.
Such structural strains are a handy criterion for ‘destructuring’ 
the country into its  geo-political components. But other criteria  on 
which it  could also be segmented include religion and ethnicity. 
Together, these three criteria have become primary indices in most 
analyses of the Nigerian society. Particularly, regarding the tw in 
problem of unity and s tab ility .*1) However, the effects of these indices 
on work and productivity in the economy have not been directly 
addressed. Why is this so?
Probably, this is because Nigeria could further be structured along 
an important fourth criterion - production relations. This criterion 
impinges more directly upon productivity in the economy than geo­
politics, religion or ethnicity -  all commonly used in addressing the
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problem of unity/stability. Though a crucial criterion, production 
relations has, however, been unduly underemphasised in understanding 
the Nigerian society.
The underlying reason for this could be seen in the greater 
political concern generally shown for Nigeria's unity and stability. This 
has been at the expense of the equally important problem of low 
productivity in the economy. However, in this chapter, i t  w ill be argued 
that production-relations is as important as the other three factors in 
understanding the Nigerian social system. Beyond underlining this 
importance, an attempt w ill be made to show its  impact on work and 
productivity in the Nigerian economy.
For, because it  concerns the relationship between the two most 
important factors of production (capital and labour), it  is highly probable 
that its influence on work and productivity in the economy would be 
greater than those of the other three criteria. These three criteria, of 
course, do make remarkable impacts on productivity in the economy as 
w ill be demonstrated below. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
capital and labour is more important in understanding the productivity 
problem. This is largely so because it  concerns the principal factors 
involved in the production process. This relationship therefore w ill 
command primary attention in the analyses below. First, however, the 
preceding criteria along which Nigeria has often been structured are 
hereby analysed. This is in quest for the implications they have for 
productivity in the economy.
A. GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURING
That Nigeria is "a mere geographical expression" is often credited 
to Obafemi Awolowo, a one-time Nigerian leader; Implied in that 
statement is a flu id ity  in association among the different Nigerian 
peoples. It also indicates the inherent d ifficu lty  in seeing the country 
s tric tly  as a structured whole. The statement was, of course/prompted 
by the divisive tendencies in the country.
This notwithstanding, Nigeria as a geographical whole became a 
historical reality w ith Lord Fredrick Lugard's amalgamation of the 
southern and northern territories in 1914. Those northern territories 
had been made up of the dominant Hausa-Fulani emirates w ith their 
privileged elite groups. These groups had exercised a continuous 
administrative and judicial control over lesser politically influential 
groupings like the Nupes. Groupings who were organised in these large- 
scale statelike terms were later merged by the 1914 amalgamation to 
other groupings in the south. The latter, however, largely existed as 
dispersed societies or as small autonomous communities. The Yorubas in 
this la tter grouping were somewhere in the middle because they were 
largely organised as centralized ch ie fdom s.^ This merger created a 
conglomeration of over 250 ethnolinguistic formations. These have been 
subsequently bifurcated into a north-south divide by forces of national 
politics (see Map: Nigerian Major Ethnic Groups, Appendix I).
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Clearly, the most extant structuring of Nigeria in recent times has 
been along these geo-political lines into a north-south dichotomy. This 
has created a north-south issue that highlights the country's 
un ity /s tab ility  problem. However, this has largely been at the expense 
of other structurings that could illuminate the equally crucial 
productivity problem. U nity/stability as a national problem, 
nevertheless, reaches deep into the country's historical past. For, even 
in spite of the amalgamation treaty, the north and south were kept 
legislatively apart until the Arthur Richard's Constitution of 1946. Thus, 
as early as that, the north-south dichotomy had been initiated. It could, 
in fact, be argued that there was no Nigeria prior to 1946 because the 
amalgamation was anything but real.
Indeed, as David Williams observes, it  merely produced "two 
different, to some extent, rival systems of administation: the northern 
and southern groups of p r o v in c e s . " ^ )  Besides, the idea of a separate 
north was generally, though cautiously, pursued by the British 
administrators all through colonial rule. In their approach to governance, 
for instance, the indirect rule system was a preferred political 
expediency for the north exclusively as against the more direct approach 
in the south. Besides, the north was generally protected from the 
various modernising influences that contemporaneously were gaining 
ground in the south. For instance, there was created an imbalance of 
education between the north and the south partly on account of 
deliberate governance of the two regions. Lord Lugard, for example, was 
known to have given an undertaking to the northern emirs not to allow 
Christian missionaries who were largely responsible for education in the
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south to in filtra te  the north. Thus, the few government schools 
established in the north became poorly attended because colonial 
officers were not prepared to persuade, s t i l l  less, compel Muslim 
parents to send their children to such places of learning. Hence, the 
predominance of Koranic education in the north during this period when 
formal education was preparing in the south a people who became largely 
different in worldview and outlook from the people of the north.
Again, probably because of its  pursuance of a policy of a separate 
’one north', the colonial administration declined to create new states out 
of that area in spite of violent agitations of the 1940s and 1950s from 
the northern minority groupings for separate states. Conversely, the 
south had been sp lit into east and west in 1939. Therefore, the pattern 
of the historical development of Nigeria clearly favoured the emergence 
of a north-south structuring.
The emergent political organisations were closely to align w ith 
this largely geographical structuring. The Northern People's Congress 
(NPC) as its name implies, was the party of the Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri in 
the north and did not extend its  membership to the south. The Action 
Group (AG) more or less represented the Yorubas in the west w h ils t the 
National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) drew its  support largely 
from the Ibos of the east. The north-south dichotomy sharpened when 
the Northern Region, under the Macpherson Constitution (1951) received 
50% of the seats in the central legislature because of its  declared 
superiority in population.
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Thus, in the 1st Republic, ruling northern politicians hardly needed 
to seek direct support in the south to remain in leadership. For, from its 
advantageous constitutional position, the NPC merely needed an alliance 
w ith one of the southern parties, more often the NCNC, in order to govern 
at the centre.
In the 2nd Republic, the pattern was basically the same only that 
the NPC had become the National Party of Nigeria (NPN); the AG, the Unity 
Party of Nigeria (UPN); and the NCNC, the Nigerian People's Party (NPP).
It is the competition for political ascendency amongst these 
political organisations in the last three decades that probably has 
generated the sharpest visible conflicts in Nigeria. For example, the 
insurrections of the middle-belt minority groups of the 1950s, the 
controversial federal elections of 1959, the disputed 1963 Census 
exercise with its  aftermath, the Western Nigerian crisis of 1964, and 
the f irs t m ilitary intervention of 1966, all were off-shoots of this 
competition for political power. In the same way, the thousands of lives 
and millions of naira worth of property lost in sim ilar conflicts in the 
Second Republic all at once would suggest un ity /stab ility  as Nigeria's 
preeminent predicament. By the same token, the north-south structuring 
which appears to be at the roots of these conflicts would sim ilarly 
overshadow other possible structurings; capital-labour; Talakawa (the 
poor) Obokwu (the rich), for instance.
It should be stated, however, that it  would be virtua lly impossible 
to understand issues in the Nigerian system outside an adequate
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reference to the strongly intense internecine contest for political 
control amongst Nigeria's political parties and their ancillary 
organisations. Even as they now regroup in preparation for the Third 
Republic hopefully to be introduced in 1992, the influence of this 
politicking is altogether immense. Principally, they are of importance 
because they threaten the very survival of the country. Previously, there 
had been shouts of Araba! (i.e. secede) from some Hausa-Fulami elements 
when in 1967, they thought this political ascendancy had eluded their 
own leaders. And if  there is anything that unites the peoples of the 
south, it  is their constant apprehension about being dominated by the 
north. Indeed, the frequent calls for a southern solidarity, in a major 
sense, represents an attempt to organise a united front against a more 
powerful opponent on the part of the east and the west.
Yet, though these geo-political issues threaten the very existence 
of Nigeria as a social entity, they have generally overshadowed the issue 
of the relationship between capital and labour. The la tter issue, in any 
case, directly bears on the low productivity problem.
The implication of this situation for productivity may not be at 
once clear. However, what is discernable is that the focal attention of 
the nation has become fixed on the problem of national unity. But this 
has largely been at the expense of paying adequate attention to the 
equally important problem of low productivity.
It is apparent that for long the collective energy of the nation has 
been largely dissipated on attempts to forge a suitable political 
arrangement. Between them, the years of colonialism saw a total of four
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constitutional changes. These included major adaptations in regional 
structure and character.*4  ^ The 1960-66 period sim ilarly witnessed the 
major change to Republicanism in 1963 as well as the sequestration of 
another region from the south - the mid-west region. Then the m ilitary 
intervention of 1966 which became a landmark for three others in 1976, 
1983 and 1985. Meanwhile, during the Second Republic, sandwiched 
within the m ilita ry between 1979 and 1983, there was also a major 
change from the Westminster style of governance of the First Republic to 
a pattern that resembled the American presidentialism. Even now, 
elaborate agendas have been drawn up towards a possible return to, yet, 
another c iv il rule in 1992.
These preoccupations, are crucial and deserve the concern and 
urgency w ith which they have been treated. Yet, they have prevented 
present leaders from developing vision in respect of other problems. 
Probably if they had been adequately settled by earlier attempts, the 
national energy which they evidently continue to sap would have been 
channelled into solving the low productivity problem, for instance.
By occupying a position of primary focus, therefore, the political 
issue has overshadowed the productivity problem. In consequence, the 
practice of looking at Nigeria in its  geo-political structural parts has, 
accordingly, reduced the importance of the necessity to look at it, too, in 
a capital/labour structuring. This tends to eliminate access to the crux 
of the low productivity problem.
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B. RELIGIOUS STRUCTURING
Like geography and politics, religion apparently has offered a 
convenient basis for structuring Nigeria into a north-south divide. 
Again, largely because it  has been as volatile as politics and has 
produced almost as many violent episodes in the country as the latter, 
the north-south dichotomy apparently produced by religion has assumed 
more importance than the contradictions between capital and labour in 
the country. it  should be pointed out, of course, that these 
contradictions between capital and labour are no less important in 
understanding the Nigerian system than religious differences. Like 
politics, religious differences may threaten the structural base of the 
country. But the economic problems that have manifested most as low 
productivity threaten the very life  of the society.
Demonstrably though, religious contradictions in the country have 
been remarkable. The north-south geo-political structuring is re­
enacted in a dominantly Muslim north and dominantly Christian south 
dichotomy. The geo-political divide is, thus, reinforced by a 
corresponding religious divide. In fact, religion has been largely 
manipulated to sharpen the contest of the divide in the hands of 
politicians. Especially amongst the f irs t generation of leaders, it  
became a constant tool for consolidating political support in re lig io- 
ethnic strongholds, in the 1959 federal elections, for instance, Chief 
Awolowo's helicopter-assisted campaign in the north was considered 
offensive to the Muslims w ith the Premier of the region, Sir Ahmadu 
Bello, constantly reminding the northerners that Awolowo was
contemptuous of Islam and would ban it  if  he came to p o w e r.^  
Sim ilarly in the south, the leadership of the country by the north was 
interpreted as the political expression of the jihad envisaged by Ottman 
Dan Fodio, founder of the Sokoto caliphate.
To illustrate the impact of these religious issues further during 
the Second Republic (1979-83), a modus vivendi was often sought 
between the two religions by 'balancing the ticket' between the 
presidential and the vice-presidential candidates of each party: i f  one 
was a Christian, the other would be Muslim. Further acts of balancing 
were consummated through the principle of 'federal character'. Thus, in 
spite of the seeming incompatibility between Christianity and Islam as 
practiced in some parts of Nigeria, the adherents of each fa ith  continued 
to live side by side in reasonable harmony until a new danger to peaceful 
coexistence was ignited by the insurrection of the Maitatsine 
fundamentalists in December, 1980 when several hundreds were killed in 
Kano as a result of clashes with the army and police. Yet in spite of the 
ruthless response to the sects, wanton destruction, further outbreaks of 
violence took place in Maiduguri, Yola, and Gombe between 1982 and 
1983.
But though the Maitatsine rebellion was largely an intra-lslam ic 
confrontation, the fact that Christians were also at the receiving end of 
the violence emphasises the north-south religious contradictions. The 
fundamentalists had claimed that they primarily opposed corruption 
within Islam and sought a return to what they perceived to be a purer 
form of their religion. Yet, they attacked, maimed, and killed Christians 
and destroyed churches in the process.
109
The Maitatsine rebellion apart, a greater threat to the stab ility  of 
the nation through religious differences came in 1987 in the northern 
states when mainly in Kaduna, Islamic fanatics went on rampage and 
burned down churches and other Christian properties. The rioting was 
clearly an embarrassment to the President who described it  as "the 
equivalent of a "civil coup". In June 1987, he established an Advisory 
Council on Religious A ffa irs w ith a membership of 12 Muslims and 12 
Christians as if to even out the north-south differences - differences 
which equally have resulted from fundamentalist beliefs and practices 
from the Christian south.
These differences have proved so threatening that on three 
important occasions, the issue of religion vis-a-vis the secularity of the 
state provoked heated public controversies that generally have 
transcended the basic geo-poiitical north-south parameter. These 
surrounded firs t, the Sharia Court controversy. During 1978, the debates 
in the Constituent Assembly about a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal saw 
the Muslim leaders in the former northern region allying w ith politicians 
from the south. In the end, Section 242(1) of the 1979 Constitution 
provided for state Sharia Courts of Appeal. Secondly, in 1983, the then 
President, Shehu Shagari provoked a hostile reaction from Christians 
when he attempted establishing a Department of Islamic A ffa irs in his 
presidency. And thirdly, in 1986, the Babangida Government was taken to 
task over its decision to recognise Nigeria’s membership of the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (01C).
The north-south dichotomy, however, soon reshaped when the issue
of Sharia once again heated up in 1988. This time, another Constituent 
Assembly w ith as many as 567 members met to discuss the Constitution 
that w ill create the expected Third Republic in 1992. Its Committee 16 
failed to reach a decision about Sharia because the Muslim members 
wanted to upgrade its current state status by establishing a federal 
court of appeal while the Christian members wanted it to be expunged 
from the constitution. The acrimony generated by the heated debate was 
such that public peace was seriously threatened and the Government 
intervened by banning any further discussion since according to the 
President, "The issue had already been settled by the 1979
Constitution."^)
Apart from the fact that the controversy surrounding the Sharia 
has been largely suppressed, not resolved, other disagreements have been 
deepening antagonism between adherents of the two major religions. The 
question whether or not to restore diplomatic relations between Nigeria 
and Israel has had Muslims and Christians pitching tents and their 
leaders have seldom failed to scrutinize w ith jealous eyes any o ffic ia lly  
granted privileges that might be thought to favour one camp or the other. 
For instance, the Christian Association of Nigeria has recently criticised 
the Government "on grounds that the country’s newly established Pilgrim 
Commission caters for Muslims travelling to Mecca and discriminated 
against Christians wishing to v is it Bethelehem."^ Similar accusations 
of preferential treatment have been made in the past concerning 
subsidies to religious organisations for the construction of mosques and 
churches and especially, the appointment of offic ia ls  to important posts. 
Also, several of the higher Institutions of Learning have suffered from 
fierce religious disputes on their campuses and various student
organisations have tended to be divided on anti Muslim/Christian lines.
What is indicated in all these is that religious differences are, 
indeed, strong indices for structuring the Nigerian society. In fact, they 
are crucial factors as far as the political survival of Nigeria counts. To 
stress this point, in October 1987, Sheikh Abubaka Gumi, a respected 
Nigerian Muslim scholar, warned that future politics in Nigeria would be 
reiigionised. Appraising the proposed two-party system for the Third 
Republic, he predicted that it  would lead to a Muslim/Christian divide. 
But most importantly, he expressed the view that Muslims would not 
tolerate a Christian leader of the federal government. Such a person, 
according to him, "could be appointed by use of force -by army coup - but 
by election, it  would be d ifficu lt for a non-Muslim to be leader in 
Nigeria!" And when asked what would happen should Christians refuse to 
accept Muslim leadership, he was quoted as replying: "Then we have to 
divide the country."*8 )
Herein, it  is clear, the stakes lie. For Gumi, as observed by the 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Lagos, certainly had not merely expressed a 
personal opinion; but most probably, a deep-seated sentiment in the 
north. In a retort, the Bishop, Dr. A. Okojie, had to warn that Christians 
would 'burn the country'. In his words, "We just want to keep Nigeria 
because of peace (sic) but if  anybody tried any nonsense this time, I don’t 
care, we w ill burn the nation because it  is going to be a religious war 
and nobody w ill dare stop anybody; No gun w ill stop it."*9 )
Such is the acuteness of the religious controversy that the 
respected Bishop cast aside the decorum that normally would pertain to
his person and position to display such belligerence. This suggests that, 
the religious factor remains a crucial collective concern to the peoples 
of Nigeria. It would also largely jus tify  the importance accorded to 
religion as a parameter for structuring Nigeria and for accounting for 
some of its system problems.
To do this, however, would continue to be at the expense of an 
equally important structuring based on the parameter of production 
relations. The almost obtrusive focus on Nigeria's religious differences 
like the focus on the effects of its  geo-political differences has tended 
to push the differences between its  capital and labour away from view. 
The differences which could help in the understanding of the low 
productivity problem have, thus, been relegated to an epiphenomenal 
status. Production relations, therefore, have been denied the attention 
that would have produced a more meaningful account of social conflict in 
Nigeria.
Yet the entire burden of religion and concern with its  effects on 
the society just like the sim ilar concern w ith national s tab ility  does 
also sap the energy and time of those in leadership who, if  spared these 
preoccupations, probably would have made the economic burden of low 
productivity a primary focus. But an attempt at preserving the political 
unity of the country through f irs t dealing w ith the religious differences 
appears now paramount. As explained by General Olusegun Obasanjo, 
former Head of State,
By act of commission, we have raised the religious 
issue to a high pedestal. We can neither sweep it 
under the carpet nor ignore it. We must face the 
issue squarely and permanently lay it  to rest.( 10)
113
Again, the burden of permanently laying the religious problem to 
rest, though consequential, yet is in a sense another major digression. 
Effort funneled into this endeavour could be usefully deployed in 
combatting the, it  appears, less avoidable economic burden. 
Nevertheless, there is a dilemma here. For, conjured up is an image of a 
patient suffering from multiple diseases. Before an inexperienced 
physician, it  could be uncertain which of the diseases should be given 
principal attention. However, it  is plausible to assume that any disease 
of the heart or other vita l organs would receive the principal attention. 
In Nigeria, the economy - its life  - it  is clear, would represent the heart 
in the above analogy. The need, therefore, to give it  preeminent attention 
as well as the corresponding need to emphasize the contradictions 
between its capital and its labour is crucial.
C. ETHNOL1NGU1ST1C STRUCTURING
The sheer diversity of Nigerian peoples and culture produces a 
variability that has often been used to structure the country along 
ethnolinguistic lin e s /1 ^  Nigeria is inhabited by a large number of 
ethnic groups ranging in size from a few thousand to many million. 
Speaking between them, over two hundred and f if ty  languages. Of these, 
however, the Hausas, the Ibos, and the Yorubas are clearly, major groups. 
Minority groups include, for instance, the Edo, the Nupe, the Ijaw, the 
Tsekiri, the Tivs, the Nembe, the Efik, the Ibibio, the Kalahari, and the 
Okrika.
What is evident is that the three major groups form a quasi-tripod 
on which the whole country seems to stand. The three props of this 
tripod, however, generally relate in constant antagonism. The preceding 
geo-political and religious differences highlighted earlier are, in the 
main, to be based on the differences w ithin the tripod. To illustrate, in 
the First Republic, the NPC essentially was a Hausa Party; the NCNC, 
essentially an Ibo Party; whilst the AG esentially was a Yoruba Party. In 
the same way, the Hausas are mainly Muslims; the Ibos, mainly 
Christians; and the Yorubas, part Muslim and part Christian.
What also is evident is that these major groups generally have 
allotted to themselves the most important spheres of communal life  in 
Nigeria. Of the eight leaders since Independence, Tafawa Balewa 
(October 1960 - January 1966) was from the Muslim Hausa-Fulani group. 
Agwiyi Ironsi (January 1966 - July 1966) was from the Christian Ibo 
group. Yakubu Gowon (July 1966 - July 1975) a Christian, comes from 
Pankshin, a minority group in the north. Murtala Mohammed (July 1975 - 
February 1976) was from the Muslim/Hausa-Fulani group. Olusegun 
Obasanjo (February 1976 - September 1979) comes from the Christian 
Yoruba group. Shehu Shagari (October 1979 - December 1983) comes 
from the Muslim/Hausa-Fulani group. Mohammed Buhari (December 1983 
- August 1985) comes from the Muslim/Flausa-Fulani group. And the 
incumbent leader, Ibrahim Babaginda (August 1985 - ) is a Muslim from 
Nupe, a minority group in the north.
Amonst these regimes, the longest - nine years - has been that of 
Yakuba Gowon who does not belong to the Muslim Hausa-Fulani group. 
And the incumbent leader belongs to a minority Muslim group.
Besides, Sheikh Abubaka Gumi's declaration that Muslims in 
Nigeria would not tolerate a Christian leader of the federal Government, 
a sentiment that appears quite widespread in the north, is indicative 
enough of the Hausa-Fulani resolve not to negotiate their stronghold on 
the Nigerian political leadership.
However, the Lagos-lbadan zone, an enclave of the Yorubas, 
remains the stronghold of Nigeria's industrial activities. Sited in this 
axis are most of Nigeria’s key industries, employment places, and 
businesses w ith the result that nearly 75% of the total circulation of the 
naira is estimated to be confined to this zone. Consequently, much 
financial and industrial control of the Nigerian economy is firm ly held by 
the Yorubas. Even so, they also largely share the control of bureaucratic 
power w ith the Ibos who before the c iv il war, generally were in greater 
control of this sphere.
But this sharing of the national booty amongst the major groups 
has largely created discontent amongst the minority groups. Though in 
recent times, individuals from these la tter groups have found important 
positions in the c iv il service, the police, and the judiciary, yet general 
discontent from their kith and kin has often been translated into overt 
political action. For instance, the yearning for the creation of more 
states through which, i t  was assumed, the interests of the m inority 
groups would be safeguarded, symbolised the general anxieties shared by 
these groups that they would be dominated by the major groups When, 
however, it  appeared that new states would not be created as early as 
they' had desired, discontent on the part of minority groups galvanised
into, for instance, the Tiv riots of 1964. Of importance, however, is that 
the current 21 states structure evidently took into consideration the 
anxieties and aspirations of minority groups. Cross River, Akwa-lbom, 
Rivers, Benue, Plateau, and Niger are some of the newly created states 
that have generally mellowed down the anxious feelings of the minority 
groups. Yet the quest for more states s t il l remains substantially 
unassuaged. Indeed, the state creation issue would compare in vo la tility  
w ith the religious differences issue (see Map: The Federation of Nigeria 
Since Independence, Appendix II).
Therefore, largely because of the intense heat that has been 
generated through Nigeria’s ethnically differentiated character, there 
has been a strong compulsion to analyse it  along ethnolinguistic lines. 
Of course structuring it  along these lines is of some analytical 
importance concerning the productivity question. For, the fillin g  of job 
positions largely has been influenced by ethnic considerations as much 
as by education and experience, for instance. When positions are 
ascribed rather than achieved in this way, inefficient work performance 
could arise. Also when promotion from one position is sim ilarly partly 
determined by the incumbent’s ethnic origin, performance generally could 
be mediocre. Hence, low levels of productivity.
Much of Nigeria's wage employment scene, however, has been 
characterised by these ethnic particularistic influences to the extent 
that these influences have been considered primary variables for 
understanding the Nigerian social system. There are reasons, 
nevertheless, for the importance attributed to these variables as factors 
of explication. For the Government of the Federation generally has
elevated their importance as analytical concepts through for instance, 
its doctrine of 'federal character’. By this doctrine, school admissions, 
entry into the c iv il service, m inisterial and ambassadorial appointments, 
and government scholarships, for instance, must all reflect the ethnic 
character of the federation. This of course de-emphasises merit and 
ab ility in the fulfilm ent of those roles. Again, its frequent manipulation 
by political leaders in pursuit of personal ends tends to heighten the 
cumulative effects which it  is thought to leave on Nigeria's national life.
There is the remarkable case of one of the Presidential candidates 
in the 1979 elections whose candidature was threatened because he had 
failed to pay his taxes. When the candidate saw the chances open to him 
in the ethnic issue, he called a press conference to explain that he was 
being victimised because he was an Ibo! Of course, he was an Ibo. In 
invoking the ethnic sentiment, however, he had only underlined the 
potency of the ethnic factor in deciding important national issues. 
Though the annulment of his candidature was later rescinded, yet he lost 
the elections probably chiefly because he was neither a Hausa-Fulani nor 
a Muslim.
All the same, though of significant concern in Nigeria’s national 
life, the ethnic factor like the geopolitical and religious factors, has 
largely been blown out of proportion. Like the la tter two factors i t  has 
affected the perception of national issues so thickly that other possible 
crucial factors have been ignored. Specifically on the productivity 
question, it  offers an explanation which is partly convincing as, for 
instance, the displacement of the merit criterion in recruitment of 
personnel for work positions and their eventual performance in such
positions. Or, through the doctrine of 'federal character', the insistence 
that there must be an equal ethnic representation in the c iv il service and 
government parastatals could hinder levels of productivity. As valid as 
this proposition may be, a more fundamental impact on national 
productivity would largely arise more from the contradictory relations 
between capital and labour in Nigeria. It is to these relationships that 
the analyses now turn.
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CHAPTER V:
THE NIGERIAN SOCIETY:
Changes In Structure Of Production Relations
The relationship between capital and labour in Nigeria commands a 
position of primary Importance for understanding its low productivity 
problem. Universally, both capital and labour are crucial factors of 
production. Thus any lasting patterns of relationship between them w ill,  
influence productivity.
The relationship between the two factors in Nigeria is largely 
antagonistic. Neither of the two factors, nevertheless, is s tr ic tly  
monolithic. Capital, for instance, exists in the forms of Public Capital, 
Private Indigenous Capital and Private Foreign Capital. Perhaps a uniting 
factor amongst these forms is that they provide employment for 
Nigeria's wage labour. And especially in the private form, they aim at 
maximizing profits for their owners. What, on the other hand, unites 
labour is that whether in public or in private employment, its  services 
are for wages. Marx, of course, warned that wherever labour is 
commodified, the employers’ attempts to produce a surplus value out of 
labour (valorisation) would lead to a resistance from the alienated 
labour. Continued and collective resistance from the Nigerian labour 
marks one important aspect of the contradiction between capital and
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labour that i t  is argued here, is one of the roots of the low productivity 
problem in Nigeria.
I CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE FORMS OF CAPITAL
Though labour's resistance against capital is a contributory factor 
to low productivity in the Nigerian economy, internal differences 
between the forms of capital tend to exacerbate the low productivity 
problem. Public Capital, represented by the State Government, Private 
Indigenous Capital; and Private Foreign Capital, all are locked up in a 
contest for control over the Nigerian economy. This contest, in its 
ramifications, ultimately adds a critica l dimension to the low 
productivity problem.
The overall picture appears blurred though. For the relationships 
between these forms of capital cannot be s tric tly  described as 
combatant. For instance, the State Government, as Public Capital, has 
been generally variable in relating to the other two forms of capital. 
With Private Foreign Capital, in particular, i t  forged relationships that 
varied from subtle opposition to cautious promotion between 1960 and 
1985, for instance. And between i t  and Private indigenous Capital, 
relations were less oppositional and less cautiously promotional w ithin 
the same period. This is broadly indicated by the indigenisation 
exercises of 1972 and 1977. It is argued here that these shifting 
orientations (represented in the table on page 124) reveal a laxity on the 
part of the State Government. By being inconsistent it  has been 
essentially disabled from laying down consistent, reliable, and confident
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bases for organising social production in the economy. Consequently, 
this has taken a vita l to ll on national planning for productivity 
enhancement.
These periods are now analysed in an attempt to show the 
influences of these changing orientations of the State Government on 
productivity.
A. PROMOTION OF PRIVATE INDIGENOUS CAPITAL (1 9 6 0 -6 9 )
Because this period immediately followed the 1960 Independence, 
it  was marked by some degree by ebullient nationalist feelings that 
mainly characterised the pre-Independence period. These remnants of 
nationalist feelings, thus, were probably most chiefly responsible for 
the State Government's overt promotion of Private Indigenous Capital as 
an agency of enhancing productivity during the period. By creating 
National Development Boards, though, the Government attempted also to 
undertake the development of State capitalism in the same period. Thus, 
as C.R. F ra n k ^  describes, this was a pattern of involving emphasis on 
Private Indigenous Enterprise combined w ith the use of National 
Development Corporations and other quasi-governmental bodies. The 
pivot of this strategy, nevertheless, apparently rested on the 
development of Private Indigenous Capital.
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Period 
1960— ( 
1970- '  
1975-^
1981 - €
TABLE V.1
SHIFTING ORIENTATIONS OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT 
BETWEEN 1960 AND 1985
State Government's Orientation
Promotion of Indigenous Private Capital w ith some State 
Capitalism and Welfarism
Cautious promotion of Foreign Private Capital w ith some 
Welfarism
Reversal to the promotion of Indigenous Private Capital 
w ith some State Capitalism, some Welfarism, and 
tendencies towards accelerated productivity
Promotion of Public (State) Capital; dwindling Foreign and 
Indigenous Private Capital
Source: Direct Tabulation
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Public Capital yet was diffused and too weak to pilot productivity 
enhancement. The public corporations set up to engage in direct 
productivity enhancement as from 1950 evidently had failed in this role, 
for instance. To a large extent, this probably was due to the relatively 
high degree to which they had become politicized. Thus, the constraint 
was on the State Government to lay emphasis on Private Indigenous 
Capital as an agency for productivity enhancement.
However, this was an agency that would not usually be expected to 
be a ltru istic. The logic of its  existence based on private accumulation of 
capital, would reduce any chances that it  would pursue collective 
aspirations like productivity-enhancement programmes. It was, 
therefore, a tragedy that the State Government relied on this largely 
self-servicing Private Indigenous Capital to pilot its productivity 
enhancement programmes in this period. Perhaps, this was a case of 
misplaced trust or faulty judgement. Possibly, too, it  could have been a 
case of inexperience. The State Government, after all, had hardly 
emerged from colonial tutelage. It had yet to settle in. Inhibited by a 
paucity of alternatives, it  was constrained to use this group which, in 
any case, was the most obtrusive. For, back in 1949, this group had 
persistently sought for increased participation in the economic life  of 
the country. Its importunity had made the Colonial Department of 
Commerce in that year to declare as its  aims:
To develop secondary industries on the widest 
possible scale by methods that w ill ensure the 
maximum participation by Nigerians themselves in 
industrial enterprise and to provide all possible 
opportunities for Nigerian businessmen to take an 
increasing share in the trade of the country.(2)
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And by fia t of instruments like the 1959 Report of the Advisory 
Committee on Aids to African Businessmen, the group had consolidated 
as the most articulate segment of the Nigerian economy during the 
period. In itia lly, thus, there existed deep sentiments between it  and the 
State Government.
The question, however, is the plausibility of basing the 
enhancement of national productivity programmes on sentiments rather 
than rational judgement. This was, yet, another tragedy of the State 
Government’s policies. But by doing so, the State Government clearly had 
'poured its new wine into an old wineskin’. Logically, this ruptured as 
failed plans and unattained productivity enhancement goals. The pattern 
taken by these consequences is illustrated below.
Between 1960 and 1969, the reliance on Private Indigenous Capital 
to enhance productivity in Nigeria in the main, yielded the manufacture 
of consumer goods. What was expected from this stratagem probably 
was the pro fit that would quickly accrue from the sale of consumer 
goods. Following the capitalist strategy, of course, such pro fit was 
expected to be ploughed back as quickly as possible to create further 
profit. From the outset, however, the State Government had nursed 
reservations about the credentials of Private Indigenous Capital as a 
reliable agency of productivity enhancement. Hence, it  had led the way 
by establishing the f irs t large-scale industries.
But Government’s pioneering role in industrialisation had obviously 
taken off on a wrong foot. For, breweries and cigarette factories 
certainly are a questionable basis for propping the industrialisation of
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an economy. But this was done as the State Government set up its f irs t  
industries as large breweries at Aba and in Lagos and its cigarette 
factories in Ibadan and Port Harcourt.
The rationality in this pattern of industrialisation is questionable. 
Besides, the stated goals of productivity enhancement could hardly be 
attained through the establishment of breweries and cigarette factories. 
Probably if that f irs t  thrust had been directed into producing small- 
scale capital goods, a modest enhancement of productivity would have 
been initiated. Then, an important lesson would have been learnt from 
Lenin's caution that:
To expand production, it  is f irs t  of all necessary 
to enlarge that department of social production 
that manufactures means of production.(3)
Thus, the productive capacity of the economy would have been put, this 
early, into a positive formative shape. The vita l conditions for the 
reproduction of capital, however, were not initiated. Rather, what were 
readily reproduced were, largely, consumer goods which, moreover, were 
mainly non-essential.
Nevertheless, this preference for consumer goods production had, 
at least, two negative consequences on national productivity. First, it  
restricted the market in the economy to, largely, consumer goods. 
Production of capital goods would have encouraged a more rapid growth 
of the market. Even so, the beer and cigarettes that formed the nucleus 
of industrial production generally were not essential goods for which a 
majority of the population would benefit from. Clearly, they were goods 
targetted at the new elites who could indulge such luxuries. Thus,
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bounds were set on the Nigerian market In this way. Consequently, the 
State Government, therefore, had begun, quite early to rely, for the 
growth of the economy, largely on the foreign demandfor its  agricultural 
products. In this light, it  becomes less surprising that productivity 
during this period was unable to grow any faster than was determined by 
agricultural exports. Between 1960 and 1965, for instance, it  was 
estimated that the productivity rate was about 1% lower than the rate of 
export growth which was 5.2% per annum.*4 )
The production of capital goods, of course, was not to ta lly 
neglected. The incipient artisan crafts were s t il l a reminder of the 
opportunities open for enhancing productivity through the development of 
manufacturing. It could be argued, though, that a few institutional 
obstacles in the economy resisted the development of manufacturing. 
Indeed, J. Mars, P.T. Bauer, 5.R. Smith and C. Liedholm at different times 
raised the argument that manufacturing was discouraged in the colonial 
situation because the colonial regime's priority was to protect interests 
in trade.*5 ) Thus, the State Government inherited this inhibition.
However, other structural factors conducive to the development of 
manufacturing could have been utilised especially, after Independence. 
The continued existence of the artisan crafts apart, the competition 
generated by foreign enterprise could have stimulated productivity 
generally. This would have stimulated further investments from foreign 
enterprise in order to gain a firmer foothold in the expanding economy. 
These factors, among others, could have neutralized the effects of any 
'institutionalised obstacles' in the economy. Thereby, productivity would
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have been enhanced through the development of manufacturing.
But the marginalisation of this sector in the wake of the emphasis 
on consumer goods is shown by the relatively insignificant share of the 
6DP in its  favour during the period.
TABLE V 2
ANNUAL SECTORAL SHARES OF NIGERIA'S GDP 
SELECTED YEARS (1962 FACTOR COST)
Sector Sectoral Shares
1960 1966 1967
Farming, Forestry and Fisheries 64.6 54.9 55.9
Mining 1.3 7.2 3.5
Manufacturing 1.6 1.3 1.4
Electricity and Water Supply 0.3 0.7 0.7
Construction 4.4 5.1 5.0
Marketing Boards 0.4 0.4 0.6
Other Distribution 11.9 12.3 12.7
Communications 4.3 4.0 3.9
General Government 4.0 3.3 3.3
Education 2.4 3.6 3.2
Health 6.4 0.6 0.6
Other Services 2.0 2.6 5.2
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Computed from Digest of S tatis tics  (Lagos) October
(1970). The 1967 figures were computed from the Second 
National Development Plan 1970-74 (Lagos) 1970, p.50.
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From the table we can see that manufacturing was marginalized, 
for instance, by the negligible 1.3% of the GDP that was its share in 
1966. Compared to the 54.9% share in favour of Farming, Forestry and 
Fisheries in the year’s GDP and the corresponding 12.3% in favour of the 
Commerce sector, the case for the marginalisation of manufacturing is 
clearly established. Yet, the irony of the situation would become clear 
when it  is recalled that Nigeria reputedly has had the largest industrial 
sector in Black Africa. In terms of the percentage share of GDP claimed 
by manufacturing, however, countries like Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda 
have had higher proportions.*6 ^
Though the manufacturing sector was marginalised at the expense 
of productivity enhancement in this way, it  is remarkable that what 
li t t le  was done towards developing that sector was achieved w ith 
relatively unimportant indigenous participation. Thus, the 1.3% share of 
the GDP in 1966, for instance, essentially came from Private Foreign 
Capital participation in the economy as would become clear from the 
table overleaf.
From the table, we can see that out of a population estimated at 
63 m illion w ith an active labour force of over 20 million, only 13012 
were employed directly in capital goods production. The 0.07% of the 
active labour force represented by this would underline the more, the 
neglect of that v ita l sector, a neglect which partly would explain the 
inhibitions on productivity. Besides, from the paid-up capitals in that 
sector in 1963, Private Foreign Capital accounted for an
TABLE V.3
INDIGENOUS AND NON-INDIGENOUS CONTRIBUTIONS TO
MANUFACTURING IN NIGERIA (1963)
Manufacturing Groups
Number EmDloved 
Nigeria Expatriate
Private
Nigeria
£
Paid-UD CaDital 
Private 
Foreign 
£
Nigerian
Government
£
Wood, Wood Products 10287 120 128691 1852650 463571
Paper, Paper Products 5154 81 423083 692413 1741096
Non-Metalic Mineral Products 
Except Petroleum and Coal 2870 83 1163270 1976785 3593920
Basic Metals 526 39 97075 365925 175000
Fabricated Metal Products, 
Machinery, Equipment, etc. 13012 517 597521 15692111 543102
Source: Extracted from Industrial Survey of Nigeria 1965 (Lagos 1966), Tables 1, 5 ,7
and 8.
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overwhelming £15,692,111. Compared to the £1,140,623 accounted for 
by both Public and Private Indigenous Capitals, the very limited interest 
shown by indigenous concerns in the manfuacturing sector becomes 
obvious.
Possibly, of course, the apparent neglect of this vita l sector could 
have been due to some of the structural constraints noted earlier.*7 * It 
could also have been due to the dictates of international division labour
i
by which the Nigerian economy was deemed to gain more by producing 
primary export crops which could be exchanged for imported capital 
goods. Whatever merits there are in the la tter argument, in the light of 
the character of contemporary world exchange trade, there was a lack of 
foresight in neglecting manufacturing in the economy.
However, the theoretical point underlined here is that in relying on 
Private Indigenous Capital for productivity enhancement in the Nigerian 
economy soon after Independence, the State Government had chosen an 
agency whose interests were neither national nor a ltru istic. This agency 
would deemphasize capital goods production in its  preoccupation w ith 
consumer goods. In practical terms, therefore, the inducement of growth 
in productivity had become seriously handicapped.
B. CAUTIOUS PROMOTION OF PRIVATE FOREIGN CAPITAL
( 1970- 74 )_________________________________ _
Perhaps, the subsequent reliance on Private Foreign Capital for 
productivity enhancement in the economy that followed in the 1970-
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1974 period was largely due to the failure of Private Indigenous Capital 
to do so. Through the Second National Development Plan, Private Foreign 
Capital received the enabling charge "to perceive investment 
opportunities, to establish their commercial viability, and to undertake 
most medium or large-scale economic activities in the modern 
sector.”*8 ) Thus, the foreign investor had become the pivotal agency for 
productivity enhancement in the economy.
In 1973, for instance, the volume of direct investment in the 
economy by Private Foreign Capital amounted to $878.26 million. This 
represented 16 times the sim ilar volume in 1960 which was $53.20 
m illion.*9 ) This rapid increase underlines a heightened vigour in Private 
Foreign Capital participation in the economy. Besides the generous 
reliance on this capital to enhance productivity in the economy is 
reinforced by the encouragement it  received to operate freely in the v ita l 
spheres of Mining, for which it  controlled 51.4% investment; 
Manufacturing, 22.4%; and Trading and Business Services, 20.6%.*1Q) 
And whereas until 1964, Private Foreign Capital participation in Agro- 
Industrial activities was nil; by 1972, it  had controlled 11.2% 
investments in these activ ities .*1 ^  Other evidences of the central role 
assumed by Private Foreign Capital as a result of the apparent failure of 
Private Indigenous Capital include the phenomenal rise of its  total 
investment in manufacturing from $110.6 m illion in 1963 to $580.6 
m illion in 1972.*12)
These burgeoning activities of Private Foreign Capital le ft 
distinct effects on national productivity. According to o ffic ia l reports a 
considerable growth in productivity was attained through the primary
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role that Private Foreign Capital had begun to pay in the economy. Real 
Gross Domestic Product, for instance, was estimated to have risen by 
30.5% in 1970 above the average for the years between 1964 and 
1966.^3) ^nd, average annual growth of GDP for the three years up to 
1973 was given as 11.7%. The perceived enhancement in productivity, 
however, was particularly o ffic ia lly  buttressed by a considerable 
expansion recorded in manufacturing and construction. From a relatively 
small base, the former was estimated to have grown by 10%. 
Construction output, in turn, was seen to have increased by 41.2% in 
1971 and 15.6% in 1974, for instance.^ 4) But of these supporting data, 
improvements in Nigeria's balance of payments which were due to the 
new reliance on Foreign Capital perhaps, is the most crucial. For, 
deficits in the balance on current account ranging between N242 m illion 
and N325 m illion from 1970 to 1972 were estimated to have been 
converted to a surplus of N402 m illion in 1973/15)
Therefore, based on these statistics, it  is correct to describe the 
period of national reliance on Private Foreign Capital for productivity 
enhancement as one of general economic growth. However, that much of 
the growth so attained could be attributed to the fortuitous oil boom 
which set in in the period is indicated by the fact that the growth in GDP 
in 1972 given as 7.3% was entirely due to crude petroleum sa le s /16) 
The boom, of course, imparted a significant stimulus to the rest of the 
economy as is evident in the volume of construction work w ith in the 
period. The magnitude of productivity enhancement resulting from the 
reliance on Private Foreign Capital was, therefore, less than was 
o ffic ia lly  credited to it.
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Even so, this new reliance on Private Foreign Capital le ft some 
negative effects on the productivity it  had been targetted to enhance. 
For its  activities also implied some degree of net capital loss to the 
economy. This, of course, could not have been a deliberate design. 
Rather, the situation obliged the Nigerian economy to a number of 
conditions which meant a net loss of capital. Some of these conditions 
were:
(a) Paying fees for consulting and other special services to outside 
groups.
(b) Paying fees to skilled foreign construction and administrative 
personnel.
(c) Costs of buying raw materials, tools, and other production aids 
from the home countries of Foreign Capital.
Besides, the reliance on Private Foreign Capital to enhance 
productivity in the economy apparently was not conducive to the 
development of indigenous productive forces. The clearest impact this 
had on productivity in the economy is mostly in the development of 
indigenous crafts and skills. Largely because these crafts and sk ills  
were rudimentary, their leather, textile, and iron products could not 
compete in quality and price w ith their imported equivalents. There is 
li t t le  surprise, therefore, that the domestic market inclined to the 
better-finished foreign varieties.
The resultant neglect of these crafts was generally widespread as 
craftsmen turned to other opportunities in the economy. To illustrate, 
local brewing had made beer from corn and m ille t (burukutu) dating back 
to 1 8 6 0 . ( 1 The subsequent undermining of the demand for this local
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brew was largely due to the establishment of Private Foreign Capital 
beer enterprise in 1949 in the economy. This undermining is indicated by 
the virtual loss in demand for the local brew in the midst of the almost 
2.5 m illion litres  of foreign beer per annum in the economy. In the same 
vein, cotton, once locally spun, hand-woven, and dyed w ith colours 
obtained from local plants into textiles that provided most o f the 
clothing of the indigenes currently cannot compete w ith the several 
m illion square yards of fabric imported into the economy by private 
Foreign Capital. Likewise, the laterite mud compounds that for long had 
formed the primary building materials cannot now compete w ith over 2 
million tones of cement annually introduced into the economy by Private 
Foreign Capital. Thus, increased Private Foreign Capital activity, though 
apparently productivity-enhancing as shown above, was also partly 
responsible for reduced productivity in the economy in the long run.* 1
Arguably, though, the effects of Private Foreign Capital on 
indigenous crafts and skills are not as devastating as presented 
sometimes. Some rural segments of Nigeria, of course, s t il l build houses 
with laterite mud compounds. Some also s t il l patronise the locally spun 
and woven fa b r ic s .* ^  And some customers, indeed, s t il l prefer the 
local burukutu to the foreign brew. Different markets in the economy 
serve different brands of the same product. This segmented character of 
the Nigerian market has been pointed out by Peter Kilby thus:
This phenomenon of market segmentation flows 
from the level of per capita income. With severely 
lim ited purchasing power, the community's poorest 
members w ill often choose inexpensive low- 
quality products such as tyre-sandals or household 
utensils beaten out of scrap by the tinker in 
preference to the higher quality, more durable
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dearer alternative.(2 0 )
Thus, income differentiation in the Nigerian economy has tended to 
assure indigenous crafts a share of the local market. However, these 
crafts generally have been besieged by the better quality, foreign capital 
manufactures.
Yet, another impact of the reliance on Private Foreign Capital to 
enhance productivity in the Nigerian economy is the propensity inherent 
in it  to inhibit the development of indigenous entrepreneurship, it  was, 
of course, to correct the apparent failings of the la tte r that reliance was 
placed on Private Foreign Capital in the f irs t place. But the logic of its  
existence in the form of large-scale firms would dictate that such firms 
strive to become monopolies. Hence, any bid to keep local firms out of 
the industries in which they were the f irs t party to in itia te  productive 
fac ilities would be easily understood. Though in the interim, the 
consequences of the reliance on them for productivity enhnacement were 
hugely positive, in the long run this was not s tr ic tly  so. This is largely 
so because the prominent role they played in the economy has tended to 
minimize the chances available to local entrepreneurs for improving 
their knowledge, experience and abilities. This, clearly, has hardly been 
in the interests of long-term productivity enhancement.
C. REVERSAL TO THE PROMOTION OF PRIVATE INDIGENOUS
CAPITAL(1975 -80 )_________________________________
Mainly because of the perceived negative implications of its  
cautious promotion of Private Foreign Capital into productivity
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enhancement roles in the economy, the argument subsequently emerged 
that
interests of Foreign Private investors in the 
Nigerian economy cannot be expected to coincide 
at all times and in every respect w ith national 
aspirations.(2 1 )
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1977 reinforces the 
previous 1972 Decree. Thus, there was a reversal to the promotion of 
Private Indigenous Capital into productivity enhancement roles between 
1975 and 1980.
However, the State Government s t i l l  relied on Private Foreign 
Capital to enhance productivity while promoting Private Indigenous 
Capital influence in the economy. This posed a curious mixture of 
nationalism and an internationalist dependence character. Private 
Foreign Capital presence, of course, remained v ita l for the establishment 
of new techniques especially in the Government's huge projects in 
liquefied natural gas, petroleum products, and fertilisers, for example. 
In retaining its reliance on Private Foreign Capital for these roles while 
promoting Private Indigenous Capital influence in the economy, the State 
Government's position was equivacatory and ambivalent.
These tra its, clearly, could hardly be in the interest of national 
productivity for a number of reasons. Primarily, through these unstable 
predilections, the State Government inadvertently played itse lf into a 
position of weakness in interacting with Private Capital. From this 
weak position, it  would have been d ifficu lt for it  to exert any meaningful 
control over those interests it  had attempted to protect through decrees.
Attention has. for instance, been drawn to tne ’carelessness' in 
design and ’sloppiness' m implementation of the Government’s 
indigenisation exercise.*22 ) It would be unfair, thougn, to describe the 
designing of the enabling decrees as careless. Jumbled, would be a fa irer 
description because the decrees were not. in tne f irs t place, firm ly 
dictated by the State Government alone. They were muddled by 
influences from both Indigenous and Foreign Private Capital. If Private 
Indigenous Capital had drafted the decreees, they would possibly have 
been consistent w ith its  objectives. Similarly., if  the State Government 
had not been substantially influenced by either Private Indigenous 
Capital or Private Foreign Capital, its draft would have been more 
consistent w ith the stated objective of enhancing productivity. The 
differing objectives of each of these actors in the economy had vied for 
primacy in the decrees. Hence in promulgating the decrees, the State 
Government was caught in the cross-fire of the other principal 
protagonists.
That the decrees had been aimed at transfering proprietary 
interests in business organisations from expatriates to indigenes, of 
course, was not merely to assuage the th irst of nationalism. The 
economic independence thus advocated was no end in itself. Rather, i t  
essentially was a process aimed at attaining the desired goal of 
productivity enhancement. In the exercises, it. would be d ifficu lt to see 
the Government's classification of all business enterprises in the private 
sector into three groups as careless.*2 ^ )  By the 1977 Decree. Nigerian 
participation, to the respective tune of 100%, 60% arid 40% in each of the 
emergent three categories, had become mandatory. This classification in
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'schedules' corresponded w ith the perceived importance of the economic 
activities based upon the principles of size and technical 
sophistication.*2 4 * It. would be wrong to describe as careless the State 
Government's inclusion of small scale, low technology activities in 
Schedule 1 which demanded 100% Nigerian equity participation. The 
retail trade, jewelry, newspapers, garments and singlets included in that. 
Schedule were.correctly placed For, those 'were activ ities which were 
almost already wholly controlled by indigenes. The further inclusion of 
bakeries, electrical assembly, rice-m illing, and tyre-retreading in this 
schedule was also proper. So also advertising, forwarding, hair dressing, 
road transport, laundry, buses, taxies, and radio/television broadcasting.
In the same way, the State Government's grouping of largely 
intermediate scale activities into Schedule II could hardly be faulted in 
design. These activities included the more technically sophisticated 
areas like construction, coastal and inland shipping, real estate 
agencies, internal air transportation, travel agencies, paper conversion, 
screen-printing on textiles, manufacture of tyres, etc.
By means of this 'scheduling process' the State Government had 
evidently aimed at reinforcing the position of Private Indigenous Capital 
in the on-going contest for control over the economy. Thus, Private 
Indigenous Capital had been granted an additional inducement, through 
the indigenisation exercise, to enable it  to accelerate the enhancement 
of productivity. However, whether the State Government was capable of 
implementing the exercise was the real concern.
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Evidence indicates that tne State Government snowed a practical 
weakness in implementing the exercise. Foremost, that the original 
decree had to be modified in 1977 implied that, there was an obvious 
dissatisfaction with its results. This is borne out by relevant statistics. 
For instance, by the middle of 1975. only 209 out of a total of 357 
affected firms in Schedule 1 had complied with the f irs t decree. The 
resultant 40% default rate indicated weakness m implementing the 
decree. However, this weakness is not firm ly indicated in Schedule II 
where the default rate was only 10%. 533 out of 595 affected firms had 
complied w ith the decree by the same date. Table 5.4 overleaf gives 
further details.
The general impression, therefore, is that the State Government 
was not well prepared for the various antics adopted by Private Foreign 
Capital as strategic devices of escape. Thomas B i e r s t e k e r ^ S )  h a s  
provided a graphic presentation of some of these antics summarized 
below:
Step One: Attempt reclassification
Appeal to NEPT 
Rename Existing 
Incorporate new company 
Bribe
If successful, go to Schedule II 
If not, try Steps Two through Five.
Step Two: Take out Nigerian citizenship
If successful, sell shares to self 
If not, try Steps Three through Five.
Step Three: Front
No purchase; no share certificate; bogus purchase; single
TABLE V.4
EXTENT OF COMPLIANCE BY FOREIGN FIRMS
Multinational
Capital
Indian
Capital
Levant in 
Capital
Other
Capital
Total
Schedule!
Compliances 52 17 98 42 209
Defaults 14 •70 ”7 “7 27 140
Compliance Rate 79% 44% 56% 61% 60%
Total Affected 66 39 175 69 349a
Schedule 11
Compliances 342 66 89 36 533
Defaults 97 g 15 1 1 62
Compliance Rate 93% 88% 86% 77% 90%
Total Affected 369 ■7C! ^ 104 47 595
% of Total 62% 1 771 -J A'j 17% 8%
Source: Compiled from Report of the Industrial Enterprises Panel
1977 Vol. II.
a - Does not equal 357 because of some cases pending via arbitration.
purchaser w ith questionable involvement.
Sell to reliable employee or distributor.
If successful, carry on business as usual 
If not, try Steps Four or Five.
Step Four: Stall
Overvalue assets to deter buyers 
If successful, try Steps One through Three again or 
repatriate capital 
If not, go to Step Five.
Step Five: Overvalue assets and sell privately
Sell commerical activities only 
Sell existing business and diversify 
Sell enterprise and leave Nigeria.
Thus, reclassification, naturalisation, fronting, stalling, and overvaluing 
of assets were some of the devices adopted by Private Foreign Capital to 
frustrate the State Governments attempts to weaken its  position in the 
economy.
To a large extent, the State Government failed to realise the 
objectives of the indigenisation exercise. Private Foreign Capital's 
position in the economy, therefore, remained defiant. Its aim of 
improving the country's balance of payments position through 
indigenisation, for instance, was a failure.*26 * Also, the exercise made 
affected foreign firms alter the productive structure of their Nigerian 
subsidiaries. This generally enabled them to relocate their control over 
these subsidiaries away from economic and management functions to 
technological functions. This had adverse effects on the labour 
absorption rate in industry.*27* Therefore, the principal instrument 
fashioned by the State Government in an attempt to enhance productivity
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through Private Indigenous Capital was largely a failure.
D. PROMOTION OF PUBLIC CAPITAL (1981 -85 )
With the apparent failure of the indigenisation exercise, the State 
Government became roused to the reality that the enhancement of 
productivity in the Nigerian economy was its  responsibility. Hitherto, 
this responsibility had been shoved to either Private Indigenous Capital 
or Private Foreign Capital. However, neither of the two had attained an 
enduring success in this task.
The Third National Development Plan coinciding w ith this period of 
Government self-realisation, reveals the Government's attempt to 
alternatively enhance productivity in the economy through the promotion 
of Public Capital. The Plan, for instance, stressed the need for 'se lf- 
reliance' and the involvement of the generality of Nigerians in developing 
productive forces in the economy. Thus, the need for the development of 
grassroots energy for productivity enhancement became, for the f irs t 
time, addressed.
Remarkably, it  was emphasized that investment would henceforth 
be largely financed from domestic savings. This certainly was a positive 
development. Positive also was the Plan's recommendation for the 
development of technology and reduction in rural-urban drift. So also 
was the intention to promote a new orientation conducive to greater 
discipline, better attitude to work and a cleaner environment. That 
cost-consciousness was also emphasised, indicated the arrival of a new
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era in which the State Government had become productivity conscious. 
For, the drafters of the Plan had been enjoined to ‘think small' instead of 
'big' as had been done in the grandiose projects of the previous years. 
Besides, they had also been instructed to use existing project designs 
where possible so as to minimize consultancy fees. Generally, therefore, 
e ffort was made toward simpler, more functional, and more economic 
projects that could be executed using more direct labour and local 
resources than hitherto.
This positive inclination, of course, reflected the general trend 
towards a self-re liant and self-sustained development which, like a 
wind, had blown across sub-Saharan Africa during these years. By 
adopting the ’Lagos Plan of Action' in 1980, the Organisation for African 
Unity had endorsed the fact that African countries must be their own 
saviour and must pull themselves up from undevelopment. Its prevalent 
vision of a developed and prosperous Africa by the year 2000 probably 
was a principal stimulus that awakened in the Nigerian State Government 
the need to fashion its  own programme, craft its  own policies, mobilize 
its own material and human resources towards a genuinely prosperous 
Nigeria. This, generally, was a bold and challenging vision towards 
attaining enhanced productivity in the economy. At least, the debacle for 
control over the economy of the past years had become de-emphasized.
That the State Government began to lay emphasis on the domestic 
production of goods previously imported indicated its  awakening to the 
importance of productivity enhancement through self-reliance. It also 
indicated its  new awareness that an indiscriminate importation of 
finished products might throttle the development of local productive
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forces. But perhaps of greater importance, is the additional indication 
that the State Government had awakened to the reality of basing 
productivity enhancement in itiatives on a broad mass basis rather than 
the narrow basis founded either on Private Indigenous or on Private 
Foreign Capital.
But that it  now endorsed the domestic production of goods 
previously imported meant that the State Government had chiefly 
adopted import substitution as a strategy. As a strategy import 
substitution, of course, was not a novelty in the economy. Peter Kilby 
had observed the hesitant steps taken towards it  in earlier years.*28 * 
And, as an industrialisation strategy, W.F. Steel*29 * and T.L. K illick*3*** 
had studied it  in the neighbouring Ghana in 1972. A. Seidman*31 * also 
provided a useful critique of this strategy as it  was applied in Zambia in 
1974.
Therefore, in adopting the import substitution strategy, the State 
Government subscribed to an approach adopted elsewhere on the. 
continent towards tackling low productivity and underdevelopment 
generally. The dictates of this strategy spelt out by Raj and Sen,*32* 
for instance, were problem-solving enough to attract the sympathy of 
the State Government. In brief, these dictates exposed Nigeria, 
according to Raj and Sen, to three basic options. First, i t  could use its  
foreign exchange to import investment goods (e.g. looms), raw materials, 
fuels, etc. to manufacture consumer goods (e.g. cloth). Or, it  could use 
its foreign exchange to import capital goods (machine tools) to make 
investment goods which, in turn, produce consumer goods and to make 
intermediate goods (e.g. steel) and develop raw material supplies. Or
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s till,  it  could use its foreign exchange to import capital goods to make 
capital goods which, in turn, make other capital goods, investments 
goods, etc.
The dictates of this strategy would immediately compel attraction 
- its provision that 'production1 would actually happen locally. 
Investment goods, raw materials and capital goods could be imported, 
though. Yet their salience is that they all in turn would serve to produce 
use goods at home. Besides, as a strategy, it  could conserve foreign 
exchange which, in turn, could improve Balance of Payments. Again, 
since the market of any product would be largely local, it  would be fa irly  
well-known and established. Above all, the strategy could satisfy the 
desire to demonstrate an ab ility  to produce for the local economy rather 
than import into it. Greater employment opportunities could also be 
created. Thus, general benefits of technical progress could, all told, be 
derived from it. Seen in this way as a positive, deliberate, and conscious 
development strategy and a 'cause' to economic growth, l i t t le  wonder it  
appealed to the State Government in Nigeria especially in the early 
1980s.
The above attractions of import substitution which apparently 
influenced its adoption by the State Government as a deliberate policy 
towards productivity enhancement, however, were also open to 
objections. Critics inclined to neo-classical thought, like the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), saw the 
State Government's position as an economic blunder. The Bank, for 
instance, pointed out that the entailed deliberate imposition of 
protective ta riffs  could force the transnational corporations to reduce
domestic production fac ilities  in order to protect their market position. 
This precisely is Kilby's reading of the situation in his market protection 
hypothesis (1969). Thus, these ta r iffs  could, in the final analysis, be 
counterproductive. Indeed, a study of net effective protection arising 
from trade policy across 54 industrial groups carried out by the IBRD in 
1977 in the economy indicated disincentives to export-oriented 
industries as well as import-substituting intermediary industries based 
on local raw materials. Besides, the State Government's protective 
ta riffs  and discriminatory attention to industry was also seen to be a 
bias against agriculture. This was a lopside which would mean that 
productivity could be enhanced only through industry w ith the resultant 
possibility of over-using this sector.(33)
Even so, the State Government’s orientation to import substitution 
as a means of productivity enhancement was considered unreasonable in 
neo-classical circles as a planning instrument. Under the strategy, it  
was pointed out, the planner would usually consider a product suitable 
for domestic production i f  the domestic market, as given by the value or 
volume of imports of that product was equal to or greater than the 
minimum economic output of a single manufacturing unit. Protection 
would, then, be given to the domestic producer so that the price of the 
imported product (assuming that imports are permitted) w ill be equal to, 
or greater than the price of the domestic product. This argument, of 
course, raised one or two issues which, in turn, questioned the 
advisability of the State Government's adoption of the strategy as a 
means of productivity enhancement.
First, the market for imported goods, it  was pointed out, is not 
likely to represent the demands of the population as a whole, import 
substitution accepts the pattern of demand and the underlying 
distribution of income as given whereas it  may be both necessary and 
desirable to alter radically consumption patterns and distributional 
profiles, both aspects of the economic and socio-political structure 
which industrialisation is intended to alter. Again, it  was pointed out 
that the State Government's subscription to import substitution was 
wrong because i t  is not necessarily the case that products which enter 
the country do not merit domestic production nor does i t  mean that 
because certain products enter in large amounts, domestic production is 
desirable since industrialisation may well require the domestic
production of goods previously neither imported nor (of necessity)
consumed. Finally, i t  was argued that through import substitution, the 
State Government had given priority to consumer goods production 
leading to what could be regarded as a tim id industrialisation strategy 
which although i t  could generate rapid growth in the short run, yet would 
be unable to maintain this momentum either in the medium or in the long 
run. Since therefore, through this strategy, these negative consequences 
were le ft on the Nigerian economy, it  was argued that the State
Government’s subscription to import substitution was generally
counterproductive to productivity enhancement.
This argument is of utmost importance in the discussion of the 
low productivity problem because the period beyond 1985 has been 
chiefly characterised by the State Government's subsequent inclination 
to its  viewpoint. Thus, the Government has generally made a detour from
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the Lagos 'Plan of Action’ to the World Bank 'Agenda for Action' in the 
period beyond 1985,. Interestingly, though, both options are action- 
oriented. At least, in principle.
E. BEYOND 1985
The neo-classical economic advice which the State Government 
has generally heeded to beyond 1985 is chiefly encapsulated in the IBRD’s 
'Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action’ 
(1981). The World Bank had -  using this medium -  cautioned that if  the 
Government took the issue of productivity enhancement serious, certain 
measures were imperative. These included:
(a) Rationalization and lowering of protective tariffs :
(b) Devaluation of the naira.
(c) Encouragement of free play of market forces.
(d) Encouragement of exports.
(e) Removal of the disincentives suffered by other sectors of the 
economy; particularly agriculture.
(f) Reduction of the degree of the State’s direct intervention in the 
Nigerian economy.
These measures largely represent the structural adjustment 
strategy of tackling the productivity problem to which the State 
Government currently subscribes. This new tw is t of course reflects 
global currents in international economics w ith special reference to the 
development of the Third World. It reflects a general shift, on the part 
of Third World countries, from the question of development to the more
specifically directed problem of adjustment. Thus, Richard Feinberg 
argues: "If development was the dominant theme and aspiration of the 
Third World in the 1950s and 1960s, adjustment is the painful necessity 
of the 1 980s."(34)
This need for adjustment has, now, been heightened no longer 
simply because of the low productivity problem but also by a number of 
cataclysms in the global economic structure. These include the all 
related phenomena of higher costs of capital, global recession, and 
retrenchment in international financial markets. These phenomena have 
meant that Nigerians have had to accept lower standards of living to o ff­
set these costs. Secondly, the incidence of rising costs of food in 
particular has called on the State Government to adjust investment 
priorities and relative prices. Thirdly, Nigeria's productive structures 
generally have been battered by the accelerating pace of technological 
innovation, especially in electronics. Finally, Nigeria has also been under 
an increasing pressure to expose itse lf more fu lly  to a liberalised 
economy.*35  ^ This liberalisation which according to Feinberg would 
mean, "freeing prices to reflect international cost structure" w ith its 
concomitant stabilisation which demands of the government to bring 
expenditures into line w ith available resources makes up, indeed, a 
formidable agenda for any State Government in the Developing World.
It is true the naira has been drastically devalued through firs t, a 
Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market (5FEM), and a simple Foreign 
Exchange Market (FEM). This, clearly, is a bold measure adopted by the 
State Government to stem what could have been a major economic 
catastrophy. The naira had mainly appreciated, in the f irs t  instance,
because of the huge oil sales of the early 1970s. Thus i t  was backed by 
neither agricultural nor industrial products but by crude oil whose 
stab ility  in terms of price and volume could not be relied on. To be 
placed on almost exchange parity w ith more adequately backed foreign 
currencies was economically unwise. That i t  was permitted to float to 
its own level through the SFEM and FEM was a positive step by the State 
Government.
Again prior to structural adjustment, petroleum was heavily 
subsidized by the State Government. A litre  sold for 20k and i t  was 
perhaps correctly argued that Nigeria was one of the few countries 
where a litre  of fuel sold cheaper than a bottle of Coca Cola Petroleum 
subsidy has been withdrawn to the chagrin of university students, 
workers and other pressure groups. And possibly in an attempt to curtail 
direct government involvement in the economy, government m inistries 
and parastatals have undergone rationalization. Privatisation also now 
is well received by the State Government. Through it, Government would 
appear not only to seek to reduce its 'direct intervention' in the economy 
as cautioned by the IBRD but also to encourage the 'free play of market 
forces'. Besides, there now is a deliberate t i l t  by the State Government 
towards emphasis on export-oriented industries v is-a-vis the import 
substitution industrialisation preference of the previous years.
These measures add up to the State Government's willingness to 
'try out', as it  were, the recommendations of the IBRD which have their 
roots chiefly in neo-classical economic theory. These recommendations 
do provide some insight into the productivity question and economic 
development generally. Reasonable exchange rate of the naira; home
prices which reflect international costs; stabilised Government, 
expenditures; and the stimulation of exports are all fiscal and economic 
measures which may enhance productivity and induce output expansion. 
This argument could hardly be challenged.
The recommendations, however, oversimplify the productivity 
problem just like most of the other approaches. They do not, for 
instance, address the issue of the ownership and control of the means 
involved in the production process. Some correlation should be expected 
between productivity on the one hand and ownership and control of the 
major means of production on the other. Again, they overlook the 
possible influences of conflicting interest groups on productivity in the 
economy. These influences are of paramount importance in understanding 
the problem. Even so, the fragmented nature of the Nigerian market may 
not provide a useful basis for an adjustment programme based on the 
operation of market forces alone. Though evidently useful 
recommendations, all told, a more useful approach would be to 
incorporate them into a more broadly based structural option which 
takes into account the gaps noted above.
Thus, in summary, the task of enhancing productivity in the 
Nigerian economy has been quite formidable. But as an agency to 
accomplish this task, the State Government has been inconsistent in its  
policies. Its plans have generally been uncordinated in execution. They 
have been largely experimental; often incoherent. Paul Collins has 
reached sim ilar conclusions by arguing that the role of the State 
Government at the very least, has been a variable one. Sometimes he 
underlined it  has served ’technocratic’ or more productive interests
against Foreign Capital - as for instance, over share pricings in the 
indigenisation decrees. Yet paradoxically at other times, it  has favoured 
Foreign Capital in certain sectors of the decree's schedules.*36)
Therefore, there has largely been an element of uncertain indecisiveness 
in the State's role. This has preyed upon its  ability to direct
productivity enhancement in the economy.
The overall picture that emerges is that of a State Government 
caught between the webs of class, or more generally speaking, group 
dynamics. Its perception, thus, has been characterised by unclarity for 
the webs. In this frame of thought, the sim ilarly placed State
Government in Kenya was described by C. Leys as "essentially a register 
of the balance of class forces."*37 ) He went on to differentiate this 
perception of the role of the State Government from-the 'neutral' or 
’dependency' theorists by arguing that the central point is the 
fundamental coincidence of 'capital-indigenous' and 'alien'; and that what 
are in conflict are the interests'of different elements of the bourgeoisie 
differentially affected by the form the conflict takes.*30) Similar 
conflicts in interests of sim ilar class formations characterise the 
Nigerian example and they prey upon the development of forces vita l for 
productivity enhancement in the economy.
At the very least, circumstantial evidence suggests that they do. 
For, when a State Government entrusted w ith the responsibility of 
piloting the development of an economy becomes more principally 
concerned w ith power-broking than economic development, the la tter 
would be neglected. Since Independence, the Nigerian State Government 
has been preoccupied w ith sorting out the equation on the balance of
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power between Private Indigenous and Private Foreign Capital on the one 
hand, and its own position in that equation on the other. Consequently, 
there were occasions when it  sought to place Private Indigenous Capital 
in a position of control in the economy. This presumably was to enable 
the la tter to enhance productivity in the economy. Realising, 
nevertheless, that Private Indigenous Capital’s abilities could not be 
vouchsafed, it  called in Foreign Capital into the task. Yet not confident 
of the intentions of this substitute, the State Government on occasions 
declared i t  had resolved 'to control the commanding heights of the 
economy’. This, clearly, has been a ’muddling through’ process.
Nevertheless, economic development has suffered neglect and 
productivity has generally remained low as standards of living have been 
impoverished. But meanwhile, the Nigerian labour gets blamed for i l l -  
motivation and low productivity.
It would be conceded that the motivation of Nigerian labour is 
indispensable for enhanced productivity in the economy. Yet what is 
underlined here is that low productivity in the Nigerian economy has been 
essentially caused by the ambivalences of the State Government in its  
economic development programmes.
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CHAPIE.B.V1: 
STATE/LABOUR RELATIONS IN NIGERIA
At a glance, the terminology, 'Nigerian Labour' would seem a bogus 
description. In a broad sense, i t  could include all the employed elements 
of the human factor of production in Nigeria. From the agricultural farm 
to the manufacturing industry and from the private to the public sector, 
this aggregate non-management human factor of production could be 
described as ‘Nigerian Labour'. However, any singleness of category 
thereby connoted would be deceptive since Nigerian labour actually is as 
variegated as there are divergences in sector, cadre, industry and firm.
The semi-skilled technician in a car assembly plant, for instance, 
would be quite a different worker categroy from an assistant executive 
officer in the c iv il service. Similarly, the bank clerk would vary from 
the post office clerk. Thus, the technician in the car assembly plant and 
the bank clerk, both of whom are employed in the private sector where 
conditions of work are generally better than in the public sector, could 
show different patterns of work behaviour from the assistant executive 
officer or the post office clerk, both of whom work in the public sector.
Nevertheless, in an attempt to demystify the terminology, 
'Nigerian Labour', F.H. Harbison's classification of labour in developing 
economies becomes helpful. Attention is drawn to this classification for
illustrative purposes only. The intention is not to apply it. Rather, i t  is 
to illustrate the variegated nature of the Nigerian labour. Following his 
cue, it  could be distinguished into urban and rural fronts. These could 
then be isolated into:
(a) a modern urban sector;
(b) an intermediate urban sector;
(c) an informal urban sector;
(d) a modern rural sector;
(e) an intermediate rural sector;
( f )  an informal rural s e c to r .^
(a) The modern urban sector would consist of the large 
manufacturing and commercial enterprises, the Government m inistries 
and corporations, and wholesale businesses. To a large extent, this 
represents a sector that is relatively most capital intensive. It would, 
however, make up a small proportion of the urban labour force w ith 
workers who are relatively highly educated, highly paid, and unionised. 
Generally, this sector maintains the most direct relations w ith the State 
Government. It is mostly on workers in this sector that the State's 
policies on labour make the most pronounced impact. On account of their 
urban and educated status, also, workers here generally are the most 
articulate group to confront the State Government on such policies they 
adjudge detrimental to the interests of labour generally.
(b) The intermediate urban sector would include workers in small 
family enterprises, retail trade shops, garages and repair shops, 
handicrafts, and small-scale transport businesses. This sector would be 
characterised by less capital intensiveness than the former. It
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manufactures and sells chiefly to the low income population. Since 
available labour for this sector is relatively surplus, wages are 
relatively low and chances for meaningful unionisation are few. But of 
technical importance is that workers in this sector would not be in 
direct labour relations w ith the State Government.
(c) The traditional or informal urban sector would consist of 
interm ittent part time workers, side-walk barbers, casual construction 
workers, handicraft workers, and such like. These workers use very 
li t t le  capital and their income streams vary in worth and regularity. 
Although technically employed, many of them are actually 
underemployed. These would represent the urban poor who are the most 
minimally affected by the State Government's policies on labour.
(d) The modern rural sector would include the salaried workers in 
the large state-owned plantations, federal, state and local government 
staff including school teachers, Community Development officers and 
health workers.
(e) The intermediate rural sector would consist of casual 
intermittent workers like bricklayers and carpenters.
( f )  The traditional rural sector would mostly include share 
croppers and subsistence farmers who could be more appropriately 
classified as peasants.
Thus, the proportion of 'Nigerian labour' w ith whom the State 
Government most directly relates is relatively small. Hence, the
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probability that Government's policies on labour would be limited, in 
effect, to only a small proportion of workers. The 1986/87 Labour Force 
Sample Survey, for instance, estimated that 71.7% of the Nigerian labour 
were farmers; 12.9% were sales workers primarily engaged in commerce; 
and 10.9% were craftsmen or product processing workers concentrated in 
manufacturing and construction. These proportions fa ll outside direct 
Government employment. However, only 4.5% comprising professional, 
technical, administrative and clerical workers were estimated to have 
been directly employed by Government.*2 ^
Because Government apparently deals w ith only a small proportion 
of labour, its  policies would appear to bear minimally on general labour 
productivity. However, the Nigerian economy essentially is an 
interlocked entity. Therefore Government's policies targetted at its  
direct worker population have consequences on the total workforce. This 
would include even the seemingly remote peasant farmers.
The State Government's switch over from labour-intensive to 
capital-intensive production in the 1970s amply illustrates th is point 
The production crisis of that period had been blamed on the peasant 
farmers' assumed failure to provide sufficient quantitites of cheap food 
and export crops for the urban and foreign market. Thereby, foreign 
exchange necessary for investment, Government spending, and consumer 
imports was limited. When in an attempt to redress the situation, 
Government substituted capital-intensive production methods, the 
peasant farmer, as a result, became displaced as an important factor in 
national production.*^)
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A. THE STATE AND LABOUR RELATIONS: EARLY CONFLICTS
( 1897- 1959)______________________________________________
Though the State Government is in direct labour relations w ith a 
relatively small worker population, its overall relationship w ith 
Nigerian labour has been historically characterised by conflicts and 
disputes. Why has this been so? We can point to the manner in which 
labour was generally recruited by the colonial Government. Recruitment 
was often by conscription (that is, forced labour). The conscripts were 
paid low wages;often below subsistence levels. This laid the earliest 
bases of future conflicts.^4 * Since, however, the primary reasons for 
recruitment evidently were the maintenance of conditions conducive for 
the promotion of trade and commerce, the nucleus of Nigerian labour was 
formed not to generate social wealth. As A.G. Hopkins points out, i t  was 
brought into being to service the needs of a capitalist state 
apparatus/5  ^ Therefore, the development of the Nigerian labour shows 
that what was created was a subservient corps of workers geared 
towards service, not production.
These in itia l conditions had a number of implications for the 
Nigerian economy. Foremost, the intrinsic value in work became 
debased. By commanding a position which enabled it  to conscript labour, 
arb itrarily set the rules and pace of work, and dictate wages, the 
Government diminished the intrinsic value in work. From this beginning, 
the incipient Nigerian labour became psychologically and economically 
abused. In consequence the workers became gradually socialised into 
perceiving work in the public service principally as one for acquiring the 
‘white man's' money.
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This conscious mercenary attitude became externalised in the 'Olu 
Oyibo’ attitude towards public service - a syndrome which, as previously 
argued, tended to diminish the natural commitment of the workers to 
work. Largely, this was on the incorrect assumption that public service 
is the white man’s work - a job to be carried out perfunctorily. What 
effects this disposition had on productivity in the public service are not 
d ifficu lt to imagine. A part of the absenteeism and labour turnover 
recorded by the early studies on the productivity question could be 
explained along these lines (see Chapter i, Footnotes 7 and.8).
Besides, recognising that workers preoccupied themselves w ith 
monetary concerns the Government encouraged those conditions of work 
which were specifically aimed at exacting maximum productivity from 
workers at the expense of their welfare. The workers later fe lt 
deprived. Employment relations became infected as labour began to 
confront the Government.
Indeed, the f irs t  hesitant steps towards this confrontation were 
taken by the workers at these stages. These early demonstrations of 
grievance represent a fau lt-line in labour/government relations which 
later deepened into the present r i f t  between the two. But of theoretical 
importance is that these early grievances naturally undermined 
productivity rates in the economy given their scope and diversity 
exemplified below:
(1) 1897 - Large scale strike by artisans and labourers in the Public 
Works Department, Lagos (see A.G. Hopkins, 1966, 
Appendix).
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(2) 1899- Strike of government-employed canoemen at Badagri (see
AG. Hopkins, 1966, Appendix)
(3 ) 1899 -  Warders in the Lagos hospital came out on strike (see A.G.
Hopkins, 1966, Appendix).
( 4 ) 1902 - A strike involving clerks working in the railways (see A.G.
Hopkins, 1966, Appendix).
(5) 1904- A second and more widespread strike involving railway
clerks which spread to other employees (see A.G. Hopkins, 
1966, Appendix; also Public Record Office, C.O. 147/174: 
Lagos Weekly Record. Dec. 31,1904).
(6) 1913- 83 Government Printers came out on strike (see Lagos
Weekly Record. June 21, 1913).
(7) 1919 -  Strikes and other labour disturbances at Lagos docks (see
Nigerian Pioneer. January 31,1919).
(8 ) 1919 -  A strike by engineers employed by Elder Dempster over
inadequate war bonuses (see Lagos Standard. May 14,
1919).
(9) 1919 -  Widespread strike action undertaken by railway employees
at Iddo, Lagos (see Nigerian Pioneer. January 23, 1920; 
Lagos Weekly Record. Jan. 31. 1920)
(10) 1920- There was an extensive strike in Port Harcourt (see
Nigerian Pioneer. Feb. 27, 1920).
(11) 1920- A strike in the marine Department, Lagos (see Lagos
Weekly Record. Nov. 6, 1920).
(12) 1920- A strike at the Enugu Colliery (see Nigerian Archives,
1920).
(13) 1920- A strike in which all the daily-paid workers in the
employment of the railways and the Public Works
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Department were involved (see Nigerian Archives, 1920).
( 14) 1921 - Railway artisans were involved in strike action (see
African Messenger. November 24, 1921).
(15) 1924 - 'Pit boys’ at Enugu coal mines went on strike.
(16) 1926- Tub boys’ at Enugu Colliery went on strike.
( 17) 1933- Disaffection among the fire  brigade and police (Public
Record Off ice, 1933: Nigerian Pioneer. April 28, 1933).
(18 ) 1934- A strike by bus drivers against Zarpas (see Lagos Daily
News. July 24. 1934).
( 19) 1935- industrial unrest in the Eastern section of the railway
(Legislative Council Debates, December 20, 1935).
(20 ) 1935 -  Strike initiated by lorry owners but supported by drivers
in protest against Government measures to protect
railways from competition by road transport (Legislative 
Council Debates, September 21,1936).
( 21 ) 1937 - Continuing strikes and unrest among coal miners at Enugu
(Legislative Council Debates, March 25, 1937).
( 22) 1937 -  Produce labourers at ljebu Ode refused to work in protest
against ill-treatm ent (Legislative Council Debates, July 
12, 1937).
Source: Compiled by the author.
Therefore, i t  was the tragedy of Nigerian labour that workers were 
socialised into wage employment by a government that functioned in 
conditions unfavourable for the development of creative labour. With the 
emphasis on the provision of services at low wages, a creative 
orientation towards work was not available for Nigerian workers. This 
was not conducive for the development of a productivity conscious wage
168
workforce. Rather what was primarily nurtured were workers who were 
principally concerned w ith  material considerations. This clearly was a 
faulty beginning in the development of organized work in Nigeria.
B. THE STATE AND LABOUR RELATIONS: LATER CONFLICTS
( 1960- 1987) _____________ _____________ ___________ ____
If labour productivity had been diminished in the in itia l period 
largely because the mode by which Nigerian labour had been socialised 
into organised work had bred government/labour conflicts, these 
conflicts have been intensified by sim ilar conflicts between government 
and private capital in succeeding years. Nigerian labour, thus, generally 
functions in a situation of conflict.
In a s tr ic t sense, though, conflicts between government and 
private capital really are conflicts w ith foreign private capital. The 
relations between i t  and indigenous private capital, at worst unstable, 
have been largely protectionist. This is generally indicated by the two 
indigenisation exercises created in favour of indigenous private capital.
In its  protectionist role favouring indigenous private capital, the 
State Government however offends, the more, the already sour relations 
between i t  and Nigerian labour, in consequence, labour reinforces its  
perception of itse lf as a deprived group - a perception that had taken 
root in previous years. Its subsequent efforts to unionise are, perhaps, 
best explained in this light. But the State Government’s attempts to 
oppose such efforts heighten the conflicts that mark relations between 
the two.
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The State Government's opposition to labour's efforts is a 
relatively recent phenomenon though. Before 1968., the form of relations 
between the two was largely based on the Doctrine of Voluntarism that 
Peter Kilby describes as an 'Anglo-Saxon m o d e l'.^  By this model, 
Government had abstained from direct relations w ith labour. Its adopted 
ideology was one of Tree collective bargaining’ between the 
'representatives of labour* and the ‘representatives of management’. 
Thus, the Federal Minister of Labour addressing an International 
Conference on Labour in 1955 said:
Can the various types of collective bargaining 
fam iliar to older industrial societies thrive in 
different conditions of underdeveloped countries 
today? This is an important question which in the 
view of my Government permits of only one 
answer. We have followed in Nigeria the voluntary 
principles which are so important an element in
industrial relations in the United Kingdom.
Compulsory methods might occasionally produce a 
better economic or political result but labour- 
management must, I think, find greater
possibilities of mutual harmony where results 
have been voluntarily arrived at by free discussion 
between the two parties. We in Nigeria at any 
rate, are pinning our faith on voluntary
methods.(7)
Having started from this stand-offish posture towards organised 
labour, the State Government’s subsequent direct interventionist 
attitude towards labour becomes intriguing. Was i t  primarily to promote 
the development of industrial relations in the economy? Or were there, 
perhaps, underlying political-economic dimensions to this remarkable 
shift in orientation described by W.A. Warmington thus:
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The Labour Department has in fact departed very 
considerably from the pattern it  is trying to
impose  it  has given Government greater
influence and has on occasion interfered in much 
more detailed aspects than would ever be 
contemplated in Great Britain.(8)
However, in committing itse lf into direct interventionist relations 
with Nigerian labour, Government appears largely to be responding to the 
logic of its  essentially capitalist character. Especially so, one that is in 
competition w ith Foreign Private Capital and suspicious of Indigenous 
Private Capital. A demonstration of these relations becomes obvious 
when the Government’s policies towards labour, soon after Independence, 
are examined. At that time, though the struggle for Independence had 
ended, the embers of nationalism s t il l glowed. This was particularly in 
the direction of economic independence. Meanwhile, some ex-leaders of 
the nationalist struggle who had turned industrialists, transporters, 
commercialists - private employers of labour generally -  kept the 
economic nationalist feelings aflame as well as regulating labour in the 
best way that would ensure maximum profits from their investments.
Government's in itia l direct interventionist relations w ith  labour 
could be seen to have been framed to suit the interests of this emergent 
indigenous capitalist employer class. At least two evidences suggest 
this. First, is the administration of the Labour Code (1945) in the period 
before Government’s interventionist relations w ith labour and during the 
period of this intervention. In the f irs t period, employers who 
contravened the Code were generally prosecuted. 7 out of 8 such
employers., for instance, were convicted in 1956 according to the Morgan 
Commission.*9  ^ However, in the la tter period, none of such employers 
was convicted.**0 *
Secondly, the privileged position enjoyed by the Association of 
these employers (Nigerian Employers Consultative Association) suggests 
the preferential status they were accorded in the economy. For the State 
Government’s policies on labour generally were influenced by this body.
S. Tracy, for instance, argues that even matters directly related to the 
c iv il service like the five-day working week and vacation system of the 
public sector were discussed w ith the Employers Association rather than 
the representatives of labour.** ** Besides, both the Nigerian Chamber 
of Commerce and the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria 
(organisations formed chiefly by the same private indigenous employers 
of labour) enjoyed sim ilar statuses.
When the State Government, therefore, deliberately kept labour's 
wages.low, its reason given as "to promote economic development" 
becomes highly suspect. Deliberate low wages were specifically aimed 
at maximizing employers’ profits as a primary measure. It remains true, 
though, that deliberate low wages are a legacy of the Colonial Office 
Document of 1905.**2 * However, the justification for low wages then, 
namely: that the workers would prefer leisure to income once they had 
achieved a certain standard of living was based on the incorrect 
assumptions of ’target working’. Such faults that are evident in these 
assumptions adequately highlighted in A.G. Hopkin’s Critique of the 
Backward Sloping Supply Curve of African Labour thesis need not be 
repeated.*!3) what needs emphasis, however, is that a policy of
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deliberate low wages generally has been a dynamic for capital 
accumulation whether in past or in present relations of the Nigerian 
Government w ith labour. Of course, labour’s general fight against low 
wages and resistance to capital accumulation are evident in the 234 
strikes recorded w ith in the f irs t  three years of Independence. These 
were estimated to have cost the economy 3.65 m illion lost days of 
production/14* The peak national strike of 1964 is estimated also to 
have cost 1.3 m illion days/15* These losses in man-days, of course, 
meant a cumulative deterioration in productivity.
C. THE STATE GOVERNMENT’S SELF ASSERTION
The Government’s wage commissions which followed could 
therefore look like means set up to check deteriorating productivity. 
This deteriorating productivity, of course, was perceived as resulting 
from labour's dissent in the economy. E lliot Berg, though, would argue to 
the contrary that "labour unions had li t t le  effect on wage 
commissions."^15* According to him the causal factors for the setting 
up of the wage commissions ranged between:
(a) Ideological or moral sentiments connected w ith social justice 
which motivates government to meet the minimum needs of 
workers.
(b) A response to unorganised dissatisfaction manifested by rioting or 
demonstrations.
(c) A preemptive increase designed to assuage possible dissent or 
undercut the labour movement.
(d) An attempt to win friends for the Government/17*
In a sim ilar line of thought, John Weeks would also argue that:
One can build a model of wage determination in the 
Nigerian context which is consistent w ith union
weakness For humanitarian, institutional, and
ideological reasons, the Government commissions 
a major wage review about every five years.( 18)
To Berg and Weeks, i t  would be conceded that there are good chances that 
Government's wage commissions are set up partly for humanitarian or 
moral reasons. At least, the creation of a Social Welfare Unit of the 
Federal Ministry of Labour that "oversees conduct and safety at the 
workplace" suggests this altruism. But i t  would become d iff icu lt to 
argue this point to a logical conclusion in the absence of a corresponding 
supporting social philosophy. What social philosophy that has guided the 
Government all along is capitalism w ith its  primary orientation to 
profit. Besides, were morality or humanitarianism the primary 
motivation for the establishment of wage commissions, then real wage 
increases would have been awarded labour before its organised dissent 
took shape. Thus, the commissions were largely aimed at enhancing 
productivity.
But beyond serving as a means of checking deteriorating 
productivity perceived as resulting from labour's dissent, the wage 
commissions were also instruments set up by the Government to assert 
itse lf politically in the struggle for control over the economy. The f irs t  
of those post Independence commissions, the Morgan Commission (1964) 
gives a strong suggestion of this essentially political character of the 
commissions. Because wage levels in the private sector have been
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hooked w ith those in the public sector under Government's direct control, 
Government apparently used the Commission to regulate wages both in 
the public and private s e c t o r s . * * p or none 0f pre-Independence 
commissions*20) pacj any direct attention to the private sector. 
However, to the Morgan Commission, the charge was given to provide 
recommendations on the following issues that ran across both public and 
private sectors:
(a) A general upward revision of salaries and wages of junior 
employees in both Government and private establishments.
(b) The abolition of the daily wage system.
(c) The introduction of a general national minimum wage.
By extending the Commission's frame of reference beyond the 
public sector, Government used the Commission as a means of asserting 
its influence more positively in the economy. This political dimension of 
the Commission, previously overlooked, is of utmost importance in 
understanding these issues. For, they reveal the character of Government 
that has been impeded from confronting the productivity problem by 
political distractions.
( i)  The Adebo Commission (1970)
Like the preceding Morgan Commission, the Adebo Commission of 
1970 was also an attempt by Government to reinforce its political 
position in relating to labour and private capital. For if anything, the end 
of the c iv il war in that year took off the lid from the pent-up grievances 
of dissatisfied but repressed labour. With the nightmare of the c iv il war 
over, however, labour could then make demands and go on strike if  they
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were not reasonably met. Indeed, 124 such strikes were recorded in the 
1970/71 year alone w ith a total loss of 224, 470 man days.^2 1 ^
Thus by setting up the Adebo Commission to review wages and 
salaries in July 1970, the State Government may seem to have tried to 
assuage strident demands from labour. These were previously dormant in 
the war years but released at the end of hostilities. However some other 
structural conditions in the post war economy also played equally 
significant roles in compelling Government to set up the commission.
Foremost of these conditions is that following the 30 month long 
hostilities, the Nigerian economy had become seriously distorted and 
depleted. Business confidence had plummetted and there was the 
necessity for Government to open up new areas for the deployment of 
foreign investment capital. Production levels in several manufactured 
goods like soap and cement had fallen. And inflationary pressures 
became so hard that Government was constrained to set up price 
monitoring and control agencies. Generally, what emerged from the civ il 
war was an out-of-hand economy.
In setting up the Adebo Commission, therefore, Government 
attempted, through it, to regain control over an economy that had been 
distorted by a c iv il war. This is evident in Government's own expressed 
view that:
A wage and salary review was therefore seen not 
only as a means to assuage discontent but as an 
opportunity to stimulate the national economy and 
reorient the supply of consumption goods and 
services from the constraints of a war 
economy.(22)
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Thus, the Adebo Commission after all, was not aimed only at 
assuaging the discontent of labour but also, importantly, at regaining 
control over the economy by the State Government, in this sense, the 
political context of the commission becomes as obvious as i t  was in the 
preceding Morgan Commission. Because politics became more important 
than economics in the Government's consideration this minimized the 
effectiveness of the Commission.
The Government, for instance, used the Commission as a forum for 
in itiating political attacks on the indigenous private capitalist class:
The increase in the cost of living is a reflection of 
that sacrifice that has to be made in the interest 
of national secutiry. Such sacrifices would be 
easier, however, if  they were seen to fa ll 
equitably on all sections of the population such 
that the least sacrifice was made by those in the 
lowest income group.....From some of the
representations made to us, it  is clear not only 
that there is intolerable suffering at the bottom of 
the income scale, but also that the suffering is 
made even more intolerable by manifestations of 
affluence and wasteful expenditure which cannot 
be explained on the basis of visible and legitimate 
means of income.(23)
Thus by recognising that this group showed manifestations of affluence 
and wasteful expenditure w hilst labour suffered intolerably "at the 
bottom of the income scale”, Government, through the Commission, 
ordered that "The private sector should make adjustments (wage 
increases) to its workers in comparable circumstances."*24^
Therefore, the State Government's interests in overseeing the
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private sector f irs t  witnessed in the Morgan Commission is reinforced in 
the 1970 Adebo Commission. But the question arises whether in ordering 
the private sector to pay higher wages to its  workers, Government 
showed genuine interests in protecting labour. This would seem hardly 
so given the number of strikes recorded amongst its  own workers over 
wages and salaries given as 52 for the 1970/71 year against 84 in the 
private sector.*25 ) Therefore Government could not have been 
protecting workers' interests. Rather, its  directives for better 
conditions of work in the private sector chiefly were a strategy for 
consolidating its  influence beyond the public to the private sector.
( i i )  The Udoji Commission (1974)
If the State Government's interest in superintending the private 
sector was demonstrable in both the Morgan and Adebo Commissions, in 
the succeeding Udoji Commission this interest began to wane. As its 
third major incursion into labour relations in Nigeria, Government would 
have ben expected to pursue this interest to a more logical conclusion. 
With Udoji, however, Government relapsed to its  pre-Morgan 
preoccupation w ith the public sector. Thus, i t  appeared to have lost 
grounds for greater control of the economy to the private employer. In 
respect of wage increases recommended by this latest Commission, 
Government, for instance, maintained that:
Employers may negotiate w ith their respective 
employees appropriate increases in salaries and 
wages to compensate increases in the cost of 
living since the wage freeze.(26)
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Such sudden tw is t in Government's interest is surprising. 
However, a set of factors could explain Government's Udoji peculiarities. 
One factor is ideological. The Government’s ideological position at that 
stage was not quite clear. Though i t  showed capitalist tendencies, yet it  
was hesitant to be freely committed to an unfettered market economy as 
its  intervention in direct labour relations through Morgan and Adebo 
indicate. But by intervening through these last commissions, Government 
probably sensed that i t  had strayed too far in a socialist direction. The 
Udoji Commission, thus, offered a worthwhile opportunity for fence- 
mending and putting the necessary checks on State intervention in the 
economy. Secondly, the previous two commissions in the interest they 
had shown in the private sector, had triggered a spate of strikes in that 
sector. Resulting from these two commissions, strikes in the private 
sector had multiplied surpassing those in the public sector by the ratio 
2:1.(27 ) Thus, in relaxing its  interest in the private sector,■Government 
must have taken into consideration the incidence of strikes after both 
Morgan and Adebo.
Along this line of thought, Government's Udoji peculiarities 
become easier to understand. Yet, the evidence from Morgan and Adebo 
strongly point to the political context of Government's wage 
commissions generally. This political context, i t  is argued, makes 
Government's intervention in labour relations not purely a measure aimed 
at ensuring a stable economy in which labour was producing maximally. 
Equally too, it  was a Government’s attempt to po litica lly consolidate 
itse lf in the economy. However, since this attempt would mostly be 
resisted by labour as by the private capitalist employers, the resulting
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situation became one of general conflict marked by discontent and 
dissent.
D. LABOUR'S RESPONSES
As we have noted, the pattern of Nigerian labour’s responses to the
political dimensions of Government’s direct intervention in its  affairs
has been characterised by a primary concern for increases in wages and 
salary. I t  has even been argued by Arrighi and Saul for instance that the 
Nigerian labour has become a labour aristocracy:
The higher wages and salaries foster the
stabilisation of the better paid section of the 
labour force whose high incomes ju s tify  the
severance of ties w ith the traditional economy. 
Stabilisation, in turn, promotes specialisation, 
greater bargaining power and further increases in 
the incomes of this small section of the labour 
force which represents the proletariat proper of 
tropical Africa. These workers enjoy incomes 
three or more times higher than those of unskilled 
labourers and together w ith the elites and sub­
elites in bureaucratic employment in the c iv il
service and expatriate concerns constitute what
we call the labour aristocracy of tropical
Africa.(28)
Though a relevant aspect of labour’s general responses to 
Government’s direct intervention, the thesis of a Nigerian labour 
aristocracy is inconclusive. For, i t  is correct that Nigerian workers 
generally have won quantitative increases in salaries and wages since 
Independence. A university graduate teacher, for instance, who earned an
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average monthly salary of the equivalent of N120 in 1972 now earns a 
monthly average of N400. When, however, adjustments are made for 
inflationary trends, these increases are not increases in real wages. 
They represent a decrease. The N120 of 1972, for instance, was worth 
about £60 while the N400 of 1990 is worth only about £28. Thus, using 
sterling as an index, current salaries of graduate teachers have 
depreciated by more than 50%.
To describe this workforce as an aristocracy, nevertheless, is a 
different matter. Probably this characterisation chiefly emerged by 
magnifying the perceived divergences between the workers' incomes and 
those of the largely unskilled workers including the peasantry. What, 
however, is overlooked are the additional responsibilities the workers 
often bear in high rents and b ills  and in meeting the expectations of the 
extended family. When these and other expenses are taken into account, 
income differentials between the workers and peasants would tend to 
narrow considerably.*29^
Even so, any quantitive gains that labour has won have been on the 
battlefield of strikes which invariably has le ft its  impact on 
productivity. Tabulated overleaf are examples of such strikes between 
1960 and 1978 showing the number of strikes for each year; workers 
involved; and total man-days lost.
Between independence and the c iv il war, labour had organised 550 
strikes. This fe ll to 247 during the c iv il war and rose again to 1290 
between 1971 and 1978. Of importance is that the monetary factor was
TABLE VI. 1 
STRIKES (19 60 -1978 )
Year No. of Strikes Workers Involved Man-Days Lost
1960/61 65 36667 157373
1961/62 58 18673 57303
1962/63 45 n.a. 53039
1963/64 62 45409 96621
1964/65 195 73447 253460
1965/66 125 n.a. 238679
1966/67 70 41344 100000
1967/68 83 11767 70955.5
1968/69 29 11551 35028
1969/70 46 18357 71894.6
1970/71 124 78474 224470
1971/72 85 31915 63254
1972/73 71 43676 105415
1973/74 105 41527 148130.1
1974/75 354 126818 357028.2
1975/76 264 122546 439296.3
1976/77 130 83126 225709.6
1977/78 153 97802 448335.7
Sources: Fed. Min. of Labour, Annual Reports.
Peter Kilby, Industrialisation In an Open Economy, p.275.
0. Sonubi, Trade Disputes in Nigeria, 1966-71. Nigerian 
Journal of Econ. and Soc. Studies. XV 2 July 1973, p.232.
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primarily the cause of these strikes. In the 1966/67 year, for instance, 
out of 70 recorded strikes, 28 were for wage levels; and 11, for irregular 
payment of wages. Thus 55% of this total was on account of wage- 
related problems while the rest were for sim ilar problems of promotion, 
grading, and removal of management. Similarly, in the 1977/78 year, out 
of 153 recorded strikes, 33 were for wage level; 20, for allowance and 
bonus; and 8, for irregular payment of wages. This adds up to 61 or 40% 
of the total that were organised for wage-related matters. The table 
overleaf provides further details.
It is evident, therefore, that w h ilst there has been a contest for 
the control of the Nigerian economy between the State Government and 
the private capitalist classes, labour's main preoccupation has been w ith 
increases in wages and salaries through strikes. It is probably on 
account of its  relative political apathy that i t  seems to f i t  into Frantz 
Fanon's critic ism  of workers in post-Independence African nation states 
generally:
The workers now that they have Independence’ do 
not know where to go from there. For, the day 
after Independence is declared, the trade unions 
realize that if  their demands were to be 
expressed, they would scandalize the rest of the 
nation; for the workers are in fact the most 
favoured section of the population, and represent 
the most comfortably off.(JO)
The Fanon embourgeoisement thesis, like the labour aristocracy 
thesis, however, is a different discussion. Its justification, perhaps, 
stems from the seeming preponderant interest shown by the Nigerian
TABLE V I.2
STRIKES AND ISSUES INVOLVED. 1966-69. 1972-77
Issue 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/'
Wages 18 20 3 3 9 6 11 23
Conditions of 9 9 ' 10 9 25 21 26
Service
Discipline & 
Termination
7 6 1 3 15 11 5 8
Hours of Work 5 5 - 2 1 8 3 6
& Overtime
Allowance & 5 4 - 3 6 57 11 8
BonusAnti-Union &6 3 - 1 4 4 9 8
Union
Recognition
Irregular 10 3 12 2 - 8 . 5 -
Payment of 
Wages
Refusal to - 1 1 1 4 4 4 6
Bargain
Violation of 1 - - - 4 1 2 -
Agreement
Promotion & 2 - 2 1 2 3 - 2
Grading
Removal of 5 8 - - A 8 5 4 3
Management
Commission
Award
“ “ — “ 2 _ 24 8
Benefits - - - - 6 - 5 6
Others 2 2 1 3 1 5 5 6
Total 70 61 29 32 87 133 90 90
Source: Compiled from the Records of the Federal M inistry of 
Labour, Lagos.
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workers In wage and salary Increases at the expense of organising 
themselves towards winning political control. However, In any system 
of industrial employment, wages and working conditions are the centre 
of trade union activities. Thus, in preoccupying itse lf w ith wage 
increases, Nigerian labour had pursued the f irs t principles of trade 
unionism.
However, labour's pursuit for wage and salary increases, mainly 
through strikes, le ft an impact on productivity. Of significance is that 
these strikes were organised most frequently in the Manufacturing and 
Construction/Engineering industries. There were 252 and 163 recorded 
strikes, respectively, in these industries between 1967 and 1978. The 
greatest losses in man-days were in the Government Services, though, 
where there were 42 recorded strikes in the same period.
- So a pattern emerges in which strikes in Manufacturing and 
Construction/Engineering were shorter w ith less man-days lost than 
strikes in Government Services where strikes lasted longer. 
Nevertheless, in whatever industry they occurred, these strikes 
generally interrupted production and services. In the short term this 
would naturally have had effects on productivity. Given the number of 
strikes and the working days lost it  would not be easy for productivity 
losses to be made good. This, of course, is only a working assumption 
since there are no s ta tis tics available to confirm or refute the claim.
Thus, out of 696 recorded strikes in the period, 415 were recorded 
in the two v ita l industries of manufacturing and construction/
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engineering. The 59.6% of the total number of recorded strikes 
represented by these figures indicates the effects that labour’s strikes 
have on productivity in the Nigerian economy.
186
TABLE VI.3 
STRIKES BY INDUSTRY (1 9 6 7 -78 )
Industry Strikes Workers involved Man-Days Lost
Manufacturing 252 101171 282353
Agriculture 30 17160 58044
Construction/Engineering 163 110079 350522
Dock 14 26210 106266
Printing/Publishing 19 8573 25158
Transport 44 27884 84204
Educational Services 24 50578 211705
Petroleum 43 12976 40284
Government Services 42 32436 434604
Commerce 36 10579 35229
Service 29 26539 83418
Source: Compiled from the Records of the Federal Ministry of Labour,
Lagos.
187
E. IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT/LABOUR CONFLICTS 
ON PRODUCTIVITY_______________________________
In Nigeria, strikes are detrimental to productivity growth since 
they occur most frequently in the vita l industries. However, these 
strikes are not direct and absolute consequences of workers' lack of 
motivation to produce highly. For, though the workers have organised 
strikes largely on account of wage-related issues, their conditions of 
work are not so stringent that they have been absolutely denied the 
motivation to produce highly.
Perquisites attached to work in the Nigerian economy range from 
the essential to, sometimes, the ludicrous. There is, for instance, 'the 
annual leave w ith pay' varying in duration for the different cadres of 
both the public and private sectors. By offering an opportunity for rest 
and recreation to workers, this leave clearly is essential. Also the 
'study leave w ith pay’ which prepares beneficiary workers for more 
challenging duties in the organisation is of mutual benefit to both the 
worker and the work organisation. Similarly, the subsidized (sometimes 
free) medical treatment received by most of the workers. Rent and 
transport subsidies also paid as work incentives equally are essential in 
cushioning their salaries from the effects of inflation.
However, ‘incentives’ like ‘double pay at Christmas’, car loans, 
housing loans, entertainment allowances, driver and gardener allowances 
which some of the senior cadre workers receive, suggest that generally 
the attempt has been made to motivate the workers w ith incentives. For 
it  is uncommon to find (even in developed economies) a head of
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department of a university who is given sim ilar work incentives as one 
in Nigeria In most Nigerian universities, a head of department receives 
a loan from the university w ith which he would buy a car. Such a car 
would be locked up in a garage while the head gets chauffered in his 
o ffic ia l car as departmental head. The same o ffic ia l car could 
additionally be used to give his children a ride to and from school or take 
his w ife to the local market.
That these situations obtain in the Nigerian economy suggests that 
Nigerian workers (whether in the senior or in the junior cadre) are to 
some extent motivated w ith work incentives. Since, however, their 
productivity generally remains low, any correlations between their level 
of motivation and their level of productivity would, therefore, be less 
important than other factors. The roots of their general low levels of 
productivity, nevertheless, could always be traced to the strikes noted 
above. But these strikes are more a consequence of political conflicts 
characterising the economy than non-motivation at work. Thus, the 
conflicts through which they are mediated are more responsible for the 
resultant low productivity in the economy/than il l motivation.
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CHAPTER VII:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The principal position of the present study is that the contest 
between the State Government and Private Capitalist classes for control 
over the Nigerian economy is at the root of the low productivity problem 
in contemporary Nigeria. Before systematic knowledge was applied 
towards understanding this problem in Nigeria, as in the rest of Africa, 
its  roots had traditionally been traced to certain assumed innate 
characteristics of the African worker. These characteristics, as 
observed in the study, primarily bordered on various innate 
characteristics which the worker was assumed to have.
Thus listlessness, lack of determined endeavour, lack of 
fam ilia rity  w ith the process of organised industrial work, lack of 
fam ilia rity  w ith machines and other industrial tools, as well as other- 
assumed innate disabilities were used to explain low productivity, in 
Nigeria. Nevertheless, from the evidence gathered by the present study, 
especially from the pre-Independence peasant economy, it  is clear that 
Nigerian workers operating in a situation w ith fewer political-economic 
constraints could produce effectively in relation to available resources. 
Therefore, the perception of general group inadequacy amongst such 
workers could best be seen as an inaccurate judgement. Of course, since 
much of this judgment originated from expatriate opinion lim ited by
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insufficient knowledge of the character, norms, and customs of the 
Nigerian, we should not be too surprised.
Later, scientific management theory was to trace the roots of this 
problem to a faulty indigenous management functioning. Kilby, in 
particular, stressed his thesis of ‘non-functional foremanship' as the 
principal correlate of the apparent inability of the Nigerian workers to 
fu lly exert their ab ilities in the work-place. His arguments were 
buttressed w ith his study of the five oil palm and one rubber plantations 
in the former Western Nigeria in the 1960s. i t  was only in the 
expatriate-managed firm  where marked progress in production was found 
in the Kilby study. This may indict the managerial capabilities of the 
Nigerian of that age. This, all told, may have been quite true of the 
situation given the very modest educational attainments of the Nigerian 
in the early 1960s. Before 1960, for instance, there was only one 
university college in Nigeria, the University of Ibadan, which, for that 
matter, was a ffilia ted to a British university -  London. The other 
colleges were few and far between and they were mainly arts students. 
Therefore, if  Kilby failed to find f irs t  class managers in the sixties, this 
should evoke li t t le  surprise given these circumstances.
Indeed, the Wells and Warmington study, spanning Nigeria and 
parts of the Cameroons, was to underline this educational attainment 
factor. They had stressed that productivity was low in both countries 
largely because of relatively low educational qualifications of their 
workers. The three: Kilby, Wells, and Warmington no doubt provided the 
platform for discussing this problem in a systematic fashion for the 
firs t time. Their contributions, in spite of Taylorist overtones, were
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Informative and forceful enough to illuminate the Nigerian productivity 
problem especially at this early state. However, the d ifficu lties  that 
marred scientific management as a mode of explication of the 
productivity problem in Europe and North America also cast doubts on it  
as a satisfactory explanation of the problem in Nigeria In particular, its 
isolation and analysis of the Nigerian supervisory manager who 
apparently was seen as caught in the dilemma of not knowing which to 
observe: the rational rules of his firm , or the ethnic sentiments of his 
kin-group. This predicament was, indeed, present in the Nigerian work 
scene. To the indigenous supervisor, i t  may have been quite a dilemma. 
He may also not have been well acquainted w ith  how to train his 
supervisee to f i t  perfectly into his work in the sp irit of scientific 
management, or to enable him to master the scientific  management 
THERBIGS’ plan of increasing worker productivity. • However, this 
approach to the question is fragmented in its  exclusive focus on the 
manager or supervisor. The manager/supervisor, a fter all, is only but 
one of the actors (albeit an important one) that is to be found in the 
work-place. Indeed, by losing sight of the entire structured work 
conditions and by lim iting the discussion of the problem to the 
supervisor, scientific management as discussed by Kilby in the Nigerian 
situation had even neglected the crucial role of the worker (the 
supervisee) in the whole issue.
Not that the subsequent emphasis laid on this worker by the 
succeeding Human Resources Theory advanced the discussion suffic iently 
to provide a satisfactory explanation of the productivity question. 
Drawing from Georgopoulos et al, Olatunde Oloko had very strongly 
argued in favour of aligning the goals of the firm  to the needs of the
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worker. Thus according to him, if  the Nigerian worker would perceive 
that he would meet his personal needs by pursuing the goals of his work­
place, then he would produce maximally. Oloko, thus, had cut this path- 
goal hypothesis towards understanding the productivity question in 
Nigeria.
This hypothesis seemed quite illuminating. In all its  sim plicity, it  
also seemed quite practical. In logic, it  was straightforward and 
convincing. Vet its  preoccupation w ith the assumed ‘need’ of the Nigerian 
worker, which need had to be tied to the ‘goals' of the workplace 
diminished its  apparent practicality and logic. For in analysing Maslow 
who clearly provided the principal influence on this hypothesis, the 
present study has opposed the idea that the Nigerian worker would ’se lf- 
actual ise* in the workplace, or seek to satisfy his ’social needs’ mainly in 
the work-place. It was argued, on the contrary, that what needs such 
worker would primarily seek to satisfy in the work-place at best would 
be the Maslowian basic physiological needs of food. Beyond these, it  was 
emphasized that the workplace could hardly be seen as a forum for need- 
satisfaction.
However, there were fundamental attractions in going beyond the 
scientific management as well as the human resources understanding of 
the problem. It was not simply to fashion a new fad that would replace 
these hitherto well-received viewpoints. But a principal reason for the 
search for a new understanding of the problem in this study is that in the 
last decade, Nigeria has been host to forces that, to say the least, have 
been momentous. These forces have been of greatest effects in the 
political and economic realms.
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Politically, the sh ift between m ilita ry and c iv il rule seems to 
have reached a peak in the last decade w ith the m ilita ry once again 
ousting the civilians in the dying hours of 1983. More than that, a 
segment of the same m ilitary, yet again, ousted the incumbent segment 
less than two years later in 1985. However, the main worry is that this 
agency that has undergone such rapid changes is the primary organ vested 
w ith the responsibility of directing the general economic development of 
the country, including the enhancement of worker productivity.
The State Government, as has been noted, has been further 
disturbed by perennial conflicts w ith powerful social formations at 
home and powerful economic interests from abroad. At issue has been 
the ultimate control of the country’s economy. Coveted both by the 
powerful social formations at home and the powerful economic interests 
from abroad as well as by the State Government itse lf, the quest for this 
control has been turned into a contest. And the role of the State 
Government in that contest, this study has argued, has been essentially 
vacillating and indecisive.
Between 1962 and 1968, for instance, the Government chiefly 
involved itse lf in promoting Indigenous Private Capital. That was soon 
after its preliminary adventures in industrialisation through cigarette 
factories and breweries. In this way, therefore, it  promoted the cause of 
Indigenous Private Capital in the contest over the control of the 
economy.
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However, between 1970 and 1974, the Government that emerged 
was one that promoted the interests of Foreign Private Capital in that 
contest. It reserved for itse lf residual w elfarist measures during the 
period though. But between 1975 and 1980, the same State Government 
reverted its  support to Indigenous Private Capital while s t i l l  retaining 
some w elfarist measures. And between 1981 and 1985, it  intensified its  
support for th is Indigenous Private Capital while Foreign Private Capital 
subsequently dwindled in importance as a result of the State 
Government's economic stabilisation policies of the period.
The consequences of these Government shifts have been ambiguous. 
Primarily, however, they have reduced the effectiveness of the State 
Government as an organ of meaningful development change. In its 
changing character, i t  lost c larity of direction and purpose for the 
economy. During its  First Developmental Plan period (1962-8) 
nonetheless/recognition is given to, for instance, C.R. Frank's assertion 
that the State Government's ’direction’ was one of involving emphasis on 
private enterprise combined w ith the use of national development 
corporations. If w ith Frank we allow that this was some kind of 
direction-following by the State Government towards economic 
expansion and productivity enhancement, the chief problem would remain 
that this principally arose from private enterprise pressurising which 
could be dated right back to 1949. The State Government, thus, was 
brow-beaten into following that 'direction'. Therefore, it  was not a truly 
rational decision on the part of the State Government to enhance 
productivity and expand the Nigerian economy through private and public 
enterprise. Because the State Government accorded principal
consideration to proddings from Indigenous Private Capital in its choice 
of a direction for national economic development, the ensuing strategies, 
therefore, were more political than economic.
There would, in fact, have been no objections against this choice if 
its political character also contributed to economic development and 
productivity enhancement. This, however, was hardly so. The indigenous 
capitalists, as chosen agents of productivity enhancement in the 
economy were, in the study, found to have been more prone to 
consumption than to investment which would have paved the way for 
general economic expansion. The fact that between 1960 and 1963, 
consumer goods accounted for 56.9%, 54.8% and 51.9% of Nigeria's 
imports, respectively, attests to this. Beyond that, mainly because of 
the influences of indigenous capitalists’ interests in commerce and 
consumption, most of the Government’s investments were wrongly 
located. For the 1966/67 fiscal year, for instance, that the Commerce 
Sector accounted for up to 12.3% of the GDP against the corresponding 
1.3% accounted for by the Manufacturing Sector indicates misplacement 
of investment priority. This was largely because the State Government 
was more interested in pleasing the indigenous capitalist group which 
was more interested in Commerce and Consumption than in social 
productionr
Not that the State Government generally was ignorant of the 
necessity of activating manufacturing if  productivity was to be enhanced 
in the economy. For in an attempt to evaluate its  performance in this 
period, through the Second National Development Plan, it  had claimed 
that 'remarkable progress’ had been attained in the Manufacturing Sector
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(p. 137). The present study found, in any case, that this ‘remarkable 
progress in this sector was distributed as: £20,452,884 foreign 
contribution, and £6,516,639 indigenous contribution for 1963. The 
State Government, therefore, had shown more interest in promoting the 
Commerce Sector than Manufacturing. The opportunity costs of these 
choices could be seen in dwindling outputs which the period and 
subsequent periods witnessed.
Misplaced investment priority  apart, the State Government's 
'Guided Promotion of Foreign Private Capital' in the subsequent 
Development period (1970-74) could not be expected to generate 
grassroots concern for productivity. When we see that for the year 
1970, the aggregate volume of foreign investment in the economy 
amounted to the colossal sum of £899.2 million, the indication is that 
indigenous investment potentialities were, indeed, overwhelmed. 
However, issues would not be taken w ith colossal foreign investments if  
such investments were geared toward productivity enhancement as an 
interim measure. When dormant local productive forces have been 
developed, such overwhelming foreign investments could then gradually 
accommodate indigenous investments. The foreign investments of this 
period on which the State Government leaned, however, were not aimed 
at preparing grounds for indigenous investments. Rather, they seemed to 
have been largely used as a battle weapon by foreign economic interests 
for gaining greater control over the Nigerian economy. Thus, they were 
highly adventurist and could not be counted on for long-term productivity 
enhancement. Once again, therefore, the hidden political content of its  
reliance on foreign investments in the Second period diminished the 
usefulness of these investments as instruments of productivity
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enhancement.
However, i t  was quite amazing that while leaning on foreign 
investments for productivity enhnacement during the 1970-74 period, 
the State Government also made its presence fe lt on the scene by 
directly championing some projects. When i t  made its earliest attempts 
at industrialisation in the sixties, i t  was remarkable that this was 
through cigarettes and beer. In this later period, however, i t  apparently 
widened its  horizon to include such ’development projects’ as palm- 
kernel crushing plants; pulp and paper m ill; a chemical complex; and 
fe rtilise r plant; and, even, a car assembly plant. The present study 
insists that while launching these grandiose projects, the State 
Government was largely flexing its  political muscles on the scene. Its 
aims were hardly the enhancement of productivity in the economy in any 
rational way. This is largely so because those projects were manifestly 
out of place in the economy at the time. In that economy, there was a 
clear low capital to output capacity ratio, for instance. Therefore, the 
grand total of N188.4 m illion sunk by the State Government into those 
projects were more an attempt to assert Government presence than 
development-oriented measures. It is the view of the present study that 
they should have been de-empahsized in favour of smaller industrial 
ventures. These would have involved a greater amount of grassroots 
participation in developing the economy along higher productivity lines. 
But again, one witnesses the State Government’s economic strategies 
being mitigated by hidden political calculations. Once again, the logical 
opportunity costs were an enhancement of productivity and increases in 
output.
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Besides, the economic nationalism shown by the State Government 
in the 1975-80 period, the Indigenisation Decree of 1977, also had a 
questionable political character. The Decree possibly had been aimed at 
transfering greater control of the economy to indigenes. In principle, 
this aim was a wholesome national aspiration. Nevertheless, in pursuit 
of this aim, the State Government permitted features of the contest, 
that has been thus far emphasized, to affect the drafting of the Decree. 
In this way, influences from both Foreign Capital and Local Capital 
turned the Decree into the confusion i t  became. If the State Government 
had not yielded to these influences, the Decree, probably, would have 
been more consistent w ith  the national targets of productivity 
enhancement and output expansion through indigenisation. But the 
contest for control over the economy ultimately mitigated these 
economic expansions.
Perhaps a comparison between these turbulent periods and the 
relatively calmer period of 1981-85 would serve to emphasize the harm 
caused. By 1980 when oil sales had fallen, foreign loans had mounted, 
and unemployment and poverty had become real, and reason dawned on the 
economy, the State Government appeared exorcised of its  previous 
preoccupation w ith who was in control of the economy. The present 
study noted that w ith this liberation, the State Government now realized 
the need to switch away from eye-catching physical infrastructures to 
real targets directed at economic expansion. Within this period also, we 
saw that the State Government began to lay emphasis on domestic 
production of goods largely previously imported. And, most importantly, 
it  awakened to the reality of basing development in itia tives on a wider 
grassroots pattern. This was a necessary change from the previous
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practice of courting either Local or Foreign Capital as agencies of 
productivity enhancement. This period thus, in our view, marked the 
beginning of the State Government's real attempts to enhance 
productivity in the economy. Evident, therefore, is that inverse 
relationship between the contest for control over the Nigerian economy 
and expansions in productivity and output. Whenever the contest was 
intensified, chances for expansions in productivity and output were 
minimized.
By 1981, therefore, i t  was evident that the State Government had 
begun to withdraw from the battle i t  had hitherto fought against Private 
Local and Private Foreign Capital. This, the present study holds, was a 
healthy development. Yet, that i t  abandoned the Import Substitution 
Industrialisation that marked the 1975-80 period in favour of the 
Export-oriented Industrialisation recommended by the IBRD, further 
reflects the presence of major inconsistencies. These were possibly 
derived from its running contests against Private Capital. This change to 
Export-oriented Industrialisation as well as the devaluation of the naira, 
the encouragement of free play of market forces, and the reduction of the 
Government's direct intervention in the economy are some of the 
measures in the new productivity enhancement pack -  Structural 
Adjustment. The view taken here is that this new programme has rightly 
diverted the State Government's attention from its  political contests 
against Private Capital to a more meaningful economic expansion 
programme. Beyond 1985, therefore, as we observed, the State 
Government's energies were channelled into Adjustment. Richard 
Fergerg, thus, is justified in the Nigerian case when he argues that if  
Development was the dominant theme and aspiration of the Third World
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in the 1950s and 1960s, Adjustment is the painful necessity of the
1980s.
But although the State Government was diverted from its  political 
contests against Private Capital, this does not imply that the battle is 
over. Hence, the bane of the Nigerian economy has been removed Thus, 
productivity and output can now expand. Private Foreign Capital is even 
more ready than before to perpetuate the contest. Between 1950 and 
1972, the rise in foreign private investment was from $29.40 m illion in 
1950 to $2.1 billion in 1972. This represented a satisfactory progress 
report for Foreign Capital, in the oil sector, in particular, i t  enjoyed 
absolute monopoly of investment even ten years after independence. And 
in the vita l sector of Manufacturing, by 1970, i t  s t i l l  owned as much as 
57.3% of the total investment. Similarly, in the Trading Sector, i t  owned 
as much as 94% of the total number of enterprises by the same year, 
1970. On the strength of these data, the indication is that Private 
Foreign Capital had a head start in the contest for control over the 
economy.
It, therefore, has had an edge in winning the contest. However, in 
the beginning, this Foreign Capital could hardly withstand the combined 
local forces in the contest. Yet, by strategically raising most of its 
capital in the Nigerian economy; by lim iting its  subsidiary firm s to the 
local Nigerian market; by underpricing its  exports and overpricing its 
imports; and by restricting linkages to the local economy to a minimum, 
it  was able to assault the economy from the flanks, as it  were. This has 
been with substantial success.
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But this, also, has been at the expense of productivity
enhancement in the local economy. For instance, the $11,760,000 net
annual outflow of capital from the economy calculated by Thomas 
Biersteker at the instance of 42 foreign-owned companies in 1976 would 
represent a major drain of source materials necessary for productivity 
enhancement in the economy. Hence, the colossal defic it of $7324 
million in the country’s Balance of Payments in 1982, for instance, could 
be partly accounted for along these lines.
Besides, in its  attempt to consolidate its  control over the Nigerian 
economy, Foreign Capital tended to thro ttle  the development of
indigenous crafts. This is a strong reason to conclude that some
indigenous productive forces were inhibited. The resultant de-emphasis 
of these crafts, i t  is argued, robbed the local artisan of vita l experiences 
in Manufacturing which had been accumulated (albeit on rudimentary 
scales) in earlier years. More so, is the occurrence of a ’manufacturing 
gap' created as the artisan was made to adapt to alien manufacturing 
skills and tools. The present study holds that these indigenous crafts 
should have been allowed to develop alongside the alien manufacturing 
technology chiefly mediated by Foreign Capital, in this way, the chances 
of the occurrence of a manufacturing gap or a time-lag witnessed in 
practice would have been largely obviated.
But probably more injurious to productivity than the lulling of the 
development of local crafts were the incidents of displacement of 
comparable indigenous firms. This was a result of the reliance placed by 
the State Government on Foreign Capital for productivity enhancement. 
With competition from comparable goods produced by the more effic ient
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Foreign Capital, such goods as were produced by the indigenous firms 
tended to suffer from glut in the market. Resulting from this was the 
discouragement of indigenous production. This led to the gradual 
destruction of indigenous productive forces which has contributed to low 
productivity in the economy. Destruction of indigenous productive 
forces, nevertheless, could not be described as an end-purpose. Rather 
evidence from the study suggests i t  is a major strategy by Foreign 
Capital to gain an edge in the contest for control over the Nigerian 
economy. This contest, therefore, has been deleterious to productivity in 
the economy.
Notwithstanding this, the study was not persuaded to view Foreign 
Capital as a villa in  that must be excised from the Nigerian economy if  
productivity would be enhanced. This is because, in spite of its  
apparently injurious mechanisms aimed at consolidating its  control over 
the economy, it  usefully performs productive functions in the economy. 
Recognised among these functions include: reducing unemployment;
providing some amount of healthy competition for comparable local 
firms; and diffusing some amount of production technology and 
managerial sk ill in the economy. The chief concern about it, however, 
continues to remain that its  presence in the economy has been that of a 
predator. We would argue for a diffused Foreign Capital presence in the 
Nigerian economy which seeks the mutual benefit of both host and guest. 
There would, therefore, be less need for any of the parties to concern 
itse lf w ith acquiring hegemony in the economy. Productivity levels could 
thereby be spared some deleterious effects.
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Furthermore, production technology was yet another important
issue in which the study noted additional negative effects resulting from
the State Government's reliance on Private Foreign Capital for
productivity enhancement in the economy. In the pre-Independence
peasant economy there had been a fru itfu l emphasis on land and the
peasant as the principal factors of production. Logic seemed to have
dictated the choice of this factor-combination because of the
distribution of the respective factors of production in the economy. Our
study views this chosen factor combination as essentially fru itfu l given
the advances that were attained in the economy in the period. It could be
recalled that this was a period of relative plenty and high productivity.
The relatively high productivity in the economy had led to vibrant trade
between Nigeria and the UK fo r instance. During the period, the volume
of palm produce shipped from Nigeria to the UK had reached an average of
1,260,294 tons per annum. That of cocoa, had reached an average of
66,823 tons per annum. And, that of cotton, 6,563 tons per annum. These
had balanced the correspondingly large volumes of salt and cotton
manufactures imports from the UK which had reached an annual average
value of £300,133. The study also noted that this peasant economy was
chiefly responsible for the groundnut pyramids, themselves an evidence
of a highly producing economy. It is true that these pyramids were
subsequently reduced by the occurrence of a groundnut disease in
subsequent years. Additionally, Nigeria was ranked second and third
positions in the production of cocoa and palm produce respectively at the
■
world level. The factor combination between land and peasant labour, 
thus, was an arrangement that engendered a relatively high productivity
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The study discovered, nevertheless, the offic ia l disparagement of 
this factor-combination in the 1970s when dwindling productivity levels 
were (quite incorrectly) blamed on the peasant farmers and their 
'fragmented* land units mowhv>h , Uns m« ioi -uh uni nation was nol the 
■ -ii!'■■«s *‘if }\>v.: • )i • ■ Ii!■ ! • Hi 11H• '-.Ui.'ccedinq ec.onon’iy. This is
* t- * t j  ••
demonstrably so because of the failure of the la tter day large farm 
settlements and the even larger River Basin Authorities to improve 
levels of agricultural productivity in the economy.
But that th is factor-combination was displaced w ith one that 
employed capital machinery and land (both in large scale) would 
represent a transplant which is questionable. Principally, th is is 
because the new factor combination was adopted without proper cost- 
benefit analyses. With the benefit of hindsight derived from the 
experiments w ith large farm settlements, which have all been a failure, 
the conclusion is clear that large-scale machinery and large-scale farm 
units have not enhanced productivity in the Nigerian economy.
The theoretical point underlined, however, is that the adoption of 
this factor-combination in the Nigerian economy was largely influenced 
by the presence of Foreign Private Capital. Foreign firms had been used 
to this factor-combination as, in fact, ‘the production technology’ in 
their home bases. And i t  was chiefly on such large-scale production 
techniques that they attained what economies of scale they enjoyed and 
desired to consolidate in the local economy. Finding, therefore, the 
existing factor-combination apparently prim itive, they persuaded the 
State Government to effect the new changes to a capital-intensive
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factor combination.
It is emphasized, nevertheless, that this new arrangement is, by 
no means, an inherently unsuitable factor combination. Indeed, the study 
recognizes i t  as the essence of the industrial revolution through which 
the developed highly-producing societies were industrialised. Evidently 
too, i t  is also a primary factor accounting for the enhanced 
productivities found in the newly industrialising countries. But, 
however, its  su itability as a preferred production technology would 
depend on the relative distribution of the various factors of production 
in each economy.
For Nigeria, however, the study observed that the factors of labour 
and land are more predominant than capital and entrepreneurship. Thus, a 
rational production technology to adopt would logically be one that is 
hinged on any o f the dominant factors. In the circumstances, the fact 
that its  preferred production technology was hinged on a factor that was 
in short supply suggests that other factors beyond economics had come 
into play. And, after examining the relationships between Private 
Foreign Capital and Capital Intensive production technology, the study 
thought Private Capital generally stood to gain if  large-scale machine 
formed the pivot of Nigeria's preferred production technology. It, thus, 
becomes easy to understand why capital intensive production so easily 
displaced the orthodox production technology based on land and the 
peasant farmer. Correlations between this technological displacement 
and the quest for control over the Nigerian economy, in any case, are 
quite distinct. Private Foreign Capital, as a primary contestant for this 
control would be able to tighten its  grip on the economy if the production
209
technology w ith which it  was most fam iliar and w ith which the other 
parties were most unfamiliar prevailed. Its fam ilia rity  w ith the tools 
and practices of such technology would enhance its  position, even the 
more, in the contest Therefore by inducing the conditions which 
promoted the displacement of orthodox land/peasant production 
technology, Private Foreign Capital largely sought to consolidate its 
position in the contest for control over the Nigerian economy.
At the root of the whole issue of labour intensive production 
versus capital intensive production, of course, remains the old 
discussion of Traditionality versus Rationality discussed by Max Weber. 
To Weber, the quintessence of modern industrial life  was increasing 
rationality w ith all the gamut of advantages i t  assumedly brought to 
bear on efficiency in production. The universal ism and automation in 
process involved in capital intensive production made it  more rational 
and effic ient than the more traditional labour intensive production 
technology. This Weberian insight could hardly be assailed. But even 
before Weber, Hume had emphasized that a country would be rich by 
building on a capital base while it  would be poor by building on a labour 
or peasant farmer base. Thus, i t  would be ill-advised to insulate the 
Nigerian economy from what Rosa Luxembourg described as "the 
triumphal march o f the machine across the nations" .
The present study does not recommend the insulation of the 
Nigerian economy from the Luxembourg prophetic march of the machine. 
But its fundamental concern is that the adopted capital intensive 
production technology did not emerge as a rational, thought-out strategy 
for productivity enhancement. Evidently, i t  was essentially a battle
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strategy contrived as a means of strengthening control over the Nigerian 
economy by the parties who favoured it. However, being imbued with 
this inherent belligerency, the study found i t  partly suspect as an 
effective production technology capable of enhancing productivity. Even 
so, the contest for which it  served as a strategy, was a primary factor of 
the low productiv ity which a useful production technology should, in 
fact, have improved. As a production technology, therefore, it  has been 
problematic in Nigeria's peculiar conditions. And such low productivity 
that is currently evident in the economy is inherent, to a large extent, 
from the existing production technology. This would be more so because 
i t  served partly as a strategy for strengthening control over the economy 
to one of the principal contestants.
Thus, the contest for control over the Nigerian economy should be 
held chiefly responsible for low productivity in the economy, not labour. 
The Nigerian labour force, the study observed, has been a force only in 
name. Far from constituting a force capable of reducing productivity in 
proportions conceived by previous analyses, the study observed its  role 
as a non-essential factor in the process of social production in Nigeria. 
Even so, i t  played this role in the inherently unstable conditions 
generated by the conflict between public and private capital. Besides, it  
was introduced into the prevalent crisis-prone capitalist mode of 
production as a subservient group whose primary role was to service the 
needs of an embattled state apparatus. Later, its  primary concern 
became the pursuit for increased wages and improved working conditions 
through strikes.
The most widespread of its  collective moves to win greater 
benefits, of course, cost the economy 1.3 m illion man-days in 1964 
alone. Similarly, the spates of industrial action resulting from each 
Government Wage Tribunal proved even more disastrous on productivity 
than this. Yet this collective dissent on the part of labour resembled 
only leakages in productivity when compared to the cumulative effects 
of the conflict between the State Government and Private Capital on 
productivity in the economy.
The study underlined/for instance, how several aspects of this 
contest even preceded the major labour strike days. It was observed, to 
illustrate, how soon after Independence, some affluent seemingly 
unaccommodated elements of the capitalist class influenced their 
colleagues in Government to skew national industrial relations policies 
in their favour. This, for instance, led to a deliberate policy o f low 
wages which partly was responsible for labour's subsequent strikes.
Even so, the State Government’s gradual sh ift in industrial 
relations matters from a role of non-interference to one of intensive 
participation in later years demonstrated a policy of political se lf- 
assertion. This change in role, the study argued, was an attempt by the 
State Government to extend its  hold on employed labour beyond the 
Public to the Private sector. This brought into the forefront, once again, 
the role of the contest for control over the economy that was emphasized 
as basic in the discussion. It was underlined that the State Government's 
moves to assert its  influence in the economy were probably made most 
clear by the terms of reference of the various Wage Review commissions.
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The Miller Committee (1947); the Gorsuch Commission (1954); and the 
Mbanefo Commission (1959); all pre-Independence, were 
characteristically confined to the Public sector. Up to this point, the 
State Government's interests were limited. With the 1964 Morgan 
Commission, however, those self-imposed restrictions loosened and the 
State Government, stimulated by the contest, began to reach out for the 
control of the Private sector also. The study interpreted this 
Government action essentially as an attempt to assert itse lf po litica lly 
more positively in the economy. The study, thus, was of the view that 
the Morgan Commission, in particular, was largely political-economic 
motivated. Through it, the State Government sought to expand what 
control of the economy it  could command.
Further, the study argued that Government’s attack on segments of 
the local capitalist class through the subsequent Adebo Commission of 
1970 represented, even more clearly, the sharpening conflict between it  
and these segments. Using the Adebo Commission/the State Government 
had castigated them for "affluence and wasteful expenditure which could 
not be explained on the basis of visible and legitimate means of income." 
The intention was for it  to be seen as a benevolent State Government 
who showed concern for "intolerable suffering at the bottom of the 
scale". Behind this apparent concern, however, the study saw the State 
Government’s interest in winning workers' support. But this was 
patronising; and more importantly, one of the State Government’s tactics 
in its contest w ith Private Capital.
Surprisingly, however, the study found that w ith the Udoji 
Commission (1974), the State Government's battle energy began to flag.
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This, all told, added to the general picture that consistently emerged of 
the State Govenment - one suffering from a great deal of inconsistency. 
However the tardiness it  now showed towards going the fu ll hog of 
socialism (by too much state interference!); the general terms of 
reference of this Commission; and the spates of strike generated by 
preceding Commissions were sufficient reasons to explain the State 
Government's change in position in the 1974 Commission.
But the preference for Wage Commissions to collective bargaining 
generally was not treated in this study as a paternalistic measure on the 
part of the State Government to protect workers in industries where 
wages where low or where no adequate machinery existed for effective 
regulation of conditions of work. It was found in the study that the same 
State Government had deliberately paid low wages to workers. This, 
often, was on the pretext of encouraging economic development or even 
in order to retain the productive capacity of workers as was particularly 
the case in the colonial regime. The study was, thus, le ft w ith  a major 
contradiction when the same State Government that deliberately paid 
low wages to workers in the same breath, turned round to set up 
commissions aimed at improving conditions of work. Partly on the 
strength of this obvious paradox, it  was argued that these commissions 
were partly designed as political instruments by a State Government 
attempting to consolidate its  measure of control in the economy.
Nevertheless, the crux of the matter is that these measures tended 
to produce low ratings in productivity of the economy. The Nigerian 
labour, as is evident in the study, responded to these political schemings 
in a curious way. Rather, than aim at acquiring political control for its
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rank and file , i t  chiefly showed greater concern for the economic 
betterment of its  members. And the relatively substantial quantitative 
increases in wages it  won through strikes made Arrighi and Saul 
describe i t  as a labour aristocracy. Yet insofar as these strikes 
generally tended to distract the workers from effic ient production at 
work they tended to result in lower productivity. Between Independence 
and 1978, for instance, the study computed a total of 2087 of these 
strikes which told on the economy as lost man-days. Moreover, the 
finding that Manufacturing, Construction and Engineering were 
particularly susceptible to these strikes increased the vulnerability of 
productivity in the economy since these form the most v ita l industries in 
any economy.
Notwithstanding this, the study did not conclude that because 
Nigerian workers often went on strike in the most v ita l industries, the 
whole question of low productivity in the economy could be basically 
reduced to the issue of motivating 'the strike-prone workers'; or, 
motivating 'the self-seeking workers'; 'the listless workers who were 
unfamiliar w ith working in an industrial setting'.
Motivating the workers as a basis for confronting low productivity 
in the economy is, of course, crucial. But at the same time, it  is 
epiphenomenal. For, to blame the workers as the prime factors of low 
productivity in the economy implies an over-simplification of a complex 
issue. Besides, the study's discovery that over the years, Nigerian 
workers generally have been supported w ith work incentives and, yet, 
productivity remains relatively low in the economy, would imply that any 
correlations between motivation and productivity probably are
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overshadowed by stronger correlations between other factors.
This chiefly accounted for the search by the present study for 
other elements in the explanation. These, i t  found in the contest 
between the State Government and Private Capital (Indigenous and 
Foreign) which has characterised the economy and has impinged on its  
productivity. Theoretically, of course, the motivation-derived 
explanation w ith its  roots in the need paradigm contained some 
inadequacies. The study was, for instance, concerned w ith the problem 
of defining what the self-actualising need meant for Nigerian workers. 
The teasing question was what such workers were utlimately se lf- 
actualising. Besides, i t  was strongly held that workplaces in Nigeria 
were hardly appropriate venues for satisfying workers’ social needs, at 
least, as a f irs t option. These needs were largely satisfied in the 
primary group. Again, the discovery that even the basic needs 
(dissatisfiers) did not strongly induce motivations for producing highly 
discredited the overall need paradigm as a basis for explicating work 
behaviour in Nigeria. Thus empirically too, the need-based explication 
proved to be only minimally significant, it  was, therefore, necessary to 
depart from the prevalent Path-Goal Hypothesis, w ith its  emphasis on 
uniting the meeting of workers' needs w ith the attainment of 
organisational goals, to a more structurally relevant understanding of 
the problem.
The contest for control over the Nigerian economy became the 
primary focus of this attempt to understand the problem of low 
productivity in Nigeria from a structural approach. This was so for 
compelling reasons. Primarily, this approach provided the crucial bases
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for examining the problem in its inter-relational character. The various 
social formations, in the economy who acting w ith  specific interests 
impinged on the problem, thus, came into the limelight. The study, hence, 
attempted to demonstrate the effects of these largely conflicting 
interests on productivity in the economy. A distinctive feature of this 
approach was the vita l international aspect of the problem which 
previous approaches had not discussed. The interplay of conflicting 
interests between Private Foreign Capital, the State Government, and 
Private Indigenous Capital presented a significant insight to the problem 
that was hitherto generally neglected.
But the principal argument was that in relating w ith these 
powerful formations the State Government's attempts to enhance 
productivity in the economy have generally been blurred and ambiguous. 
Bluntly stated, its  general unclarity on what direction to follow towards 
productivity enhancement or whom to rely on as the principal agents of 
these desired changes in the economy has been primarily responsible for 
low productivity in the economy. On the other hand, influences from 
Private Indigenous Capital (self-serving as principally they have been) 
have chiefly been responsible for blurring the State Government's vision. 
Thus, it  was rendered more unable to cope w ith the various measures 
adopted by Foreign Private Capital. But the la tte r who, therefore, gained 
an edge over the other contestants could only generate changes in the 
economy that are foreign in content and character. They are, thus, 
deprived of v ita l grassroots local props capable- of generating a 
sustained long term enhancement in productivity.
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Beyond bringing these structural aspects of the problem into the 
limelight, the contest that has been emphasised, also created room for 
incorporating essential historical factors into the discussion. Using the 
colonial era as a springboard, the approach examined the problem in a 
historical stage-form that roughly corresponds to the national 
development plan periods. And w ith projections into the period beyond 
1985, the problem was thus examined in its  historical character.
In the end, what emerged was that productivity in the peasant 
colonial economy was relatively high. In the last six years of colonial 
rule, for instance, i t  was recorded that the economy held impressive 
sterling reserves in London. These stood at £243.7m (1954); £263.1m 
(1955); £245m (1956); £243.1m (1957); £231m (1958); and £216.5m 
(1959). These surplusses were generated on an economic productive base 
yet to be marred by the debilitating contest between the State 
Government and Private Capital in subsequent years. It was on the basis 
of such economy that the country attained the staggering £ 165.6m i t  did 
in the export of domestic goods just before Independence. It also 
produced the 4.1 % average growth in GDP the study noted during the same 
period.
However, at the dawn of the contest soon after Independence, 
economic confusion set in to constrain the State Government. In its  
indecision and unclarity of purpose, the Government’s plans for enhancing 
productivity in the economy became affected.
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Furthermore, the contest as the primary basis for an attempt to 
explain the productivity problem in Nigeria allowed a more holistic 
approach to the problem than previously attempted. It drew more factors 
into consideration than a need-based appraoch, for instance, would have. 
It particularly emphasized the issue of control and its relationship to 
social production in the economy. It brought into bearing Indigenous 
Private Capital's attempt to win greater control over the economy by 
instigating measures of economic nationalism which, in the end, back- 
lashed against productivity. This was so because most of the indigenised 
industries showed a greater concern for consumption than for 
investment. Particularly underlined was the preference given to the 
production of beer and cigarettes in the economy. It also brought into 
focus the attempts by Foreign Private Capital to introduce several 
mechanisms as measures of increasing its  control over the economy. 
Some of these measures, the study noted, were not to ta lly helpful to 
productivity enhancement in the economy. Furthermore, i t  brought into 
focus the State Government's apparently ostensible use of the Wage 
Tribunals as instruments of strengthening its  own political position v is- 
a-vis the other contestants in the economy. But perhaps of the most 
crucial importance was that the contest also brought into focus labour's 
organised dissent against the attempt to impose control over i t  by 
employers. This dissent cost the economy millions in lost man-days 
which, in the final analysis, lowered productivity.
Among others, these matters made the contest for control over the 
Nigerian economy more compelling to investigate in analysing Nigeria’s 
low productivity problem than other factors. Previous attempts had
chiefly tried to ground this analysis on the assumed strong relationships 
between Work and Motivation in the economy. Hence the overlabouring of 
the worker motivation factor. These approaches were clearly 
reductionist. Yet i l l  motivation became generally regarded as the prime 
factor responsible for low productivity in Nigeria. The present study has 
questioned this. This, we hope has advanced the discussion of the 
problem to more relevant premises.
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APPENDIX II
Map: The Federation of Nigeria since Independence
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APPENDIX IV 
AN OUTLINE CHRONOLOGY OF NIGERIA 
FROM 1960
1960 October Independence Day
1961 February 11-12 Second Cameroons plebiscite
1962 April 1 First National Development. Plan
inaugurated
May State of Emergency in Western Nigeria
May 13-31 Abortive population census
1963 July 13 Plebiscite in favour of creating a Mid-
West Region
October 1 Nigeria becomes a republic
November 5-8 Population re-count: results in total of
55.67 m illion
1964 May 31 Joint Action Committee of trade unions
calls general strike 
December General Election crisis
1965 October-December Crisis deepens after Western Region
elections.
1966 January 15 Coup d'etat, end of First Republic,
Ironsi regime
May 24 Federal system abolished in favour of
unitary state
July 29 Second coup d'etat, Gowon regime
August 8 Federal system restored
September-October Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference
1967 May 27 Abolition of 4 regions in favour of 12
states
May 30 Eastern Region secedes as ‘Biafra*
July 6 Start of c iv il war
August Secessionist invasion of Mid-West
November OPEC terms effective in petroleum
industry
1968-69 Agbekoya rio ts in Western State
1969 April Report of (Dina) Interim Revenue
Allocation Committee rejected 
November Petroleum Decree foreshadows
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1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
January 12 
April 1
October 1
May
August 6
February 23
January 1 
February 
October
November
September 25
October 1
April 1
July 29
October 1
October 18
January 1
February 13 
April
September
September 14
September-December 
October 1
January
government participation in oil
industry
Surrender of ‘Biafra’, end of civil war 
Second National Development Plan 
inaugurated
Gowon announces 9-point plan for 
return to civilian rule 
Nigerian national Oil Corporation 
established
Final report of (Adebo) Wages and 
Salaries Review Commission 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 
( f irs t indigenisation decree)
Naira currency introduced 
Marketing Boards reform announced 
OPEC quadruples oil prices by January 
1974
Population census results in total of 
79.76 million, but later annulled 
Report of (Udoji) Public Service Review 
Commission
Gowon postpones return to civilian rule 
Congestion acute at Lagos port 
Third National Development Plan 
inaugurated
Third coup d'etat, Murtala Mohammed 
regime
Murtala Mohammed announces 5-stage 
programme for return to civilian rule 
Inaugural meeting of (Rotimi Williams) 
Constitution Drafting Committee 
Wartime inhibitions on right to strike 
maintained in new Trade Disputes 
decree
Murtala Mohammed assassinated, 
Obasanjo regime 
12 States replaced by 19 
Programme of universal primary 
education launched
Constitution Drafting Committee 
reports
Local government reforms 
Appointment of Federal Electoral 
Commission
Second indigenisation decree
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1978
1978
1979
1980
1982
1983
1985
1987
1990
April 1
August 31 
October 6 
January
January
February
March 
April 6-24
June 5
July 14
August 29 
September 21
January
July 7 
July 14
July
July 28 
August 1 
October
June
August
March
December 3
August 27
March 
April 22 '
Marketing boards reconstituted as 
national boards
Elections to Constituent Assembly 
Constituent Assembly begins sittings 
Nigeria begins borrowing heavily in 
eurocurrency market 
Report of (Aboyade) Technical 
Committee on revenue allocation 
Trade union reform, Nigerian Labour 
Congress established 
Land Use decree
Constituent Assembly proceedings held 
up by boycott
Constituent Assembly adjourns sine 
die
Reposting of state m ilitary governors 
to m ilitary duties
Constitution presented to Head of State
Constitution promulgated, ban on
political parties lifted
Further rapid increases in oil prices
begin following Iranian.revolution
Elections to the Senate
Elections to the House of
Representatives
Elections to the State Houses of 
Assembly
Elections of state governors 
Presidential election 
Withdrawal of the m ilitary from 
government, installation of Shehu 
Shagari as President, inauguration of 
Second Republic
Report of the (Okigbo) Commission on 
Revenue Allocation
Report of the (Irikefe) Tribunal of 
Inquiry into Crude Oil SAles 
Economic Stablisation Programme 
Fourth coup d’etat, Mohammed Buhari 
regime
Fifth coup d’etat, Ibrahim Babangida 
regime
Structural Adjustment Programme 
Sixth (attempted) coup d'etat, Major 
Orka.
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